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 Abstract 
This thesis addresses the nature and role of contemplation in the early-thirteenth-century 
English Ancrene Wisse (AW). Previous scholarship on the text has debated whether or not it 
ought to be described as ‘mystical,’ and has generally focused on language and imagery that 
the AW shares with more conventionally recognised mystical literature. This thesis takes a 
different approach by focusing on the role of the conscience within the text. The AW 
prescribes a rule of life that governs the heart. The AW author defines a pure heart as a clean 
conscience. An attempt to understand the contemplative life in the AW must first establish 
what the author means by the conscience; applications of modern and medieval scholastic 
understandings of the conscience to the AW are anachronistic. This thesis explores the AW 
author’s handling of conscience within the context of twelfth-century monastic thought, as 
expressed in three treatises on conscience which have hitherto received minimal scholarly 
attention: Peter of Celle’s De Conscientia, and the pseudo-Bernardine Tractatus de 
Conscientia and De Interiori Domo. In these texts, conscience is neither a moral guide nor a 
record of personal conduct. Their authors synthesise a new understanding of the conscience 
from different elements within classical, biblical, and patristic thought. This thesis argues that 
this distinctive approach to conscience gave rise to a different form of contemplative thought 
and practice that lies outside the mainstream development of medieval mysticism. Rather 
than utilising tripartite schemas of spiritual ascent based on the stages of purgation, 
illumination, and union, the conscience texts base their view of union with God on the model 
of moral reasoning. This thesis argues that the AW participates in this school of thought on 
conscience and contemplation, rather than more conventionally recognised traditions of 
medieval mystical literature.  
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Note on Texts and Translations 
 
 
All citations from the Ancrene Wisse are, unless otherwise noted, from Bella 
Millett, ed., Ancrene Wisse: A Corrected Edition of the Text in Cambridge, Corpus Christi 
College, MS 402, with Variants from Other Manuscripts, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). References to the AW are given parenthetically in text as section (P for the 
Preface, Roman numerals for subsequent sections), and line numbers from Millett’s edition. 
Citations from Peter of Celle’s De Conscientia are, unless otherwise noted, from 
Jean Leclercq, OSB, La Spiritualité De Pierre De Celle, vol. 7, Etudes De Theologie Et 
D’Histoire De La Spiritualité (Paris: J. Vrin, 1946). I have also drawn upon Hugh Feiss’s 
emendations to the text as found in Peter of Celle, Selected Works, trans. Hugh Feiss 
(Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1987), 38-40. References to De Conscientia are given 
parenthetically in text as page and line numbers from Leclercq’s edition. 
Citations from the Tractatus de Conscientia and De Interiori Domo are from the 
text included in volume 184 of Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., Patrologiae Cursus Completus: 
Series Latina (Paris: Migne, 1841-64). References are given parenthetically in text to the 
paragraph numbers as they appear in the Patrologia Latina. I have also included the same 
paragraph numbers in my translations of the texts, found in the appendices to this thesis. 
Direct citations from the texts are accompanied by footnotes which also include the volume 
and column number from the Patrologia Latina. 
Biblical citations, unless otherwise noted, are from Robert Weber and Roger 
Gryson, eds., Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem, 5th ed. (Nördlingen: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft, 2007).  I have accordingly followed the Vulgate’s numbering of the 
Psalms. 
Translations from Latin and early Middle English are provided in the footnotes. 
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. 
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Introduction 
 
1. The Problem 
 
The Ancrene Wisse (AW) provides two rules of life for women living the rigorous, 
solitary life of anchoritism.1 One rule is inner, and the other outer.2 Both consist of moral and 
ethical prescriptions with a strong emphasis on resisting temptation and making a good 
confession. The prescriptions come in a variety of forms including exempla, allegories, and 
etymologies. The author’s creative and imaginative rhetoric configures the anchoress as a 
bride of Christ and sporadically alludes to extraordinary spiritual experience. The text 
describes spiritual flight, an inner vision that develops proportionately to an outer blindness, 
the secret embraces of Christ that simultaneously take place out of the body and in the bower 
of the heart, and a unique closeness with God that only anchoritism can foster. The tension 
between the two elements in the AW – the ethical and the experiential – has generated 
discussion and debate amongst scholars for almost as long as the text has been studied.3 The 
AW is a work of religious guidance, the first of its kind in English, written for women living 
as anchoresses sometime during the 1220s. What are the aims and goals of such a life? Does 
its author intend his readers to have spiritual, mystical experiences? If so, why are references 
to spiritual experience only interspersed amongst moral teaching? If not, why does the text 
allude to such experiences at all? 
Approaches to the AW’s spirituality are typically framed within the question of 
whether or not the text is mystical. Does the text suggest that its reader might or will attain 
                                               
1 The title, Ancrene Wisse, roughly translates into Modern English as “Guide for Anchoresses.” The title is 
commonly used both with and without the definite article. I have followed those who retain the definite article in 
the same way that the definite article is used with reference to the titles of other works such as the Regula of 
Benedict or the Confessiones of Augustine. 
2 For discussion of what the term rule means with regards to the AW, see Bella Millett, “The Genre of Ancrene 
Wisse,” in A Companion to “Ancrene Wisse,” ed. Yoko Wada (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2003) and Bella Millett, 
“Can There Be Such a Thing as an ‘Anchoritic Rule’?,” in Anchoritism in the Middle Ages: Texts and 
Traditions, ed. Catherine Innes-Parker and Naoë Kukita Yoshikawa, Religion and Culture in the Middle Ages 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2013). 
3 See the Literature Review (pp. 33-51 of this thesis) for a more detailed account of scholarly debates about the 
spirituality of the AW. 
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some form of extraordinary spiritual experience? Some scholars, beginning with Nicholas 
Watson and most recently represented by Mary Agnes Edsall, maintain that the AW is 
mystical but that its mysticism deviates from what would traditionally be recognised as 
medieval mysticism. The other, more generally accepted, view is that the AW is not a 
mystical text, because its allusions and references to mysticism are not part of any spiritual 
trajectory or hierarchical ascent. There is no explicit definition or discussion of spiritual 
experience or the role it plays, and references to it are scattered. 
Both sides in the debate are, ironically enough, undermined by the very presence 
of the mystical elements they discuss. Watson and his successors maintain that the AW’s 
mysticism is not conventional medieval mysticism. Mari Hughes-Edwards counters Watson, 
writing that “evidently [the] earlier medieval guides echo wider medieval contemporary 
negotiations of contemplative union.”4 The AW alludes to conventional forms of mysticism, 
and thus the author clearly has them in mind. He simply does not regard them as particularly 
relevant or important.  The problem for those who deny that the AW is a mystical text is, once 
again, that the text does contain allusions to mysticism. The author may not emphasise them, 
but they are there. Thus, questions about the nature and role of spiritual experience in the AW 
continue to appear in work on the text. 
The classification of the AW as ‘mystical’ is of minimal value in itself since, as 
Watson points out, it is largely a matter of semantics.5 Whether or not the AW is a mystical 
text will depend largely on how mysticism is defined. The classification is only significant 
insofar as it imports assumptions and expectations about the text. The expectation is that 
mystical texts will be concerned with the inner life, orienting the reader towards union with 
God or transcendence of ordinary experience. Non-mystical texts, by contrast, are 
                                               
4 Mari Hughes-Edwards, Reading Medieval Anchoritism: Ideology and Spiritual Practices (Cardiff: University 
of Wales Press, 2012), 92. 
5 Nicholas Watson, “The Methods and Objectives of Thirteenth-Century Anchoritic Devotion,” in The Medieval 
Mystical Tradition in England Exeter Symposium IV: Papers Read at Dartington Hall, ed. Marion Glasscoe 
(Woodbridge: D.S. Brewer, 1987), 134. 
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earthbound. They are more likely to provide moral prescriptions and restrictions as ends in 
themselves. 
The AW states that its purpose is the attainment of a pure heart or a good 
conscience. The spirituality of the AW is therefore best understood within the context of 
conscience literature from its time. It is necessary to take into account what the AW author’s 
contemporaries and near contemporaries wrote about conscience in order to properly 
understand how he conceptualises the conscience that he makes the basis of the spiritual life. 
Bella Millett has studied the AW in relation to continental confession literature.6 None of the 
previous scholarship, however, has read the AW in the context of the conscience literature of 
its time.  
This thesis argues that the AW draws upon a distinctive, contemplative conception 
of conscience that appears in twelfth-century monastic literature. Twelfth-century monastic 
writers transform the conscience from God’s law within the soul into God’s presence within 
the soul. They model contemplative union with God on the operation of the traditional moral 
conscience rather than on paradigms of spiritual purgation, illumination, and union. The 
moral conscience traditionally applied God’s law to daily life. The contemplative conscience, 
by contrast, applies God’s presence to daily life. 
This thesis thus argues that Bernard McGinn’s more recent analysis of mystical 
texts – what McGinn terms ‘mystical consciousness’ – is a more useful tool for reading the 
spirituality of conscience literature than traditionally defined mysticism. Conscience 
literature, including the AW, does intend for its readers to attain extraordinary spiritual 
experiences, but these experiences cannot be enjoyed independently of the reader’s ordinary 
life and practice. The extraordinary and the ordinary are fused together. 
                                               
6 Bella Millett, “Ancrene Wisse and the Conditions of Confession,” English Studies 80, no. 3 (1999): 193. 
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2. The Ancrene Wisse 
 
Six of the AW’s eight parts are devoted to the inner rule, the rule that governs the 
heart. Not all religious are obligated to follow the same outer rule, but all religious must 
“halden a riwle onont purte of heorte” (P.40).7  The inner rule “quantum ad puritatem cordis, 
circa quam uersatur tota religio” (P.38-39).8 The rule’s goal is to cleanse and purify the heart 
because “[r]ihtin hire and smeðin hire is of euch religiun ant of euch ordre þe god ant al þe 
strengðe” (P.43-44).9 An accurate understanding of what the author means by the heart is 
therefore vital, if the AW and its spirituality are to be understood at all. 
The author provides a definition of the heart when he introduces the two rules.  
Purity is explained as “cleane ant schir inwit” (P.40-41).10 The definition, however, shifts 
rather than resolves the problem. Now inwit, conscience, is in need of definition. 
Mary Baldwin illustrates the difficulties in understanding the AW’s conscience 
and heart when she points to the author's dual emphases on conscience and charity.  The 
“orientation of the inner rule raises the question of the meaning of charity in AW as a whole. 
Conscience receives a greater emphasis in the Introduction than love, and the author’s 
conception of the meaning and role of charity as the ruling force in the interior life is 
ambiguous as a result.”11 Baldwin’s reading has had an especially significant impact on 
subsequent scholarship on the AW. Baldwin’s project attempts to distil the unique doctrinal 
content of the AW by analysing the author’s reappropriation of his sources. Her unpublished 
doctoral thesis remains one of the most extensive and thorough source analyses of the text, 
and is frequently used and referenced in editions of the AW to the present. Most scholarship 
has consequently engaged the AW author’s appropriation of sources through the lens of 
                                               
7 “… keep a rule touching purity of heart.” 
8 “… pertains to purity of heart, about which all religion revolves.” 
9 “… to make the heart right and smooth is the good and all the strength of every religious order.” 
10 “… a clean and bright conscience.” 
11 Mary Baldwin, “Ancrene Wisse and its Background in the Christian Tradition of Religious Instruction and 
Spirituality” (PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1974), 33. 
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Baldwin’s conclusions. This thesis begins from the point of Baldwin’s argument that the 
spirituality of the AW is predominantly characterised by its emphasis on conscience at the 
expense of charity. This thesis argues, contrary to Baldwin, that conscience (and not charity) 
needs redefinition. 
The AW author states that purity of heart is a “cleane ant schir inwit” (P.40-41), 
equating heorte and inwit. The latter of these two Middle English words is usually understood 
to mean ‘conscience.’ The AW itself supports this reading. The author first uses inwit to 
translate the biblical consciencia (P.18). The second appearance of inwit in the text is 
similarly accompanied by the Latin gloss, consciencia (P.41), most likely to prevent 
subsequent scribal confusion of inwit and inwið.12 Baldwin observes “nothing especially 
unusual about the identification of pure heart and good conscience.”13 She traces it to the 
gospel commentaries and homilies of Jerome and Augustine, particularly to their treatments 
of the Beatitudes.14  She contrasts, however, the author's initial exaltation of the inner rule as 
“circa quam uersatur tota religio” (P.39) with the inner rule's stated object of a clean, sin-free 
conscience. She concludes that it is “a very limited conception of the rule of purity of heart 
that is the virtue and strength of every religious order and the core of the religious life,” 
especially compared with other treatments of eremitic spirituality.15  If she is correct in 
identifying inwit with something resembling a modern, popular understanding of conscience, 
then her observation is sound. The AW’s conception of the religious life would indeed be 
limited. 
In order to assess the validity of Baldwin's observation – and unequivocally use 
‘conscience’ to understand inwit – we need to establish the author's understanding of the 
words. Inwit, conscience, and heorte in the text need to be defined on their own terms and 
                                               
12 Bella Millett, ed., Ancrene Wisse: A Corrected Edition of the Text in Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 
402, with Variants from Other Manuscripts, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 6. 
13 Baldwin, “Ancrene Wisse and its Background,” 27-28. 
14 Baldwin, “Ancrene Wisse and its Background,” 27. 
15 Baldwin, “Ancrene Wisse and its Background,” 27-28. 
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distinguished from modern definitions of conscience. Otherwise we risk importing and 
imposing an anachronistic understanding on the text’s discourse on the inner life. 
3. The Modern Conscience 
 
The Modern English ‘conscience’ encompasses a variety of meanings, 
deceptively collapsed together under a single label. The Oxford English Dictionary lists at 
least four distinct meanings in the space of a single sense. Conscience 1.a. is “[t]he internal 
acknowledgement or recognition of the moral quality of one's motives and actions; the sense 
of right and wrong as regards things for which one is responsible; the faculty or principle 
which judges the moral quality of one's actions or motives. Now also in weakened sense: 
one's awareness of what is advisable or acceptable for one to do.”16 
The modern meanings of ‘conscience’ are, however, divisible into two simpler, 
more general, categories. William Spohn, writing as a theologian, suggests the terms ‘anterior 
conscience’ – “all the searching and deliberation that leads up to a moral decision” – and 
‘subsequent conscience’ – “that reflects back on decisions we have made.”17  Spohn concedes 
the ambiguity surrounding conscience, that it “eludes precise definition.”18 He attempts some 
resolution by concentrating on the anterior conscience, describing it as “a human process of 
assessment and judgement and not the authoritative voice of God.”19 
Today, William Lyons notes, “discussion of the concept of conscience in 
philosophy has become rather rare.”20 Contemporary philosophical discussions of conscience, 
when they occur at all, typically focus on the anterior conscience, corresponding to the third 
of the OED’s definitions, “the faculty or principle which judges the moral quality of one's 
                                               
16 OED Online. September 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/view/Entry/39460?result=1&rskey=CA9MeF& s.v. 
‘conscience.’ 
17 William C. Spohn, “Conscience and Moral Development,” Theological Studies 61, 1 (2000): 122. 
18 Spohn, “Conscience and Moral Development,” 122. 
19 Spohn, “Conscience and Moral Development,” 122. 
20 William Lyons, “Conscience – An Essay in Moral Psychology,” Philosophy 84 (2009): 477. 
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actions or motives.” Lyons argues for the resuscitation of conscience in analytic philosophy 
and attempts to define it in contradistinction to both theological and psychoanalytic 
understandings as “the development internally of a deep commitment to moral principles of 
an objective and ‘other-regarding’ sort that we ourselves have judiciously generated.”21  His 
philosophical definition resembles Spohn's theological one, insofar as both regard conscience 
as the end-product of a process involving other mental activities. 
Paul Thagard and Tracy Finn offer a slightly different definition that encompasses 
both the anterior and subsequent conscience. They define conscience as “the internal sense of 
moral goodness or badness of one’s own actual or imagined conduct. The products of 
conscience are moral intuitions, which are the feelings that some acts are right and others are 
wrong.”22 They proceed to argue that “conscience is not a special mental faculty, but rather a 
neural process that involves both cognitive appraisal and somatic perception.”23 Their 
definition largely accounts for the sense of moral satisfaction or guilt experienced after the 
performance of action. The reference to imagined conduct, however, enables their definition 
to also include conscience as a future-oriented moral guide, and not merely an emotional 
reaction to past conduct. 
These discussions are modern. They represent modern understandings and usages 
of the term ‘conscience.’ Millett and Dance define the Middle English inwit, in their glossary 
to the AW, simply as “conscience.”24 Their gloss risks invoking modern rather than medieval 
meanings.  
4. The Medieval Conscience 
 
                                               
21 Lyons, “Conscience,” 488. 
22 Paul Thagard and Tracy Finn, “What is Moral Intuition?” in  Morality and the Emotions, ed. Carla Bagnoli 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 150. 
23 Thagard and Finn, “Moral Intuition,” 152. 
24 Millett, Ancrene Wisse, 2:397. 
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a. Scholasticism 
 
Timothy Potts lamented in 1980 that “[c]onscience has been much neglected by 
philosophers.”25 He attempted to rectify the situation and “to create interest in medieval 
philosophy” with the publication of his book, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy.26 Thirteen 
years later, however, Douglas Langston observed that Potts’ “work has … failed to spark the 
interest he clearly hoped it would.”27 The situation is not very different today. There are few 
scholarly treatments of the medieval conscience. Those that exist – like those of Potts and 
Langston – typically focus on conscience in scholastic philosophy. The studies are usually 
less interested in history and more interested in using medieval philosophy “as an aid to 
thought about contemporary philosophical problems.”28 The scholastics are favoured because 
their works are rigorously systematic and therefore more fruitful to this end.  
Modern philosophers find a kindred spirit in the scholastics with whom they share 
a focus on moral evaluation. Both modern and medieval scholastic discussions treat 
conscience as a moral evaluation of conduct in the past, future or both. Conscience, in each 
case, compares behaviour with a moral standard.  It is the instrument for moral evaluation of 
one’s past actions and the guide for future actions. Scholastic theories differed significantly 
from their modern counterparts by firmly anchoring conscience in God as the source of moral 
precepts. 
Scholastic philosophers were predominantly occupied with the question of how 
the comparison between conduct and the moral standard works. The relationship between 
divine law and human judgement was framed within the division between conscience and 
synderesis. Discussions of the two emerged during the thirteenth century, within the wider 
                                               
25 Timothy C. Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 1. 
26 Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, ix. 
27 Douglas Langston, “The Spark of Conscience: Bonaventure’s View of Conscience and Synderesis,” 
Franciscan Studies 53 (1993): 79. 
28 Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, ix. 
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context of debates between intellectualist and voluntarist schools of thought that disputed the 
role of reason and will in human action.29 The treatises on conscience began in commentaries 
on Peter Lombard’s Sententiarum Libri Quatuor, as attempts to solve Peter’s question of 
“how the will can be bad.”30 Martina Stepinova summarises the problem as how a “person 
acts against his knowledge of what is best for him,” the debate that “is today known and 
carried on under the name ‘weakness of the will.’”31 The distinction between conscience and 
synderesis allowed for two levels of moral knowledge. Both need to operate properly for 
moral knowledge to be put into practice. If either conscience or synderesis fails to perform its 
duty, then moral decisions will be unsound. It is therefore possible that a person may retain 
some knowledge of what is in their best moral interests, and yet act differently.  
Conscience and synderesis are interrelated, although the precise nature of their 
relationship varies depending on the individual writer. Thomas Aquinas held synderesis to be 
the basis of human knowledge of divine law, which Stepinova describes as “the most 
common criterion which is the foundation of all other evaluations of things.”32 Synderesis 
belongs to the reason; conscience emerges as the application of synderesis to individual 
situations.33 Aquinas’ position is thus broadly construed as intellectualist in contrast to the 
view of his contemporary and sometime colleague at the University of Paris, Bonaventure of 
Bagnoregio. 
Bonaventure maintains in his commentary on the Sententiarum that conscience is 
essentially rational.34 Douglas Langston notes that Bonaventure’s conscience is itself 
                                               
29 Tobias Hoffmann, “Intellectualism and Voluntarism,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. 
Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 414. 
30 Timothy C. Potts, “Conscience,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the 
Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony 
Kenny, Jan Pinborg, and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 687. See Peter 
Lombard, Sententiarum Libri Quatuor II.39, (PL 192:745). 
31 Martina Stepinova OP, “Aquinas’ Solution of Aristotle’s Incontinent Man and Augustine’s Two Wills,” New 
Blackfriars 92 (2009): 322. 
32 Stepinova, “Aquinas’ Solution,” 332. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia. Q79. A12. 
33 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia. Q79. A.13. 
34 Langston, “Spark of Conscience,” 79. See Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros 
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subdivided into two parts. The first part is “a light on a par with the power of the intellect to 
discover the truth of first principles of theoretical reason,” but its domain is practical rather 
than theoretical.35 It corresponds more or less with Aquinas’ synderesis. Langston terms the 
second part of Bonaventure's conscience “applied conscience.”36 The label is essentially self-
explanatory. It is analogous to Aquinas’ conscience, although they differ in that 
Bonaventure’s applied conscience is not an event or action but a part of the faculty of the 
conscience that operates within the reason. Nevertheless, Langston points out, it is the sphere 
of moral growth and it is therefore necessary “to educate one’s self properly so that the 
applied conscience can be brought into conformity with … authority.”37 
Bonaventure’s synderesis further distinguishes him from Aquinas. According to 
Bonaventure, synderesis is the innate affection that renders obedience to conscience 
desirable. It “is the desire to do good and avoid evil” by which “we are directed to the good 
found in objects.”38 Thus “conscience works with the mediation of synderesis.”39 The 
affectivity of synderesis explains the positive and negative emotional responses of subsequent 
conscience, since “failure to follow the principles of conscience effectively thwarts the desire 
for good, and the frustration of this desire leads to the emotions of guilt and remorse.”40 
Aquinas and Bonaventure stand here as illustrations of two different scholastic 
approaches to the nature and operation of conscience. Their differences highlight two 
important features of the scholastic conscience: firstly, its connectedness to God as a source 
of moral awareness, and secondly, its fallible application in individual situations. Moral 
operations as a whole involve both knowledge and action. They pertain, therefore, to the 
rational and affective parts of the person.  
                                                                                                                                                  
Sententiarum: In Secundum Librum Sententiarum XXXIX. A. 1. Q. 1. 
35 Langston, “Spark of Conscience,” 80. 
36 Langston, “Spark of Conscience,” 81. 
37 Langston, “Spark of Conscience,” 83. 
38 Langston, “Spark of Conscience,” 86. 
39 Langston, “Spark of Conscience,” 86. 
40 Langston, “Spark of Conscience,” 87. 
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The majority of scholarly attention to the medieval conscience has focused on 
scholasticism because, as noted above, modern approaches to conscience are developments of 
and reactions against scholasticism. Scholasticism is a stage within the development of 
today’s mainstream theories of conscience. The scholastic debates, however, postdate the AW 
by several decades. It is wholly anachronistic to read the modern conscience back into the 
AW’s inwit. 
b. Conscience and Inwit 
 
The Middle English word conscience is a problematic term. C. S. Lewis notes 
that its appearance in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight “must mean ‘mind’ or ‘thought.’”41 
Chaucer’s usage differs, and “some such meaning as ‘tenderness’ (vulnerability, even 
excessive sensibility) seems to be required.”42 Chaucer describes the Prioress’s “conscience 
and tendre herte” in relation to her emotional sensitivity: “She was so charitable and so pitous 
| She wolde wepe, if that she saugh a mous | Kaught in a trappe, if it were deed or bledde.”43 
Michael Calabrese thus argues that Chaucer’s use of conscience in his description of the 
Prioress “produces a merciless pathos, at the centre of which is the unrelenting image of an 
anxious widow.”44 The Prioress utilises an “emotionalism that charms but also affronts” in 
order to evoke a response of “sorrow and hatred” in her fellow pilgrims.45 Conscience, then, 
is the sort of emotion that can be aroused by rhetoric and, once aroused, overshadows other 
considerations. 
R. D. Eaton surveys the glossaries to various editions of Chaucer’s works and 
                                               
41 C. S. Lewis, Studies in Words, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 183. The word 
‘concience’ appears in stanza 48 of the poem. J. R. R. Tolkien and E. V. Gordon, eds., Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 33, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=cme;cc=cme;view=toc;idno=Gawain. 
42 Lewis, Studies in Words, 183. 
43 Chaucer, “The General Prologue,” Canterbury Tales, fragment 1, line 150; Chaucer, fragment 1, ll. 143-45. 
44 Michael Calabrese, “Performing the Prioress: ‘Conscience’ and Responsibility in Studies of Chaucer’s 
Prioress’s Tale,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 44, no. 1 (2002): 77. 
45 Calabrese, “Performing the Prioress,” 77. 
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finds the reading of the Prioress’s conscience as ‘sensibility’ dominant and “active since the 
middle of the twentieth century.”46 Eaton himself disagrees, and argues that Chaucer intends a 
moral sense of the term conscience: “[the Prioress’s] display of emotion is evidence not of 
her conscience, but rather, of her charite and pite that in her eyes justify her claim to … 
conscience.”47 Even when conscience describes feelings of anxiety elsewhere in Middle 
English literature, “this is the anxiety we feel when called upon to appear before a stern 
judge.”48 Thus Eaton stresses conscience as morally prescriptive, but allows that it has 
affective properties such as fear and moral anxiety. The uses of conscience in Chaucer and the 
Gawain-poet are, however, considerably later than the AW. 
Conscience would later come to mean the soul or spirit as a whole but, according 
to the Middle English Dictionary, not before 1382 when it appears in the Wycliffite Bible.49 
Inwit, by contrast, had a similar meaning much earlier. The MED defines an earlier usage of 
inwit as “[m]ind, reason, intellect, comprehension, understanding,” but this too postdates the 
AW by almost eighty years. It first appeared around 1300, according to the MED, in the South 
English Legendary’s life of St Brendan. An even later usage of inwit refers to “[t]he 
collection of inner faculties” or “one of five inner faculties” more generally. This sense does 
not appear before the late 1370s. The final and only remaining definition offered by the MED 
is “Inward awareness of right or wrong, conscience.” Its earliest cited appearance is the AW.   
The Medieval Latin conscientia yields a similar set of dictionary definitions. The 
first two meanings given by the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources, “shared 
or mutual knowledge” and “complicity in guilt” are clearly irrelevant here.50 The second set 
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of definitions is, however, possible: “consciousness, (inner) awareness,” “knowledge, 
cognisance,” and “conscious choice, deliberate decision.”51 Finally, conscientia could refer to 
“conscience, sense of right and wrong,” or a “point of conscience, scruple.”52 
The second definition, “consciousness, (inner) awareness” is a direct and literal 
equivalent of the English inwit, understood as a compound of in and wit. The MED does not 
list this as a possible definition of inwit but it should not be excluded as a possibility in the 
AW, since the AW contains the earliest extant appearance of inwit. The “cleane ant schir 
inwit” is, after all, “wiðuten weote of sunne” (P.40-41). It must, therefore, necessarily have 
the capacity to be aware of sin. There is no evidence thus far, however, that its awareness is 
exclusively limited to sin. 
Eaton argues that inwit is not identical to the conscience that eventually replaced 
it. Conscience “took on meanings, connotations and associations that inwit had never had or 
would have.”53 The transition between the two occurred “when English culture adopted, next 
to the traditional idea of conscience, a new and more complex one.”54 Inwit, according to 
Eaton, represents the traditional conscience, and conscience represents the newer idea. 
Eaton’s main source for the meaning of inwit is the AW. The definition he arrives at is 
insightful, but limited since he only considers instances of either inwit or conscience in the 
text. A more comprehensive definition of the AW author’s inwit would require an analysis of 
the heart in the text since, as indicated above, the AW author equates heart and inwit. 
Eaton argues that inwit in the AW is “self-consciousness or moral introspection” 
based on the author’s description of it as “cleane ant schir.”55 Inwit is “a faculty of self-
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awareness and not a moral state or condition.”56 It follows, in Eaton’s argument, that “[a] 
pure conscience is … not a repository of spiritual history which is free of stain or corruption, 
but a self-consciousness which is aware of no instance of sin.”57 Eaton’s definition does not 
account for the AW author’s description of the pure heart as “efne ant smeðe wiðute cnost ant 
dolc of woh inwit” (P.13-14). 
The AW author strongly associates inwit with moral awareness at this early stage 
of the text. Its specified “weote” is “of sunne” or, at least, unconfessed sin (P.41-42). Its 
relationship with sin, however, goes deeper than mere awareness or introspection. The Inner 
Rule “makeð efne ant smeðe wiðute cnost ant dolc of woh inwit” (P.13-14). Sin thus exists 
within the inwit insofar as it has the power to change inwit, to make it “woh.”  The condition 
of the inwit is determined by one’s spiritual history. It is therefore misleading to draw too 
sharp a distinction between spiritual history and inwit as a faculty. Inwit is the means by 
which spiritual history interacts with life in the present. 
Eaton implicitly affirms as much when he notes that “[b]ecause of [the AW 
author’s] great respect for the moral integrity of the women … his first concern is that they 
should not be too severe on themselves” and “especially in women of [their] moral calibre …, 
the conscience fuels pride by its very relentlessness.”58 The nature of the conscience, or inwit, 
is dependent upon the ‘moral calibre’ of the person. Eaton maintains that inwit “is a purely 
human faculty” and takes the AW’s precautions against scrupulosity to indicate that “the 
influence of conscience can be counter-productive and even dangerous.”59 His observation 
here is certainly valid. Inwit, then, grows from rather than transcends the person. Spiritual 
history has a part to play in its growth. The condition of inwit reflects the condition of the 
person. It “functioned like a moral immune system, with much the same strengths and 
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weaknesses that we understand our bodily immune systems to have.”60 It follows that “[a] 
conscience out of control, like a bodily immune system out of control, could do more damage 
than the infections it sought to destroy.”61  
Eaton uses the immune system for purely illustrative purposes. He does not make 
any anachronistic suggestions that the AW author actually bases his understanding of 
conscience on the immune system. The illustration nevertheless accentuates the historical 
discrepancy. A modern writer could easily model an understanding of conscience on the 
immune system. A medieval writer could not. The problem highlights a fundamental flaw in 
Eaton’s approach. He posits that the inwit of the AW reflects an older English tradition of 
conscience.62 He also follows the view that the AW author coins the term inwit.63 If there 
were a specifically English tradition of conscience available to the AW author, it would be 
highly unlikely that he would need to coin a new word for it. What resources, English or 
Latin, did an early-thirteenth-century author have to formulate such an idea of the 
conscience? How would he think about conscience? What role could it play in devotional 
writing? 
The philosophical sources for later medieval thought on conscience are readily 
identifiable, albeit infrequently studied. Eaton uses scholastic writing on conscience to 
support his reading of conscience in Chaucer. He does not, however, consider the 
philosophical and theological writing on conscience contemporary with the AW.  
Internal evidence within the AW reveals a more expansive understanding of 
conscience. Purity of heart is also love of God. The author develops this second sense 
throughout the work, but especially in Part VII. Baldwin reads the AW against John Cassian's 
Collationes and argues that a clean conscience takes precedence in the AW, even if love of 
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God follows it as a result. Love potentially brings with it the joy of the Holy Spirit.64 Baldwin 
nonetheless follows Geoffrey Shepherd's position that the AW only refers to this kind of 
spiritual joy cryptically and fleetingly in contrast to Cassian's overt statement of it as a goal 
of the spiritual life.65 Baldwin’s distinction between love and conscience, once again, reflects 
a scholastic or modern understanding of the conscience. 
c. Outside Scholasticism 
 
Non-scholastic conscience texts do not always distinguish between conscience 
and synderesis. Writers prior to the 1230s, as G. R. Evans observes of Bernard of Clairvaux, 
“[lack] the materials, and the terminology, to advance far along the road of the discussion of 
synderesis of the thirteenth century.”66 The earlier conscience could, nevertheless, involve 
both the rational and affective parts of the person.  
Work on conscience in the twelfth century has tended to focus on the subsequent 
conscience. Thus Evans notes that Bernard’s conscience “has some independence of the mind 
in which it works and can see its conduct clearly and critically.”67 It “gnaws at us within, like 
a worm,” but “[i]f we behave rightly, conscience is silent.”68 Bernard’s conscience is more 
concerned with past than future conduct. Peter Godman similarly addresses the subsequent 
conscience when he explores the phenomenon of monks feigning faults in confession in order 
to paradoxically appear holier. Godman describes such a fabricated confession as a “fictio 
constructed by a spiritual sophist who, through his pyrotechnics of auto-execration, aims at a 
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pre-eminence of humility.”69 The monk lies about what his subsequent conscience contains.  
These approaches restrict their focus to only one of the multiple facets of the twelfth-century 
conscience. 
Other scholars have focused on the conscience in later devotional writing. Alison 
Renshaw argues that the conscience in fourteenth-century English confessional manuals is 
“promised as the clearest way to God. It is a channelling and apparently restricting, focusing 
force, that at the same time affords man the ultimate freedom in his potential to escape from 
sin.”70 She describes the conscience in texts like the Ayenbite of Inwyt and the Pricke of 
Conscience as “a residue of the ideal relationship once shared by man and God.”71 The 
torments of a guilty conscience could be transfigured into spiritual joys as the person learned 
to heed the reproaches of conscience and use them to harmonise conduct with divine law: 
“The sinner … can in fact find himself working with rather than against his desires, when his 
desires are reconciled or coincide with his higher reason.”72 There is, then, a relationship 
between God and the conscience inasmuch as “[t]he conscience is God’s agent on the 
inside.”73 Nevertheless, the conscience “is an individual drive sending man back to 
communion with God” and not the actual presence of God within the person.74 In this, the 
manualists participate in a much older tradition of thought on conscience. 
The idea of the conscience dates back to classical antiquity. The Latin conscientia 
was a literal translation of the Greek suneidesis. Both terms could mean “either the state (or 
act) of sharing knowledge or else simply knowledge, awareness, apprehension – even 
something like mind or thought.”75 Moral applications of the term are more common in Latin 
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than in Greek, particularly in the writings of Cicero and Seneca.76 Linda Hogan notes, 
however, that “[t]he relative absence of the term … should not suggest a lack of ways of 
speaking of … moral self-awareness.”77 Words referring to wisdom and prudence “carry with 
them the sense of ethical self-consciousness.”78 The classical moral conscience was the 
subsequent conscience. Eric D’Arcy notes that “[a]fter an action is performed conscience 
passes moral judgement upon it.”79 The conscience then “rewards or punishes a man in a 
peculiarly interior and effective way.”80 Lewis notes that the classical conscience “bears 
witness to the fact … that we committed a murder. It does not tell us that murder is wrong; 
we are supposed to know that in some other way.”81 He thus maintains that “[t]o talk of 
‘obeying’ or ‘disobeying’ your conscience … would be nonsensical” since “I cannot by any 
present action ‘obey’ my future privity to the fact of having done that action itself.”82 
Conscience had not yet “passed from the witness-box to the bench and … to the legislator’s 
throne.”83 Nevertheless, Hogan notes that anticipation of the torment wrought by a guilty 
conscience could serve as motivation to behave ethically, even if the conscience did not 
specify what ethical behaviour involved.84 
There is some debate about when the conscience became the anterior conscience, 
the inner lawgiver. D’Arcy traces the transformation of the term to the New Testament. He 
notes that the Greek word “occurs twenty-three times in [Paul’s] epistles, and in fifteen of 
these it has the meaning and function it had in the pagan writers,” but “[i]n eight places … we 
encounter something quite new.”85 Hogan disagrees. She argues that “[a]ll one can 
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confidently say is that Paul prepared the ground for and occasionally hinted at a guiding role 
for conscience.”86 Lewis notes, however, that “[w]hat St Paul really meant is a question for 
theologians,” and that “what he would possibly, or probably, or almost inevitably, be taken to 
mean by succeeding generations” is much more significant for the history of the idea of 
conscience.87 Eric Jager argues that Paul was highly influential in that he “anticipates the 
frequent conjunction of heart and conscience in later writers, especially under the metaphor 
of a ‘book’ containing both a record of divine ideals and an account of individual sins.”88 
Paul thus bequeathed to future writers a conscience synthesised from both the classical 
conscience and the Old Testament’s heart.  
The anterior conscience began to flourish during the patristic period.89 Jerome’s 
brief discussion of the conscience in his commentary on Ezekiel 1:5-6 is the most frequently 
cited patristic conscience text in modern scholarship. Jerome notes that some, “qui 
philosophorum stultam sequuntur sapientiam,” interpret the four faces on the creatures in 
Ezekiel’s vision as the constituent parts of the soul.90 Three of these are Plato’s rational, 
irascible, and concupsicible parts. The fourth, however, “super haec et extra haec tria est.”91 
Jerome notes that Greek calls it synderesis, but in Latin it is “scintilla conscientiae.”92 Jerome 
suggests that the conscience is an additional part of the soul, distinct from the others. His text 
provided the basis for later distinctions between conscience and synderesis, and is therefore 
significant to the development of the scholastic conscience.93  
Conscience and synderesis were not treated as separate entities, however, until 
Peter Lombard cited Jerome’s text in the 1150s and, as D’Arcy puts it, “the mould of a 
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century’s debate was cast.”94 Manfred Svensson, however, argues that Augustine uses the 
distinction between uti and frui to formulate a bipartite conscience akin to the scholastic 
division between conscience and synderesis: “only through the right delight (fruitio Dei) are 
we capable of judging about other things, and this judgement is a precondition of the usus.”95 
It follows, therefore, that “the judgement that guides our uti, as well as the judgement passed 
on our own delight, can aptly be described as acts of conscience.”96 Frui bears similarities 
with Bonaventure’s synderesis, in that it is the affective orientation towards the good that 
impels the pursuit of the good within particular choices. Usus resembles Bonaventure’s 
conscience in that it is the rational outworking of the love of goodness that makes the 
particular choices. Delight anchors the person in the good; use applies the good to specific 
situations. Augustine’s conscience, according to Svensson, “is part of a process of moral 
reasoning.”97 Svensson may accurately identify the dynamic at play within Augustine’s frui-
uti division, but his reading is problematic since, as he concedes, “the word conscientia 
cannot be found in any of these texts” on frui and uti.98 The phenomenon he observes in 
Augustine may fit later definitions of conscience, but it does not follow that it aligns with 
patristic thought on conscience. The patristic period may have sown the seeds for the 
scholastic debates, but reading patristic thought solely as a precursor to scholasticism 
overlooks and obscures the range of patristic approaches to the conscience.  
The patristic conscience could be both anterior and subsequent, although patristic 
writers themselves never acknowledge such a distinction.99 Philippe Delhaye has written the 
most comprehensive survey of patristic thought on conscience, and this section of the 
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introduction relies heavily on his work. Delhaye notes that the patristic conscience “as a 
moral guide of life is … the lot not only of good men but also of the wicked.”100 It follows 
that “man knows his moral duty, solely from the governing force of the natural law speaking 
in his conscience.”101 Delhaye finds general consensus amongst the patristic writers that 
“insofar as man is endowed with reason, he perceives good and evil, and bears within 
himself, in his conscience, the essence of his law.”102 The conscience was characterised as 
“God’s representative, defender of order, master and judge of our conduct, a kind of living 
law inscribed in our nature.”103 In short, “[t]he conscience in us is the judge who lays down 
the law: saying about what we have done and what we are thinking of doing, whether there is 
or would be room for praise or disapproval.”104 Both anterior and subsequent functions of the 
conscience come together within this description. 
The conscience thus assumes a unique spiritual importance because it enables the 
person to harmonise their own life with God’s will. Delhaye finds that, for Ambrose of Milan, 
“God enters in some way into us to lead us, thanks to the sense he gives us of good and 
evil.”105 Augustine similarly regarded “the conscience as being in reality the result of an 
inspirational grace.”106 Delhaye argues that there is a “privileged encounter between God and 
man which is to be found in the moral conscience.”107 The conscience is “God’s abode in us,” 
and “the conscience truly realises the conditions of a contact between God and the soul.”108 
The contact Delhaye describes is moral rather than contemplative, mystical, or experiential. It 
consists in the alignment of one’s life with divine law as revealed in the conscience. The 
elevated language used to describe the conscience nevertheless had profound effects on the 
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devotional conscience texts contemporary with the AW. 
Patristic writers typically follow the biblical practice of treating the heart and 
conscience as synonymous.109 Delhaye notes that the identification of the conscience with the 
heart likely seemed natural because the heart “beats much faster under the influence of 
certain violent feelings, anger or love for example. It races at times under the influence of 
fear or a vivid apprehension.”110 The physical heart was an apt metaphor for the moral heart. 
The literal and metaphorical hearts, however, remained clearly distinct. Augustine, for 
instance, is careful to correct those who take the word cor to mean the “particulam corporis 
quam in visceribus dilaniatis videmus.”111  He accounts for its usage by explaining: “hoc 
[cor] enim abutendo vel transferendo vocabulo ducitur a corpore ad animum.”112 
Delhaye lists five attributes of the biblical heart that influenced patristic thought. 
The heart is “the witness of the moral value of our acts,” “the place where the divine law is 
interiorised,” “the source of moral life,” it has “influence on the understanding of value,” and 
“God … can convert it and bring it back to himself.”113 The heart, in this sense, is closer to 
the subsequent than the anterior conscience. Delhaye maintains that “the conscience is … 
dependent upon the moral attitude or disposition of each man; the more delicate and sensitive 
it is in these reactions, the more persuasive are its remonstrances.”114 In other words, the heart 
in this sense is not the voice that reprimands, but rather the person’s response to the 
reprimands. The reprimands are still present, but the heart hardened by persistent misconduct 
ceases to feel them or to regard them as important. 
Some patristic writers conflated the conscience with personal response to the 
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conscience, so that “we are no longer dealing with the impartial judge that we are conscious 
of possessing within ourselves, but with the responsible subject that we are ourselves.”115 The 
conscience thus becomes “all our moral and spiritual history, the whole gamut of choices 
with which we shape our good or bad destiny.”116 Delhaye observes that “[i]n this new light, 
the conscience is a power of choice. Too often it sins.”117 This unique conscience ceases to be 
either anterior or subsequent. It does not give directions, nor does it punish poor choices. It 
makes choices in the present. The conscience is “a sort of tiltyard where we must come to a 
decision to declare ourselves for the spirit or for the flesh.”118 Its capacity to judge rightly in 
the present issues from the choices it has made in the past. This conscience thus absorbs the 
role of the subsequent conscience since “after having been the responsible agent of sin, the 
conscience becomes in a manner of speaking its seat or receptacle.”119 The conscience does 
not document or record past behaviour. It is the product of past behaviour: “the subject retains 
deep within himself the imprint of his acts. Choice after choice, he builds his ‘self,’” a self 
that Augustine identifies with the conscience.120 The bad conscience “should show its wounds 
to the physician, but its evil state tends to draw it away from prayer.”121 The struggle, then, 
“is a question … of freeing oneself through penance.”122 
Both sides of the patristic conscience – the law of God in the soul and the person 
shaped by past conduct – come together in twelfth-century monastic writing on conscience. 
Delhaye notes three twelfth-century conscience texts: Peter of Celle’s De Conscientia, the 
pseudo-Bernardine Tractatus de Conscientia, and De Interiori Domo.123  Delhaye has called 
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attention to the texts in a short essay, but subsequent scholarship has barely acknowledged 
them. The texts build upon, adapt, and sometimes radically transform the patristic ideas that 
have been outlined here. They represent an intensely affective, personal approach to 
conscience that lay well outside of scholasticism.  The two pseudo-Bernardine texts have not 
previously been translated into English. I have therefore included my original translations of 
the Tractatus de Conscientia and the first twenty-two chapters of De Interiori Domo as 
appendices to this thesis. 
This thesis argues that these twelfth-century conscience texts fuse ethical life and 
transcendent experience together to produce a contemplative conscience. The contemplative 
conscience houses God’s presence, and not merely God’s law. The patristic moral conscience 
was shaped by past conduct, and then applied its contents to present life. The contemplative 
conscience does much the same thing: it applies the presence of God to every present 
thought, act, and situation. The moral conscience was the means by which the past impacted 
the present moment. The contemplative conscience is the means by which God’s presence is 
realised in the present moment. The result is that the twelfth-century texts incorporate 
language and ideas from conventionally understood mysticism, but they do not adopt the 
corresponding framework of graduated spiritual ascent. They reappropriate mystical language 
within a different framework, a framework modelled on the dynamics of the patristic moral 
conscience.  
The three monastic texts are devotional treatises on conscience and are more 
concerned with life and practice than theory and, as such, they are the closest context 
available for the conscience of the AW. De Interiori Domo, in particular, circulated widely 
during the thirteenth century as the third book of a De Anima attributed at the time to Hugh of 
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St Victor (its attribution to Bernard is more recent).124 The fourth book of the De Anima 
contains the Latin text that became the basis of Sawles Warde. Sawles Warde was an English 
text closely related to the AW and possibly written by the same author. It is therefore highly 
likely that the author of the AW was familiar with De Interiori Domo. The AW states that the 
inner rule “riwleð ant rihteð ant smeðeð þe heorte ant te inwit of sunne” and this “is of euch 
religiun ant of euch ordre þe god ant al þe strengðe” (P.42-45).125 A treatment of the AW’s 
religious life must, therefore, take the contemplative conscience texts into account. No 
scholarship on the AW has yet done so. 
2. The Contemplative Conscience and Mystical Consciousness 
 
Current scholarship on medieval mystical literature frequently reconsiders the 
role of experience. Denys Turner remarks: “when I read any of the Christian writers who 
were said to be mystics I found that many of them … made no mention at all of any such 
experiences.”126 Those who “did make mention of ‘experiences’ … certainly did not think the 
having of them to be definitive of ‘the mystical.’”127 
Bernard McGinn similarly regards the insistence on mysticism involving 
experience as both reductive and anachronistic. Medieval writers themselves did not share the 
insistence. McGinn observes that “‘mystical experience,’ to the best of [his] knowledge, was 
not an expression used by mystics or students of mysticism before the nineteenth century.”128 
He prefers to formulate a definition of mysticism based on consciousness, “because 
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consciousness emphasises the entire process of human intentionality and self-presence, rather 
than just an originating pure feeling, sensation, or experience easily separable from 
subsequent acts of thinking, loving, and deciding.”129 
Mark McIntosh further describes medieval Christian mysticism as “more like the 
lenses for viewing what cannot be seen; it is describing in a simple or direct sense neither 
God nor the mystic’s experiences but evoking an interpretive framework within which the 
readers of the text may come to recognise and participate in their own encounters with 
God.”130 McIntosh’s definition risks reductionism, implying that all medieval mystical texts 
fit a single mould. He writes as a theologian before he writes as an historian, and his project 
aims to synthesise personal spirituality and the discipline of academic theology. It risks 
becoming prescriptive in evaluating what he deems authentic spiritual practice. In spite of 
these shortcomings, his description of “lenses for viewing what cannot be seen” is especially 
apt for guidance literature, as opposed to literature that recounts experience. Guidance 
literature aims to facilitate contemplative life. Contemplative conscience literature aims to 
facilitate the recognition of the otherwise hidden divine presence within ordinary life. 
Newer approaches like McGinn’s accommodate a more expansive range of texts 
and writers than traditional approaches to ‘mysticism.’ McGinn briefly addresses Peter of 
Celle and the AW (on separate occasions), but he does not fully apply his theory to either one. 
McGinn states that Peter “has little to say about union with God here below,” and that his 
“work does not contain any real theory of mysticism” comparable with those of the 
Victorines or Cistercians.131 Peter, rather, “reflects older traditions by interweaving his views 
on contemplation and vision within his overriding interest – the exposition of the meaning of 
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the claustral life as preparation for heaven.”132 He was “a biblical mystic in the tradition 
stretching back to Origen nine centuries before.”133 McGinn observes, however, that “a newer 
note is sounded in the emphasis Peter gives to sacramental confession and especially to the 
reception of the Eucharist.”134 Peter is unique amongst his contemporaries “for the central 
role he gives to the reception of Christ in the sacrament of his Body and Blood” which is “the 
basis for the believer’s access to God.”135 McGinn says much less about the AW. He notes 
that it was “[i]mportant for the growth of the vernacular tradition of spiritual writing in 
England.”136 He also observes that it employs “metaphors of sexual love between Christ and 
the soul that are reminiscent of Cistercian mysticism.”137 
‘Mysticism,’ however, remains a nebulous and often misleading term. Nicholas 
Watson acknowledges that the word has some ongoing value in interdisciplinary dialogue, but 
he argues that “for the present an historical field of study cannot readily be sustained using 
this imported, anachronistic, and, above all, essentially evaluative term.”138 He prefers the 
term ‘contemplation,’ since it “has a real, if complex, historical relationship, both with the 
activity of contemplation itself, and with the writing that developed, in England and 
elsewhere, around that activity.”139 The AW contains the first appearance of the word in 
English (III.340). ‘Contemplative’ is thus the most appropriate label for the kind of 
conscience discussed here. I argue throughout this thesis that the contemplation this 
conscience involves is most appropriately described by McGinn’s approach to mystical 
consciousness. 
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3. Thesis Outline 
 
There is almost no scholarship on the monastic conscience texts, and as such the 
first two chapters of my thesis lay the necessary groundwork for reading the AW as a 
conscience text. The first two chapters analyse the nature of conscience in the monastic 
conscience texts, as well as the workings of the texts themselves. The first chapter of this 
thesis focuses on Peter of Celle. Peter’s De Conscientia is the most extensive of the 
contemplative conscience texts and, as such, receives the most attention. I argue that Peter 
transforms the moral conscience into the contemplative conscience outlined above. Peter’s 
conscience is shaped by meditation and devotion as much as by moral or immoral living. His 
work is vibrant and richly imaginative, and I argue that meditative reading of the text itself is 
integral to the acquisition of conscience. The creation of conscience is, in large part, a literary 
process, built and edified by imaginative engagement with the text. I argue that what McGinn 
describes as Peter’s interweaving of “contemplation and vision within … the exposition of 
the meaning of the claustral life” is best understood in terms of McGinn’s concept of mystical 
consciousness.140 
My second chapter deals with two pseudo-Bernardine conscience texts. I argue 
that the first, the Tractatus de Conscientia, demonstrates an understanding of conscience 
similar to Peter’s even though it does not cite him, and is formally very different from his 
work. It demonstrates that the contemplative conscience was not restricted to Peter, but that 
Peter reflects and expresses more widespread attitudes within the monastic world of the 
twelfth century. The second text, De Interiori Domo, directly incorporates passages from 
Peter’s De Conscientia. I argue Peter’s influence extends beyond the passages that are 
immediately taken from him. The author shows care in incorporating Peter’s ideas from the 
De Conscientia as a whole, indicating that he considered Peter’s work to be important and it 
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is therefore likely that others did as well. It is likely that Peter’s ideas were known and 
transmitted in other collections and compendia that are either no longer extant or not yet 
identified. De Interiori Domo itself was just such a vehicle and means of transmission.  
The third and final chapter of this thesis reads the AW in light of the conscience 
texts. I argue that the AW author’s conscience is the contemplative conscience of the monastic 
texts. Reading the AW in this light solves the problem of the text’s treatment of the spiritual 
life. The AW incorporates both moral prescriptions and contemplative allusions without the 
framework of spiritual ascent because the author regards the contemplative life as the life of 
the contemplative conscience. The spirituality of the AW, like that of the conscience texts, is 
best described by McGinn’s concept of mystical consciousness. 
33 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
The Introduction to this thesis alludes to the history of scholarly debates about the 
nature and role of experience in the AW, and whether or not the text ought to be considered 
‘mystical.’ This Literature Review traces those debates in detail, and demonstrates how 
reference to contemplative conscience literature helps to resolve them. 
Gerard Sitwell wrote in 1955 that the author of the AW “considered the 
anchoresses to be contemplative, in the sense that contemplation would play a definite part in 
their lives. Yet he mentions this only incidentally.”1 Geoffrey Shepherd similarly maintained 
that “[t]here is little point in speaking of AW as a mystical work,” because it “is not 
concerned with the experience of union with God” and, moreover, “shows no trace of the 
teaching of the so-called Dionysius the Areopagite.”2 Peter Hackett essentially agreed that the 
AW contained only “light hints of mystical possibility.”3 Hackett accounts for this state of 
affairs by stressing that the AW “was a rule. It was not a treatise on prayer.”4 As a rule “it had 
to be lived and therefore had to be liveable.”5 It exists to answer practical questions about 
how one ought to live, and not describe the spiritual experiences one may or may not 
encounter.  Wolfgang Riehle similarly describes the AW as only a “partly mystical text.”6 He 
notes that it introduced a number of mystical tropes and images into English literature, such 
as the foot as a metaphor for love and the kiss of the spiritual bridegroom.7 G. V. Smithers 
suggested that the author of the AW was a Neoplatonist, and that he alludes to Plato’s doctrine 
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of ideas as mediated by Christian theories of typology.8 Bella Millett, however, has since 
shown that this is highly unlikely. She traces the author’s perceived Platonism to the 
preaching techniques of Alan of Lille, and argues that the AW “should be linked less with the 
high theory of Victorine tradition than with a late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century context 
of practical pastoral writing.”9 
Mary Baldwin’s doctoral thesis, Ancrene Wisse and its Background in the 
Christian Tradition of Religious Instruction and Spirituality, is a thorough and invaluable 
source study of the AW that establishes the text’s links with the traditional ascetic emphases 
on penance and spiritual combat. I have already dealt with Baldwin’s work at some length. 
Her general argument is worth noting here. Baldwin holds that “the contemplative aim of the 
anchoritic life … has to be pieced together from separate and scattered passages” in the AW.10 
Its patristic sources such as Augustine, Gregory, and Cassian, are much clearer. Baldwin 
argues, therefore, that “the author quite deliberately does not direct himself to the higher 
reaches of the spiritual teaching of his sources.”11 Baldwin asks, “[i]f extended discussions of 
temptation and confession can be included in a rule, why should a discussion of prayer be 
excluded?”12 She concludes that the AW author demonstrates a “quite deliberate choice not to 
talk explicitly about” contemplation.13 The text “contains allusions to [contemplation], but 
the presence of those allusions only emphasises the absence of any development in AW of 
some of the themes connected with contemplation.”14 The author replaces the life of 
contemplation with what Baldwin considers to be the much more limited life of conscience.15 
The argument of Janet Grayson’s 1974 book, Structure and Imagery in Ancrene 
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Wisse, is strongest when it traces the development and evolution of various images 
throughout the course of the AW. It highlights and explores the way these images are 
transformed as they chart a spiritual progression, culminating with “body and soul in tension 
reconciled finally by love, transformed into light by the Word.”16  
Subsequent scholarship has occasionally acknowledged Grayson, but her book 
has more or less disappeared from contemporary work on the AW. The main hindrance to the 
impact Grayson’s work might otherwise have had is probably her lack of interest in the AW’s 
relation to its historical situation. She notes sources and analogues for images, but these are 
usually relegated to footnotes and are brought up as points of curiosity rather than points 
relevant to her project. The consequence is that, while Grayson illuminates the AW’s patterns 
of imagery, she focuses on how those patterns of imagery might appeal to modern rather than 
medieval aesthetic sensibilities. 
Another hindrance to Grayson’s influence is her self-contradiction: she says in 
her introduction that “there is no instant of mysterious transport into contemplation, as we 
might expect if this were a mystical work,” implying that the AW is not a mystical work.17 
She then proceeds to describe it as one. She refers to the anchoress as a “mystic” and 
discusses “[t]he mystical presence of the Bridegroom comforting the spouse.”18 The 
anchoress engages in “a mystical flight” and the AW is replete with “mystical symbolism.”19 
If we overlook Grayson’s initial claim, then her analysis of the imagery is particularly useful 
since it traces the anchoress’s contemplative progress and how “the spiritual affectus by 
which the soul is drawn to God grows at the expense of physical things” as “the anchoress 
passes through graduated stages of purification or trial which prepare her for the advent of 
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Christ.”20 
Grayson organises her discussion of imagery according to the division of inner 
and outer rules that the AW author sets out in his introduction. The heart is central, but 
Grayson differs from most other scholars of the AW in that she attempts to define the heart. It 
“is the symbol of spiritual life in the Rule” where “the love of God is nurtured and good 
works are born. The ‘nest of the heart’ is inviolable, a sacred place of retreat for the 
Bridegroom and spouse.”21 She refers to it again later as the “life of the soul.”22  
Grayson later comments that the “beasts and demons,” personifying temptation, 
arise “from within the heart itself – the nest where the young cubs are whelped.”23 She thus 
indicates that good and evil works have the same origin within the anchoress, but surely this 
would call for some qualification of her claim that the heart symbolises ‘the spiritual life’ 
which is an inviolable nest and the ‘life of the soul.’ Grayson does not reconcile, or even 
address, the contradiction. However, if the heart is the conscience as represented by the 
monastic conscience texts, then the contradiction ceases to be a problem. The monastic 
conscience, as the first two chapters of this thesis show, is the origin of good and evil actions. 
It contains both.  
Linda Georgianna’s highly influential book, The Solitary Self: Individuality in the 
Ancrene Wisse, addresses the alleged contradiction in the AW between the ascetic solitary life 
and the text’s copious worldly imagery. Georgianna uses this contradiction to frame an 
exploration of the nature of the self in the AW and its relationship to the world. She claims 
that the solitary life presented in the text differs significantly from the traditional solitary life. 
She argues that, in the AW, “the life of a solitary has become a socialised and worldly life.”24 
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The AW author constantly undermines the text’s apparent “traditional, otherworldly desert 
ideals” with his “awareness that an anchoress, like all other Christians, lives and dies in the 
world.”25 The author reinvents the ascetic ideal because of “a growing feeling that salvation, 
even sanctity, is possible in the world” as opposed to the monastery alone.26 
Confession is the focal point of Georgianna’s work. She examines the relationship 
between inner contrition and the external sacrament of confession with particular attention to 
the AW’s allegorical retelling of the Judith story. She argues that the author rearranges the 
events in the story upon each telling, in order to demonstrate “that the drama of confession is 
not a linear story but a circular one.”27 The material and spiritual components of confession 
“are inextricably bound together as two concurrent parts, one outer and one inner, of the same 
act.”28 
Georgianna’s statement that the anchoress “lives and dies in the world” betrays a 
misunderstanding. She seems to suggest that the ‘world,’ in Christian theology, is 
synonymous with ‘physical reality.’ If that were the case, then she would be right: so much 
material imagery would be inappropriate for those trying to live apart from the world.  
Solitaries, however, are not trying to escape physical existence. Anchoritism meets the basic 
requirements for solitude. Material imagery would only be a problem if the AW were a 
specifically negative mystical text, and Georgianna argues that it is not.29 She does seem, in 
spite of her claims, to be reading it as one by stressing the tension between the spiritual life 
and the presence of material imagery. Where does this tension come from? 
The AW contains ample instances of conflict between the spiritual and physical. 
The text stresses the importance of leaving the senses behind, and yet its imagery and 
conception of the contemplative life are strongly incarnational. The tension Georgianna 
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observes thus needs to be refocused. The conflict between the physical senses and the 
spiritual life is not inherent within solitude, but rather inherent within the AW author’s own 
description of the spiritual life. Thus, the circular narrative, the “constant shifting from ideal 
to real, or from inner to outer” is not – as Georgianna holds – “the very texture of the solitary 
life,” but rather the texture of the AW’s contemplative life.30 Her reading of the 
interrelationship between spirituality and materiality or interiority and exteriority reveals the 
closeness of the AW to the monastic conscience texts. The AW, like the conscience texts, 
cultivates a view of the material that sees it interwoven and fused with the spiritual. Material 
things can be made a part of the life of the conscience if the conscience interprets them 
correctly. Interiority is preserved when spiritual realities are mapped onto external ones. 
Nicholas Watson was the first to argue that the AW and its associated texts 
represent a distinct kind of contemplative spirituality. He argues that “the alien quality of the 
anchoritic material” sets it apart from the forms of mysticism that preceded and came after 
it.31 The spirituality of the conventionally recognised Middle English mystics was “concerned 
at its most ambitious with a schematic interior ascent.”32 The AW, by contrast, “makes 
considerable use of the external world and is not organised around a concept of ascent.”33 
Earlier meditations like those of Aelred of Rievaulx as well as later meditations like those of 
Margery Kempe involved practitioners imagining themselves present during episodes of 
Christ’s life.34 Watson argues that in the AW, however, meditations “acquire a real emotional 
intensity” in their “brilliant change of focus, in which Christ first becomes dramatically 
animate, stretching himself out as a child would, and then becomes figuratively an 
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anchorite.”35 Meditative “intensity is not primarily centred on Resurrection or Incarnation, 
but on a reinterpretation of the anchoresses’ condition in terms of those events.”36 It involves 
“a sudden and illuminated return to an awareness of their own condition.”37 The AW presents 
a “multitude of images that both replace and transfigure the world outside the cell.”38 The 
meditative life of the AW is intimately interwoven with the unique material conditions of the 
anchoritic life: “the anchoresses are already as it were enclosed within a powerful 
imaginative structure, and require only a personal and affective realisation of its 
significance.”39  
Watson does not address the conscience or the importance with which the AW 
author imbues it. The particular kind of meditative interplay between spiritual and material 
reality that Watson identifies is, however, the kind of interplay found in the contemplative 
conscience texts. The conscience enables the interplay to operate continuously and 
uninterrupted as the contemplative reads their immediate surroundings in a spiritual light. 
Watson calls attention to the physical anchoritic situation and its role in meditation. He does 
not note that the anchorite in the cell is essentially an embodiment of the metaphor for 
conscience given in the conscience texts. Conscience is a house shut against external threats, 
a place to be alone with God. Anchoritism thus facilitates the life of conscience in a uniquely 
intense way. Watson concludes that “the best image for the spiritual life is this constancy of 
suffering, this positive activity of the manufacture of joy out of pain.”40 The anchoritic texts 
are not concerned with ascent, but “joyful crucifixion: the transformation of suffering into 
joy.”41 The texts work to enable the reader “to comprehend and to realise the spiritual reality 
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which underlies her way of life, to penetrate the image which she is herself living.”42 The first 
two chapters of this thesis contend that the reinterpretation of suffering is a key feature of the 
conscience texts. 
Anne Savage’s article, “The Solitary Heroine: Aspects of Meditation and 
Mysticism in Ancrene Wisse, the Katherine Group, and the Wooing Group,” builds on 
Watson’s account of spirituality in the AW and attempts to harmonise it with traditional 
models of contemplation. Savage notes the appearance of “[o]utward blindness, inner light 
resulting in the sight of God, a kindled heart, the tasting and knowing of God through 
removal from worldly sensation into spiritual sensation” in the AW as “aspects of mystical 
experience.”43 Nevertheless, “[n]o precise terminology of purgation, illumination, and union 
is used,” thus placing the AW’s spirituality outside the prevalent tradition of mystical 
literature.44 Savage attempts to resolve the problem by arguing that, in the AW, “constant 
attention is devoted to the physical details of anchoritic life, so that the life itself becomes an 
object of meditation.”45 The anchoritic “way of life is by definition purgative; illumination 
is … meant to be the fruit of the purgation of the world from her senses and heart; the union 
is promised as marriage to Christ in eternal life.”46 Nevertheless, “there are foretastes of this 
intimate knowledge of God. The language of romantic love and marital union with Christ 
runs through” the anchoritic literature.47 Savage’s observations are sound, but they serve 
more to highlight the problem rather than solve it: why does the author omit traditional 
language of purgation, illumination, and union? The answer, I argue, is because he follows 
the tradition of conscience literature which frames union with God in the dynamics of 
                                               
42 Watson, “Methods and Objectives,” 144. 
43 Anne Savage, “The Solitary Heroine: Aspects of Meditation and Mysticism in Ancrene Wisse, the Katherine 
Group, and the Wooing Group,” in Mysticism and Spirituality in Medieval England, ed. William F. Pollard and 
Robert Boenig (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1997), 81. 
44 Savage, “The Solitary Heroine,” 81. 
45 Savage, “The Solitary Heroine,” 80. 
46 Savage, “The Solitary Heroine,” 81. 
47 Savage, “The Solitary Heroine,” 81. 
41 
 
conscience rather than ascent. 
Savage’s arguments in her more recent chapter, “From Anchorhold to Cell of 
Self-Knowledge: Points along a History of the Human Body,” are nearer the mark. She 
observes that discussion of enclosure and contemplative life has frequently “been overcast 
with the rhetoric of the divided person, the body as chaff and the spirit as wheat.”48 She 
argues that the AW and its related texts work against that division, “striving towards a unified 
understanding of the embodied spirit, the ways in which every impulse which flickers in the 
body flickers in the spirit as well, and vice versa.”49 She describes the anchoritic life as 
“knitting them together again: the careful research of people pursuing body and spirit in every 
detail of their mutual dependence.”50 This closely reflects the conscience texts, which see the 
conscience as unifying the spiritual with the material by recognising the presence of God 
within every moment and action. 
Christopher Cannon’s 2001 article, “The Form of the Self: Ancrene Wisse and 
Romance,” attempts to resolve what Cannon sees as a contradiction inherent in the solitary 
life. “It is difficult,” he claims, “to separate the self from the world. To lock oneself away … 
is still to be somewhere.”51 He argues that the AW also recognises this difficulty, and is 
structured to create an idea of the body as a vessel or enclosure. The body contains the soul in 
the same way that the anchorhold contains the body of the anchoress. Thus, when the AW 
shows that the body is vulnerable to compromising the eremitic life, it also shows the 
anchorhold susceptible to the same weaknesses. 
Cannon argues that the tensions between external and internal that permeate the 
AW (and upon which it is structured) “are not simply the result of general assumptions about 
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how the body works, they are the set of relations out of which ‘the body,’ as an idea, is itself 
constructed.”52 The text “shows that the body allows for sin precisely because it encloses 
things. The most important of those things is, of course, the anchoress’s heart, which … turns 
out to be quite difficult to keep ‘within.’”53 
Love resolves the contradiction, the problem “that any body in isolation remains 
connected to something else precisely because it is a body.”54 The placement of the romance 
of Christ as lover-knight at the end of Part VII structurally and thematically connects the 
inner and outer rules since love is the only legitimate way in which the anchoress can connect 
herself with others. Love is for another rather than oneself, and therefore “anneals the 
boundaries of the self,” and so the anchoress is truly enclosed by loving Christ and 
neighbour.55  Love “actually protects the self from the world.”56 Cannon elaborates in his 
book, The Grounds of English Literature, that “the connection between selves usually called 
‘love’ secures the integrity of each self.”57  
Solitude, as Cannon reads it, is sought by the hermit because of its negative 
qualities rather than for any positive virtues of its own. Its appeal lies in its protection of the 
inside from the outside. The problem with Cannon’s reading is that love is simply a means of 
self-protection, for which reason it comes to appear disingenuous and even narcissistic. 
Simply put, it stops looking much like love. 
A more fundamental problem underlies Cannon’s approach. It is founded on a 
misunderstanding of religious solitude. Cannon’s article, like Georgianna’s book, blurs the 
definition of the ‘world’ from which religious hermits withdraw. The ‘world,’ in Christian 
theology, is not identical with physical reality, and so it is entirely possible for a hermit to 
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withdraw from the ‘world’ while remaining in a physical body. The problem of being 
‘somewhere,’ as Cannon puts it, is no problem at all for the solitary. Henrietta Leyser has 
shown that the new hermits of the twelfth century “both expected and welcomed companions; 
solitude did not mean for them to be without the company of fellow religious but to be apart 
from secular society.”58 Michelle Sauer likewise argues that anchoritic solitude is closer to 
modern conceptions of exile than modern conceptions of privacy.59 
The cultivation of love in the AW is actually an end of, rather than a means to, the 
solitary life. The focus of the AW is not on the self for the sake of the self and self-protection, 
but on the cultivation of love. The paradox Cannon identifies, that “the heart must be ruled by 
exercising it,” is less a paradox when understood in this light.60 Solitude and asceticism aim 
to cultivate the pure heart, not to negate or annihilate the heart. 
Once we have adjusted Cannon’s reading of the text, his argumentation leaves us 
with the centrality of the heart. Cannon identifies the heart only as “[t]he most important of 
those things” that the self contains.61 If love constitutes solitude as Cannon argues, but the 
AW treats love as an end and solitude as a means, then the AW emphasises solitude because 
solitude is constitutive of love. Solitude is valuable because it rightly positions the heart in 
relation to God and others. The AW identifies the heart as the conscience. Love and solitude 
are thus the attuning of the conscience, bringing it into right relation with the external world. 
Solitude, or the set of ascetic disciplines that anchoritism involves, cannot be separated from 
love.  
Cate Gunn’s book, Ancrene Wisse: From Pastoral Literature to Vernacular 
Spirituality, situates the AW in its context of the lay piety and religious reform that followed 
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in the wake of the Fourth Lateran Council.  Gunn explores the AW’s use of techniques that 
rose to prominence in twelfth and thirteenth century rhetoric, sermons, summa confessorum 
and other pastoral guidance literature. Two of the areas that Gunn examines are especially 
relevant for present purposes: affective Eucharistic piety and the AW’s place within 
contemplative literature. 
Gunn describes the text’s spirituality as incarnational and physical. 
Contemplation centres on the Eucharist and the humanity of Christ, while the anchoress’s 
material circumstances are the most distinctive feature of her vocation.  Gunn looks to the 
AW’s use of the soul’s hunger as an image to demonstrate that “the soul is conceived as a 
spiritual reality on the model of the body” and the “conception of the concrete reality of the 
spiritual world and its intimate interaction with the material world.”62 Thus, the anchoritic 
situation of enclosure “had both symbolic and material meaning” and these “symbols allowed 
the anchoresses to interact with a spiritual dimension.”63  
Gunn notes that, although the AW author predicates contemplation on Christ’s 
incarnation, withdrawal from materiality paradoxically precedes contemplation. Gunn 
maintains that the AW author has a firm conviction that “contemplation of divine things is 
possible only for those who have rejected the sensual world.”64 She never quite addresses this 
paradox, but claims instead that “there is no ascent to God; rather, Christ is invited down into 
the hearts of the anchoresses.”65 It is important that the rejection of the sensual world not be 
confused with the project of asceticism. The paradox that appears here is not between the 
anchoritic rejection of the world and contemplation predicated on physical things. It is the 
contradiction between the AW’s injunction “forȝeoteð al þe world, þer beoð al ut of bodi” 
(I.241-2) and the presence of God “as the image on the crucifix and in the consecrated Host 
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which is the very body and blood of Christ.”66 Gunn concludes that “the anchoresses should 
be content with … God through his descent in the humanity of Christ, rather than through 
ascent to him,”67 for which reason the text represents a mysticism that differs from apophatic, 
negative contemplation. The AW is nevertheless essentially contemplative in nature and so 
must be considered in the context of other contemplative works. The contradiction between 
being “al ut of bodi” and incarnational devotion goes unresolved, nor does Gunn present it as 
a contradiction. Reading the AW as conscience literature reconciles the two conflicting 
elements within the AW. The attuned conscience places the anchoress into right relation with 
material things. The conscience is able to read the spiritual significance in ordinary things. 
Anna McHugh argues in her chapter, “Inner Space as Speaking Space in Ancrene 
Wisse,” that the anchoritic cell “is vital for signifying not only the enclosed heart of the 
anchoress, but the enclosed spaces of her intellectual functions, specifically the memory.”68 
She follows Georgianna in seeing the anchorhold as the objective correlative of the inner 
life.69 The AW gains access to the inner life via the gateway of memory, since the anchoress 
will eventually be committing the AW and other devotional texts to memory through repeated 
rereading. McHugh interprets the AW’s frequent references to enclosed spaces as metaphors 
for the enclosed spaces of the heart, which becomes “a speaking space, where the anchoress’s 
outpouring can be made to God in a semiotically rich dialogue with the secret sharer of her 
hidden inner cell.”70 
The heart is central to McHugh’s chapter and to her reading of the AW, but as was 
the case in Cannon’s article, the heart’s precise identity remains unspecified.  At first it would 
appear that the heart is identified with the rational component of the soul. There is a “vital 
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connection between the metaphorical enclosed spaces of the mind and heart … and the 
rhetoric of the heart which these intellectual chambers facilitate.”71 It is both the seat of 
memory and the place where the anchoress is to ‘contain’ Christ.72 It is also an intellectual 
space, “where the movements of the intellect aid meditation.”73 Thus far there is nothing 
surprising; the features described are typically associated with the rational soul. McHugh, 
however, in arguing that the cell does not represent the body, maintains instead that “[t]he 
visions of enclosed space in Ancrene Wisse are visions of the enclosed space of the heart, or 
the mind, perhaps even the soul.”74 
The obvious question to ask is whether or not the text of the AW supports 
McHugh’s fragmenting of mind, heart and soul. The answer is that it does, at least partially. 
McHugh observes that the heart is “an enclosed, generative … space from which life comes 
forth.”75 She refers to the AW’s citation of Proverbs 4:23, which the author modifies slightly 
in his gloss, to indicate that the heart is the vessel of the soul’s life and distinct from the 
soul.76 Thus, the AW distinguishes heart and soul, and regards them as discrete entities. 
McHugh devotes little attention to the distinctions between heart and soul or their 
implications; her chapter seems to take them for granted.  However, if the heart – where 
McHugh maintains the internal rhetoric of prayer takes place – is distinct from the mind and 
the soul, then what is it? McHugh shows that it is intimately related to memory, and she 
makes the innovative contribution of reading the text in the context of memory literature “of 
which Ancrene Wisse is a tangential member.”77 She draws on the work of Mary Carruthers 
and identifies a number of tropes and references to memory literature within the AW: “the 
anchoress is encouraged not to recollect her sins but to ‘gather’ them,” and “mnemonics, such 
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as that of the five senses, [are] rife throughout the text as an organising principle for the 
material which the anchoress must memorise and make her own.”78 The heart is related to the 
memory, but the author of the AW identifies it as conscience rather than memory. McHugh 
thus indirectly lays the groundwork for reading the AW as conscience literature by identifying 
its relationship with literature on memory, and by revealing the complexities in the heart’s 
relationship to the soul.   
Mary Agnes Edsall’s article, “‘True Anchoresses are Called Birds’: Asceticism as 
Ascent and the Purgative Mysticism of the Ancrene Wisse,” challenges the general conclusion 
that the AW is not a mystical or contemplative text. She identifies the shortfall of the usual 
scholarly approach as an over-reliance on “models that are heavily influenced by pseudo-
Dionysian Neoplatonism and its elitist conceptions of the ascent of the mind to God.” 79 The 
over-reliance obscures readings of other forms of contemplation. Edsall follows more recent 
approaches to mystical literature, approaches which reject the earlier “lens of ill-defined or 
rigid conceptions of mystical experience.”80 She aims to “read certain patterns of imagery in 
this self-reflexive, highly metaphorical text on their own terms.”81 Edsall thus builds upon the 
work of Savage and Watson. She critiques both, however, because “for both critics, a 
mysticism of ascent and union remains a touchstone for their arguments and neither fully 
fleshes out the particular ways that AW configures contemplative experience.”82 
Edsall argues that the AW author collapses “what is usually three steps into one 
action.”83 The mystical stages of purgation, ascension and union become “a purgative 
mysticism.”84 The AW presents a mysticism that centres on meditation on the suffering of 
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Christ. Christ’s wounds cure sin in the senses and make the anchoress into a stigmatic.85 
Anchoritic asceticism has a strongly penitential character. The author illustrates the inner 
disciplines with the flight of birds and “uses language that recalls descriptions of ascent.”86 
The description of penitential suffering “unites the anchoress with the parallel, saving 
sacrifice of Christ,” and thus the anchoress achieves ascension and union whilst in the midst 
of purgation.87 
The AW’s mysticism is designed specifically for anchoritism.88 The anchoress 
“fully experiences her sin, her suffering, and her worldly abasement, yet continually and 
completely refers them to Christ, thereby transfiguring them into joy.”89 The text thus 
emphasises the transformation that results from contact with Christ, contact obtained through 
suffering and asceticism. 
Most of Edsall’s observations and conclusions are valid. Her argument, however, 
succumbs to the problems she identifies in the preceding scholarship on the AW. She still 
treats the mysticism of the AW as lying within the traditional categories of purgation, ascent, 
and union despite her stated attempt to liberate the text from the conventional models that 
have overshadowed it. The AW is mystical because she is able to find the three stages within 
it, albeit rearranged and relocated. Her approach is therefore still reductive in that it makes 
the text’s spirituality reducible to the traditional triad and isolates those elements from the 
text as a whole. 
Edsall’s conclusion thus accounts for the data just as inadequately as Baldwin’s 
conflicting conclusion does. Baldwin argues that traces, tropes, images, and allusions to 
contemplation appear within the AW because they are a feature of the author’s world, and not 
because they are a part of the text’s spirituality. Edsall brings into focus what those images, 
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references and allusions are. She does not disprove Baldwin’s conclusion that they are only 
incidental, because she does not address Baldwin’s argument that the AW focuses on 
conscience rather than contemplation. We need to consider the AW author’s understanding of 
conscience and participation in the genre of conscience literature in order to demonstrate that 
Edsall’s conclusion is preferable to Baldwin’s. Nevertheless, Edsall valuably solidifies the 
connection between the AW and monastic spirituality. She argues that “the author builds his 
text around the doctrine of double complementary compunctions of fear and love,” 
influenced by Gregory the Great.90 Gregory’s work, as Jean Leclercq notes, “bridges the gap 
between the patristic age and the monastic culture of the Middle Ages.”91 
Mari Hughes-Edwards concurs that contemplative prayer forms a part of the AW’s 
spirituality. She maintains, however, that its understanding of contemplation is traditional, 
and only plays a very minor or incidental role. Meditation is more prominent than 
contemplation in the AW.92 Hughes-Edwards notes that “meditation can involve the deliberate 
imagination of a spiritual subject … or focus on an inanimate object … or on the ruminative 
reading of a spiritual text.”93 She argues that this “fosters a cognitive relationship with God,” 
but one “more apt to be comprehended intellectually than felt experientially.”94 The 
meditative “scene remains a tableau: an imaginary landscape, intensely visual, but 
cognitively intellectualised nonetheless, despite all attempts to draw the recluse literally into 
it.”95   
Hughes-Edwards’ conclusion misjudges the role that images played within 
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medieval psychology of imagination. Jennifer Bryan, for instance, argues that “[t]he 
transformative power of vision-with-desire was in fact one of the central tenets of late 
medieval devotion.”96 Bryan, nevertheless, takes a dimmer view of earlier medieval 
devotional writing with its “interiority of the cloister and anchorhold” which she argues “was 
a matter not of refined spiritual sensibilities, but of enclosure and inviolability.”97 She 
maintains that the interiority of texts like the AW was not crafted through positive imaginative 
meditation, but rather “[t]roped as a small, tightly contained space, … created and maintained 
through an obsessive attention to its borders.”98 
Other scholarship, by contrast, has described a perceptual shift that the AW effects 
through its reinterpretation of material circumstances. Gunn argues that “[t]he devotions of 
the anchoresses were centred not on the consumption of the body of Christ but on his 
presence to them.”99 Elizabeth Robertson argues that “[t]he anchoress is taught to leave the 
world … of objects perceived through the senses, and to transcend from these objects into 
connections to the transcendental signified, God.”100 The anchoress’ “body becomes Christ’s 
body on the cross” through “the redirection of the senses … to Christ’s suffering.”101 The AW 
thus conveys “more than just knowledge, it is a guide to practice that enables 
expansiveness.”102 
Susannah Mary Chewning similarly argues that anchoritic devotion “recognises 
Christ’s body and its beauty in abjection as a means of identifying with his loss of 
subjectivity” which is “crucial to the mystic’s expression of her own loss of identity.”103 The 
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anchoress “is ‘glad’ that Christ has been humiliated; soon she will take his suffering as her 
own.”104 The anchoress thus comes to perceive Christ present in her life by reinterpreting her 
suffering as Christ’s, which in turn becomes a source of paradoxical joy. 
Carmel Bendon Davis notes that the AW author “was at particular pains to make 
the connection between the anchoresses’ choice to follow Christ and their own cramped 
living conditions.”105 The connection manifests itself as an “inversion of light and dark, of 
life and death” that unites the anchoress to Christ inasmuch as she is “ostensibly dead to the 
world but ‘alive’ to spiritual possibilities just as Christ was alive after death.”106 Vincent 
Gillespie argues to similar effect that the inner rule of the AW acts “as a training ground in 
exegetical gestures and interpretative appropriation of symbolic spaces of gradually 
increasing complexity.”107 Gillespie notes the domestic imagery in the AW and argues that 
“[t]he key point … is almost certainly the alterity of the social model provided.”108 The 
imagery invests the anchoritic situation with an alien quality that works to facilitate the 
creation of a devotional space. The creation of images that surprise or inspire the 
reinterpretation of one’s environment is a trait of the contemplative conscience texts. 
A persistent debate runs throughout the scholarship on the AW, as charted here: a 
debate caused by the uneasy tension of material and spiritual, ethical and contemplative 
components of the AW. This thesis resolves the question by reading the AW’s conscience 
within the context of the conscience literature of its time. 
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Chapter One 
Peter of Celle 
1. Introduction 
 
Peter of Celle, a twelfth-century Benedictine, served as abbot first at Celle then 
subsequently St Remi. He enjoyed a brief appointment as bishop of Chartres before his death 
in 1183. Peter’s career and influence were mostly public rather than theological. He has, 
nevertheless, since come to be regarded as a contemplative figure. Hugh Feiss notes that 
“[t]he word ‘contemplation’ occurs frequently in his writings, as do other expressions used by 
medieval writers to describe the life of prayer,” but “his vocabulary is not precise, so … it is 
difficult to know what he means by contemplation.”1 Peter wrote four treatises on monastic 
themes, including his De Conscientia.  Portions of his De Conscientia were later incorporated 
into the pseudo-Bernardine De Interiori Domo, evidencing circulation and readership of 
Peter’s text. This chapter argues that Peter’s De Conscientia adapts the patristic moral 
conscience, creating a new kind of contemplative conscience that served as a paradigm for 
contemplative life. 
Feiss notes that Peter’s work on conscience “is one indication of a pervasive 
concern for interiority,” but says little about the relationship between conscience and 
contemplation in Peter’s writings.2  He observes, however, that “[c]onscience is the sanctuary 
of self-awareness, self-possession and the intentionality which animates one’s activities.”3 
Intentionality is an important aspect of Peter’s writings. Intent, for Peter, is “a 
particular perspective or resonance” that, along with similitudo, constitutes memory.4 Mary 
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Carruthers argues that, for Peter, “all learned matters have some ‘intention’ built into the way 
they are perceived and recollected.”5 She observes that his treatise De Afflictione et Lectione 
“analyses the fundamental monastic task of knowing self and God …, in response to a hostile 
new milieu (as [Peter] saw it) of Aristotelian-based scholastic rational argument.”6 Peter 
followed the classical Stoics and early Christian monastic writers, for whom theory and 
practice are inseparable. It follows as a consequence that “there is no such thing as truly 
disinterested reading or learning.”7  Monastic writers held “aesthetic experience … to be an 
essential cognitive experience, a necessary aspect of the process of human understanding.”8 
This “addition of emotion to rational activity does not make it therefore irrational. It makes it 
aesthetic, fully rational but, as human reason was understood to be, bound within sensory 
experience.”9 
Intentionality is also central to McGinn’s concept of mystical consciousness, as 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis. McGinn follows Bernard Lonergan’s account of 
consciousness. Lonergan defines intentionality as transitivity “in the psychological sense that 
by the operation one becomes aware of the object.”10 The operations in question are the 
constitutive elements of waking, human consciousness. They encompass the four, 
dialectically ascending levels of empirical perception, understanding, reasoning, and moral 
responsibility. McGinn argues that, in mystical texts, this organisation of consciousness is 
affected and transformed as “perception [of God] restructures the subject’s drive to 
understand, affirm, and live out the gift received.”11 McGinn has more conventionally 
acknowledged mystical texts in mind. He specifically applies his theory to the works of 
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Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa and John of the Cross.12 I contend, however, that this 
model is also useful for interpreting Peter of Celle’s writing on conscience. 
Peter wrote his De Conscientia at the request of Alcher of Clairvaux, a request 
Feiss speculates was prompted by Bernard’s numerous undefined references to conscience.13 
Peter’s treatise represents distinctly monastic, as opposed to scholastic, thought. Feiss notes 
that Peter “was not a logical writer, and does not seem in fact to have esteemed logic very 
highly.”14 The observation holds true of Peter’s writing on conscience: he provides a succinct 
definition of conscience but writes a long and meandering treatise that is not always 
consistent with his definition. Feiss designates it the “least organised” of Peter’s treatises.15 
Very little of it actually concerns the meaning of ‘conscience.’ Indirectness and frequent 
obscurity are integral to his work, constructing a highly affective and imaginative picture of 
the process by which conscience must be acquired. 
Peter does not seek to define conscience purely as an abstraction.  He sums up his 
approach: “[q]uid itaque sit conscientia, non diffinitione, sed quadam descriptione uideamus” 
(199/25-26).16  He writes, as he states, to improve the life of the reader as well as his own 
(193/17-18). The goal of the treatise is that Alcher may know and have a good conscience; 
the work’s emphasis falls heavily on the second of those two objectives.  None of this 
prevents Peter from offering a definition of conscience. Peter’s definition is, like much of his 
treatise, convoluted and contradictory. This chapter elucidates Peter’s understanding of self-
knowledge and untangles his conceptualisation of conscience. It then proceeds to examine 
Peter’s highly imaginative account of how conscience is to be acquired and the life of 
conscience lived. The tension between Peter’s definition and description of conscience is an 
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integral part of his treatise. 
2. Memory in the Present: Peter’s Definition of Conscience 
 
Peter expresses his intention to follow established conventions used “a 
doctoribus” in writing treatises (198/39-199/2).17 He nevertheless distinguishes his work from 
theirs and insists that his reader “in his litteris non scientiam quaerere, sed conscientiam” 
(199/21).18 
The opposition between knowledge and conscience (scientia and conscientia) 
recurs throughout the treatise. Its centrality to the work comes from Peter’s definition of 
conscience: “[c]onscientia est sui ipsius scientia uel de bono praesumens uel de malo 
diffidens” (199/26-27).19 The definition is recursive. How can conscience be ‘knowledge of 
itself’? In order to have conscience, one must already have a conscience of which to have 
knowledge. Peter does not explicitly attempt a solution to the problem, but one begins to take 
shape when he subsequently appeals to the supposed etymology of ‘conscience’: “conscientia 
est cordis scientia” (199/29).20 He concedes that “[v]idetur forte secundum hanc etymologiam 
non aliud esse conscientiam quam scientiam” (199/30-31).21 The etymology engenders 
confusion and thus leads Peter to distinguish between two kinds of knowledge within the 
heart. The first kind is “quae in corde est ad concipiendam forinsecae philosophicae 
disciplinam” (199/31-32).22 The second kind is “quae de corde intelligendo in corde melius 
moratur et utilius consecratur” (199/32-33).23 The former is scientia, the latter conscientia. 
Conscientia is therefore not reducible to cordis scientia, but is a specific 
instantiation of it. Cordis scientia itself – the knowledge within the heart – does not have 
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specific content. It is the precondition for knowledge, the raw materials that make knowledge 
a possibility. The two kinds of cordis scientia are interchangeable until they are directed 
towards their object. Their point of origin is the same: “[q]uando nouit se appellatur 
conscientia, quando praeter se alia, nominatur scientia” (199/37-38).24 This precondition of 
knowledge is not self-aware and must be realised as conscientia by inquiry and investigation 
into one’s life. If the investigation is not undertaken, then conscience is not realised, but the 
cordis scientia still exists. 
Thus, when Peter began to write his treatise, he discovered that he was ignorant 
of conscience. Soon, “meam magis erubescere coepi putrefactam conscientiam in operibus 
mortuis” (193/21-22).25 Peter acquires his conscience by investigating his life, and discovers 
that the newfound conscience is in a dire condition. The kind of conscience that emerges 
from the investigation will depend on the moral quality of the cordis scientia that is shaped 
and formed by conduct. The newly acquired conscience is not a clean slate.  
The conscience does not evaluate moral behaviour, although the moral quality of 
behaviour contributes to its condition. Conscience is, first and foremost, dependent on pursuit 
of conscience. Peter laments that, as it stands, “[m]ulti proinde quaerunt scientiam, pauci 
conscientiam” (200/4-5).26 The lack of conscience is not a result of sin, but of a failure to 
seek conscience. 
Success in the investigation is guaranteed if the necessary effort is expended on it, 
since the monk will not find anything in himself other than himself (200/7-9). Peter states that 
there is only one other possibility: “ad suam animam operante gratia inclinatam Dei 
imaginem occuparet” (200/10-11).27 This is the “creatrix imago in imagine creata” (200/11-
                                               
24 “… when it knows itself, it is called ‘conscience’; when it knows other things beside itself, it is called 
‘knowledge.’” 
25 “… I began to be greatly ashamed of my rotten conscience in its dead works.” 
26 “… as many seek knowledge, so few seek conscience.” 
27 “… he may seize the image of God inclined towards his soul.” 
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12).28 If this happens, “tunc illustratur conscientia, tunc cordis impletur scientia, tunc in se 
Deum et in Deo mutua reuolutione recipit se ipsam imago creata” (200/13-15).29 The 
edification of conscience is a necessary prerequisite for this condition. The search for one’s 
conscience turns out to be the search for God. 
The uninformed conscience, by contrast, is “misera … caeca … stulta” 
(194/10).30 Its misery comes about because “amat tenebras et quod miserius est, quaerit etiam 
miseriam cum miseria” (194/10-11).31 If the conscience were informed and “se agnosceret 
pulchra inter mulieres” (194/4), Peter is confident that “post uestigia gregum a se abiens 
paludosa itinera incideret” (194/5).32 Peter thus depicts the uninformed conscience as 
wandering. It does not interrogate the created order in search for God, as Augustine does in 
Book 10 of his Confessiones, but pursues worldly goods and ambitions because it knows no 
better.33 Worldly fortune “non miseria aestimatur” (194/14) to the point where not even 
“miseria detrahit difficultas” (194/14).34 Thus, unlike Augustine, Peter finds that 
dissatisfaction is not a sufficient impetus to keep the conscience searching. The conscience 
needs moral education. That education consists principally in apprehending affectively what 
the conscience is, hence Peter’s preference for description over definition. 
The discovery of God in the course of acquiring self-knowledge is rooted in 
Augustinian thought. Phillip Cary argues that the very idea of an ‘inner self’ within Western 
thought stems from Augustine’s implementation of Plotinus’ Neoplatonism in the service of 
Christian theology.  Cary writes that, “[i]n contrast to Plotinus, the inner space of the 
Augustinian soul is not divine but is beneath God, so that turning into the inside is not all 
                                               
28 “… the creator image in the created image.” 
29 “… the conscience is made bright, then the knowledge of the heart is fulfilled, then the created image receives 
God in itself, and in the same way, itself in God.” 
30 “… wretched … blind … foolish.” 
31 “… it loves darkness and – what is more woeful – it even seeks out woe with woe.” 
32 “… recognised itself as beautiful amongst women”; “it would break off departing from itself on marshy paths 
after the tracks of the herds.” See Cant. 1:7. 
33 See Augustine of Hippo, Confessionum Libri Tredecim X.6.9, (PL 32:783). 
34 “… is not deemed misery”; “hardship draws it away from misery.” 
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there is to finding God.”35 Augustine’s modification of Plotinus produced a non-divine self 
that is inner and in relation to God. For Augustine, “God is not only within the soul but above 
it as well,” and thus “Augustine’s inward turn requires a double movement: first in then 
up.”36 Ann Hartle notes similarly that Augustine’s “mind (his self) is to be understood only in 
terms of what is other than (above) his mind.”37 There is such thing as a self to be known, and 
it exists as a result of Augustine’s influence. That influence was especially pronounced at the 
time Peter was writing, as Robert Crouse notes: “So far as the twelfth century is 
concerned, … everything is Augustinian.”38 
Denys Turner reads two kinds of self-knowledge in Augustine’s thought. He 
designates the first as pre-reflexive, “simply the kind of self-awareness which is given in any 
conscious activity.”39 Augustine’s goal is to actualise reflexive self-knowledge which consists 
in “the redirecting of the mind upon its own activities so as to explicitate that inexplicit self-
awareness which is present in them.”40 The division of knowledge along these lines enables 
Turner to read Augustine’s writing as “a potential critique of ‘introspectionism.’”41 He 
concludes that “there is no such thing in Augustine as the experience, explicitly, of 
ourselves.”42 Thus, the “act of self-knowledge is primarily an act of epistemological 
inference, not an act of psychological introspection.”43 Attempts to directly ‘experience’ or 
‘perceive’ the mind succumb to the error Augustine cautions against: no mirror can possibly 
                                               
35 Phillip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 39. 
36 Cary, Augustine’s Invention, 39. 
37 Ann Hartle, “Augustine and Rousseau: Narrative and Self-Knowledge in the Two Confessions,” in The 
Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 264. 
38 Robert D. Crouse, “What Is Augustinian in Twelfth-Century Mysticism?,” in Augustine: Mystic and 
Mystagogue, ed. Frederick Van Fleteren, Joseph C. Schnaubelt, OSA, and Joseph Reino, Collectanea 
Augustiniana (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 408. 
39 Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 88. 
40 Turner, Darkness of God, 89. 
41 Turner, Darkness of God, 88. 
42 Turner, Darkness of God, 89. 
43 Turner, Darkness of God, 88. 
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reflect the mind.44 
The division between pre-reflexive and reflexive knowledge helps solve the 
recursivity of Peter’s conscience. It reveals conscientia as a third stage, an intermediary 
between pre-reflection and reflection. It provides the necessary ground for reflection. Cordis 
scientia exists pre-reflexively.  It possesses the central attribute Turner ascribes to 
Augustine’s pre-reflexive knowledge: it is experiential. Peter does not expressly address or 
explain the experiential properties of cordis scientia but they are implicit within his text. 
Cordis scientia is yet to be directed either internally (and thus converted into conscientia) or 
externally (and thus converted into scientia). Peter therefore implies that one is unaware of its 
presence in much the same way that Augustine is able to be conceptually unaware of the 
mind’s workings. Cordis scientia is thus, like Augustine’s pre-reflexive knowledge, 
“‘experiential’ in the sense that it is an intrinsic constituent of all conscious human 
experiencing.”45 If one has lived in a morally deficient way, the cordis scientia they have 
accrued will unreflectively cause them to experience worldly prosperity as attractive when, in 
reality, it is a source of “miseriam cum miseria” (194/10-11).46 Turner illustrates his reading 
of Augustine with the example of playing golf:  “enjoyment is the form consciousness of 
playing takes; it is the golf not the enjoyment we are conscious of.”47 Cordis scientia 
similarly needs an object in order to be realised.  
Cordis scientia retains its character and condition once it becomes realised as 
conscientia.  Peter is thus able to say that “[s]ecundum qualitatem namque uitae nascitur 
qualitas conscientiae” (227/4-5).48 It is therefore not innate or intrinsic but rather it grows, 
aggregates, and develops as life progresses. Nevertheless, conscience is not reducible to its 
moral quality. Even the chaste conscience “[d]ecore etenim immundo atque sterquilinio 
                                               
44 See Augustine of Hippo, De Trinitate X.5, (PL 42:975). 
45 Turner, Darkness of God, 89. 
46 “… woe with woe.” 
47 Turner, Darkness of God, 83. 
48 “… for according to the quality of a life a conscience is given birth.” 
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sordidior est sine Deo” (220/22-23).49 The moral life is an essential (but not the sole) 
ingredient in a good conscience – “ad conscientiam bonam non uenitur nisi per bonam uitam” 
(227/9-10).50 The immoral life results in a bad (but not a guilty) conscience. Life without 
seeking conscience results in no conscience at all. 
Conscientia emerges when cordis scientia remains within the heart, rather than 
being directed externally. Peter uses language of seeking and self-knowledge: “[s]i enim non 
longe a se peteret et se, intra seipso doctore, cum gratia inuestigans quid mirum si 
inueniretur?” (200/7-9).51 He parts company with Augustine, however, in his understanding 
of what self-knowledge means. Peter supplies several scriptural citations which he reads as 
descriptions of “illa sapientia quae in corde est” (199/38-39) after he has already said that 
“aequis passibus ad mentem ueniunt sapientia et conscientia, ut nunquam ueniat sapientia 
sine conscientia, nunquam conscientia sine sapientia” (196/34-36).52 The scriptural texts 
Peter selects do not depict an Augustinian conceptual knowledge of the soul’s nature, but a 
knowledge that informs or characterises its possessor’s approach to external things. Thus he 
cites Exodus 30:32: “Dedit Deus sapientiam in corde Beseleel ad facienda omnia opera siue 
ex auro, siue et argento” (199/39-40).53 Here conscience is not Beseleel’s self-knowledge but 
the practical skill God gives him to construct the Tabernacle and its associated objects. Peter 
writes that “de quodam dicitur” (200/1) in Job 9:4, “sapiens corde est et fortis robore” 
(200/1).54 Strength accompanies wisdom in the same way that wisdom accompanies 
conscience. Conscience thus results in a quality or condition – in this case, strength. It is, 
once again, an orientation of the cordis scientia analogous to a virtue rather than conceptual 
                                               
49 “… without God, is more sordid than a dung heap – even with its filthy glory.” 
50 “… good conscience is not arrived at except by a good life.” 
51 “… if, indeed, he would seek himself not far from himself, within himself, with a teacher, investigating with 
grace, what marvel is it if he is found?” 
52 “… that wisdom which is in the heart”; “… wisdom and conscience come to the mind with equal step, so that 
wisdom never comes without conscience and conscience never comes without wisdom.” 
53 “God gave Beseleel wisdom in his heart for the purpose of making all works, whether of gold or of silver as 
well.” 
54 “… it is said concerning a certain man”; “… the wise of heart is also strong with might.” 
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self-knowledge.  Wisdom 7:15, “[u]tinam det mihi Deus dicere haec ex sententia” (200/2-3), 
requests a condition (‘ex sententia’) from which the asker can act and live. The final text in 
Peter’s list is Psalm 36:28, “[o]s iusti meditabitur sapientiam, et lingua eius loquetur 
iudicium” (200/3-4).55 It, like the other texts, describes the condition that results from 
conscience which in this case is discernment. 
Peter’s conscience is a condition that must be cultivated and not an abstract 
knowledge of the mind’s nature and operation. It is better understood as a condition of self-
awareness that informs and shapes experience of other things. It also enables moral 
reflection. 
Peter introduces a step that is not present in Augustine’s account of self-
reflection. Conscience requires further scrutiny if one is to evaluate the moral character of 
their life. Peter makes conscience the “[s]peculum … mundum, clarum et purum totius 
religionis” (209/30).56 He goes so far as to state that “[n]on nouit se anima quae sine speculo 
est” (209/28-29).57 Peter justifies his comparison of conscience to a mirror as “[p]lane non 
inconsulte” (209/35) on the grounds that “in eo [forma] faciei expressae se ipsam solo intuitu 
oculorum interpretatur” (209/36-37).58 
Peter’s handling of the soul’s mirror differs from the use of the image familiar 
from patristic texts. Gregory the Great succinctly summarises the traditional idea: “Scriptura 
sacra mentis oculis quasi quoddam speculum opponitur ut interna nostra facies in ipsa 
videatur.”59 Augustine himself writes that “[p]osuit tibi speculum Scripturam suam.”60 
                                               
55 “… the mouth of the righteous shall meditate wisdom, and his tongue shall speak judgement.” 
56 “… clean, bright and pure mirror of all religion.” 
57 “… the soul which is without a mirror does not know itself.” 
58 “… clearly not careless”; “in it [a mirror], the form of the face shown is interpreted to itself by the regard of 
the eyes alone.” The word ‘forma’ is absent from Leclercq’s edition of the text. Feiss includes it in his list of 
emendations from MS Lisbon Alcobaça 232. Peter, Selected Works, 39. 
59 Gregory the Great, Moralium Libri Sive Expositio in Librum Job II.1, (PL 75:553C), “Sacred Scripture is 
placed before the eyes of the mind like a certain mirror, so that our inner face may be seen in it.” 
60 Augustine of Hippo, Enarrationes in Psalmos CII.1, (PL 37:1138), “… he has placed his Scripture as a mirror 
for you.” 
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Augustine urges, “vide quod es; et si tibi displicet, quaere ut non sis.”61 Here, however, 
Augustine makes Scripture a mirror only insofar as it is a standard or ideal for comparison. 
Gregory likewise elaborates that “[i]bi etenim foeda, ibi pulchra nostra cognoscimus.”62 
Scripture’s function as a moral mirror relies on the prior assumption that we know and 
understand our own conduct. Scripture makes the reader aware of moral shortcomings by 
supplying the standard. Its similarity to a mirror lies in the fact that both a mirror and 
Scripture make the viewer aware of shortcomings, not because it actually reflects like a 
mirror. 
Peter transfers the mirror from Scripture to conscience. Its primary use as a mirror 
is to make the monk aware of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his life: “in speculo conscientiae 
exitum et reditum illorum contemplemur” (209/17-18).63 Anyone who examines it “in 
speculo tam quod decens quam quod indicens in se est apprehendere poterit” (210/7-8).64 
Peter also makes a more dramatic claim for the mirror of conscience: “anima in quibus ab 
imagine ueritatis decebat uel in quibus uestigia creatricis imaginis recipiat in tabulis 
conscientiae relegit et intellegit.” (209/33-35).65 The mirror thus allows reflexive self-
awareness: an apprehension of what the imago Dei is and the failure to live in accordance 
with it. Conscientia is not itself this knowledge. Conscientia is the mirror. Examination of the 
mirror “solo intuitu oculorum” (109/37) leads to this knowledge. Peter’s mirror, unlike the 
patristic mirror, actually reflects something and the reflection itself is interpretative.66 
Peter’s conscientia is still cordis scientia in the sense that it is an integral 
component of all knowing and thinking, but it has been shaped and ordered in a particular 
                                               
61 Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos CII.1, (PL 37:1138), “… see what you are. If that displeases you, seek 
that you should not be so.” 
62 Gregory the Great, Moralium Libri II.1, (PL 75:553C), “there, indeed, we recognise our foulness; there we 
recognise our beauty.” 
63 “… in the mirror of conscience we contemplate the exit and return of those [gifts].” 
64 “… in this mirror shall be able to apprehend in himself what is becoming as well as what is unbecoming.” 
65 “… the soul rereads and understands from the tablets of conscience in which things it was made suitable by 
the image of truth, or in which things it recovers the traces of the creative image.“ 
66 “… by the regard of the eyes alone.” 
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way. Mary Carruthers argues that medieval “[m]emoria was … an integral part of the virtue 
of prudence, that which makes moral judgement possible,” and as such “it was in trained 
memory that one built character, judgement, citizenship, and piety.”67 Peter compares 
conscientia and memoria during his description of conscientia as a mirror.  Even “quod 
memoria labilis obliuionis diluuio forte amitteret tabularum beneficio etiam in tempora 
saecularia perpetuat” (210/1-3).68 Likewise, “anima, quantum attinet ad praesentiam, 
tamquam speculo utitur conscientia sua, quantum ad praeterita more tabularum fideliter 
conseruat” (210/3-5).69 Peter’s conscience is memory in the present rather than the past. 
Peter’s obscure and contradictory definition of conscience reveals some key 
features. Conscience needs to be acquired and cultivated because it is neither innate nor 
intrinsic. It is essential to cultivate conscience in order to apprehend the imago Dei in the soul 
which is, in turn, essential for attaining union with God both in the present and future life. 
Conscience is therefore a point of exchange between the soul and God. It is a kind of 
knowledge that exists between pre-reflexive and reflexive self-knowledge. The conscience 
can be either good or bad, but it is not a moral director. A bad conscience, therefore, is not a 
guilty conscience but a conscience that misunderstands the nature of things and actively 
desires what is evil rather than what is good. Conscience thus desires things and as such 
possesses affectivity. It is therefore intentional and not purely abstract knowledge. It is similar 
to memory in this respect, but unlike memory it is concerned with the present rather than the 
past. It is, as Peter puts it, “sui ipsius scientia uel de bono praesumens uel de malo diffidens” 
(199/26-27).70 It anticipates goodness and distrusts evil because it has been cultivated and 
shaped to do so. How, then, does one acquire a good conscience? What form does the pursuit 
                                               
67 Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture, vol. 10, Cambridge Studies 
in Medieval Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9. 
68 “… that which fallible memory loses to the flood of oblivion may endure for future eras with the benefit of 
tablets.” 
69 “… the soul uses its conscience as a mirror for present things, as it is the property of tablets to preserve past 
things faithfully.” 
70 “… conscience is knowledge of itself, either anticipating good or distrusting evil.” 
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of conscience take? 
3. Acquiring a Conscience: Peter’s Description of Conscience 
 
Peter explains how to acquire a good conscience on at least four different 
occasions throughout the text. Each account maps a similar trajectory: fear results in 
disciplined living. Discipline cultivates and then culminates in the love of God. Peter depicts 
the process differently in each instance. The first characterises disciplined living as a fiery 
chariot bearing the soul towards heaven (196/34-197/28). The second creates an image of the 
conscience as God’s guest chamber, prepared by purity and grace (200/16-34). The third and 
longest of the four accounts focuses on the work of God as Trinity in the construction of 
conscience as a building (203/24-206/37). The fourth similarly depicts the conscience as the 
construction of a building, this time a tower. The fourth account inverts the third, however, by 
describing the life of the person pursuing conscience rather than God’s involvement (211/1-
212/8). Each account is complete and could potentially stand alone. Why, then, does Peter 
provide four? What do they reveal about conscience and its acquisition? I shall answer this 
question by explicating how Peter’s approach to the composition of his treatise relates to the 
acquisition of conscience, and then consider each individual account of the acquisition of 
conscience. 
a. Description and Composition 
 
The first line of Peter’s treatise equates the process of acquiring good conscience 
with inquiry into conscience: “[r]eligiosa mens religiosa curiositate quaerit de religione 
conscientiae ut sciat, imo ut habeat conscientiam bonam” (193/3-4).71 Peter’s composition of 
the treatise therefore participates in the pursuit of conscience insofar as it is an inquiry into 
conscience; he writes “[a]mplector questionem, magis quidem ut discam quam ut doceam” 
                                               
71 “… the religious mind seeks with religious eagerness concerning the religion of conscience, so that it may 
know or, rather, so that it may have a good conscience.” 
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(193/4-5).72 Peter also introduces the distinction between conscientia and scientia in the 
opening of his treatise.  He describes himself “sicut talpa quaerens uenire ad lucem 
conscientiae, quamuis caream lumine scientiae” (193/8-9).73 The distinction recurs later when 
Peter also distinguishes between definition and description. He notes that the reader may look 
elsewhere for scientia, but “habeat hanc membranulum ad inuestigationem et informationem 
conscientiarum. Quid itaque sit conscientia, non diffinitione, sed quadam descriptione 
uideamus” (199/24-26).74 The two distinctions go together. Definition pertains to scientia and 
description pertains to conscientia. The second citation from Peter’s treatise illuminates the 
first. The kind of inquiry that Peter undertakes is the kind of inquiry that results in 
conscience: a wide-ranging, image-rich, descriptive exploration. 
Peter’s treatise brims with vivid and frequently obscure imagery. The imagery is 
deliberately difficult. Carruthers writes that within monastic literature, “[t]he more [rhetorical 
tropes] need ‘chewing,’ the more difficult they are, the richer their nourishment for a mind 
engaged in memory work,” and “by the time of Hugh of St Victor, obscure figures have 
become the particular object of meditation.”75 Imagery is vital because it “signals not just a 
subject-matter (res) but a ‘mood’ (modus, color), an ‘attitude’ (intentio), and a reading 
‘tempo.’”76 Peter acknowledges that definition and description can serve the same end 
inasmuch as both enable the reader to know what conscience is. However, he contrasts the 
two and specifies that one cannot be substituted for the other. His description is not a 
definition and should not be read as one. It is possible to glean details about conscience from 
it, but that is not its primary function. Its primary function is the edification of the conscience. 
Peter states early in the treatise that “[p]erutile namque est conscientiam lentis et diuturnis 
                                               
72 “… I embrace the question so that I might learn rather than so I might teach.” 
73 “… like a mole seeking to come to the light of conscience even though I am without the light of knowledge.” 
74 “… let the reader have this little parchment for the investigation of and information about consciences.” 
75 Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200, vol. 34, 
Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 124. 
76 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, 117. 
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confricationum meditationibus ad seipsam confouere ut lata quiescat” (194/1-3).77 Carruthers’ 
observation holds true for Peter: “[t]he first question one should ask of … an image is not 
‘What does it mean?’ but ‘What is it good for?’”78 What, then, is Peter’s imagery good for? 
There are two broad categories of imagery within the treatise. The first includes 
imagery that depicts the conscience. The second, by contrast, includes imagery that depicts 
the attainment of conscience. The first category describes conscience in grandly panegyric 
terms: “[s]oror angelorum est” (195/23), “titulus est religionis … templum est Salomonis, … 
ager est benedicitonis, … hortus est deliciarum, … est arca faederis, … est scyphus 
Ioseph, … est thesaurus regius, … est aula Dei, … est liber signatus et clausus, …” (195/26-
31).79 Such imagery fosters an affective apprehension of what conscience is and stimulates 
desire for it. 
Peter relies especially on the rhetorical device of enargeia. He discusses it at 
length as the crowning achievement of a good conscience, and he also makes use of it 
throughout the text. Enargeia was a trope typical of classical rhetoric. Carruthers argues that 
it was adopted by Christian writers as well, although they did not use the term.80 She 
describes enargeia as “vivid, sensuous word-painting.”81 Henrich Plett notes that enargeia 
renders things “present and, as it were, visibly exhibited. This comes about primarily through 
a detailed description that makes use of circumstantiae …, which lend immediacy and 
concreteness.”82 Thus “the orator is able to create … imaginary scenes. These present the 
verbal utterance of a narratio in such a way that the events described seem to be happening 
                                               
77 “… it is thoroughly useful that the conscience attend itself with the vigorous rubbing of long slow, 
meditations so that it may rest happy.” 
78 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, 118. 
79 “[Conscience] is the sister of the angels”; “it is the title of religion, … it is the temple of Solomon, … it is the 
field of blessing, … it is the garden of delights, … it is the Ark of the Covenant, … it is the goblet of Joseph, … 
it is the royal treasure, … it is the court of God, … it is the book sealed and closed.” 
80 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, 133. 
81 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, 130. 
82 Heinrich F. Plett, Enargeia in Classical Antiquity and the Early Modern Age: The Aesthetics of Evidence, vol. 
4, International Studies in the History of Rhetoric (Boston: Brill, 2012), 8. 
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hic et nunc before the inner eye of the recipient.”83 The primary function of enargeia is “to 
evoke affects, either of pleasantly moderate ethos or of intensely passionate pathos.”84 Jane 
Heath distinguishes between two moments ingredient in enargeia. The first, “the ‘ontological 
moment’ of enargeia persuades the audience that what is absent is really present,” and the 
second, “the ‘affective moment’ of enargeia makes the audience aware of the tension 
between seeming presence and real absence. Longing for real presence ensues.”85 
Enargeia thus naturally lends itself to meditations in the tradition of Anselm’s: 
meditations that invite the reader to envision historical events from the life of Christ and 
eschatological scenes such as the Last Judgement.86 McGinn notes a metamorphosis in the 
practice of meditatio during the eleventh century.87 Earlier meditatio consisted of “the 
repeating of a scriptural text in order to commit it to memory.”88 Scripture was its principal 
subject matter and it “aimed at an internal effect, the personal appropriation of the word of 
God.”89 Later meditations such as Anselm’s build on the earlier foundation but also involve 
“a transposition of … theology into a different key, a prayerful melody that is meant to 
inspire our gratitude to the Redeemer and to inflame our longing for heaven.”90 However, 
they still retain “meditatio in the traditional monastic sense, that is, internalisation.”91 
Enargeia facilitates internalisation through its affective engagement of the reader. The text 
provides impetus for the image, but the reader mentally constructs it from the resources 
contained within the memory.92 Carruthers summarises: “What matters is not whom we raise 
                                               
83 Plett, Enargeia, 9. 
84 Plett, Enargeia, 10. 
85 Jane M. F Heath, “Absent Presences of Paul and Christ: Enargeia in 1 Thessalonians 1–3,” Journal for the 
Study of the New Testament 32, no. 1 (2009): 5. 
86 See, for example, Anselm of Canterbury, Liber Meditationum et Orationum II, (PL 158:722). 
87 Bernard McGinn, The Growth of Mysticism, vol. 2, The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian 
Mysticism (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996), 135. 
88 McGinn, Growth of Mysticism, 135. 
89 McGinn, Growth of Mysticism, 135. 
90 McGinn, Growth of Mysticism, 137. 
91 McGinn, Growth of Mysticism, 138. 
92 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 131. 
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up before our minds’ eyes, but the gist … which our images convey.”93 
Peter utilises enargeia during his protracted image of conscience as a lady at a 
banquet (200/34-202/9). Peter states that he shall fashion an image: “[d]e cuius habitudine ut 
tibi exemplum faciam” (200/34).94 He then shifts creative responsibility by impelling the 
reader to imaginative creation of their own: “in animo finge, quod etiam ad pietatem 
deuotionis mentem compungat” (200/34-35).95 He hopes that doing so will “de uisibili 
exemplo ad inuisibilem contemplationem animam accendat” (200/36-37).96 
The image of the lady at the banquet thus operates according to the two moments 
Heath identifies as constitutive of enargeia. Peter constructs the ontological moment with a 
series of imperatives and subjunctives commanding the reader to envision the scene, while he 
simultaneously paints the scene for the reader to envision: “Pone itaque mensam uarietate et 
plenitudine diuersorum ferculorum refertam” (200/37-38), “Constitue regem in diademate 
suo coronatum” (201/1), “Sint uasa aurea et argentea” (201/4).97 He creates a sense of 
anticipatory immediacy and invites the reader’s creative involvement, asking “[q]uid plura?” 
(201/11).98  
Carruthers observes that the reader’s participation in creating the scene is 
necessary, since “Peter does not describe each detail: as he says, he fashions an example to be 
imitated, not a recipe.”99 She especially notes Peter’s use of “the locational verb pono, which 
is the root of ‘dispose,’ at work.”100 She describes Peter’s scene as an instance of ‘locational 
memory’ in that Peter instructs the reader to “make a place for [the] mind’s eye.”101 It is 
therefore an instance of ekphrasis – the specific subset of enargeia that consists of 
                                               
93 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 131. 
94 “… in order to make an example for you from its condition.” 
95 “… shape within your mind that which might inspire the mind even to the piety of devotion.” 
96 “… it might kindle the soul to invisible contemplation from the visible example.” 
97 “Set a table replete with a variety and plenitude of diverse dishes.”; “Establish a king adorned with his 
crown.”; “Let there be gold and silver vessels.” 
98 “…what more?” 
99 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 207. 
100 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 206. 
101 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 206. 
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“description of a work of art or architecture, imagined or actual.”102 
The affective moment within Peter’s enargeia occurs on two levels. On one level, 
the lady of the banquet is initially absent. Peter’s description of the scene creates a sense of 
anticipation for her eventual appearance. The second affective moment underlies the first. It 
arises from the nature of the image as an image rather than materially perceptible reality. The 
imaginative scene intrinsically contains an affective moment since, as Heath notes, 
“[e]nargeia … achieves only a seeming presence, not the solid reality.”103 The image thus 
retains this quality even after the lady arrives. The second affective moment therefore 
eclipses the first, but derives momentum from it. 
The lady of the banquet only appears once the scene has been set. Peter has his 
reader envision the circumstantiae of the banquet in order to foreground her absence. He 
introduces her to the reader by describing her empty seat: “Vacet tamen interim locus prae 
aliis spatiosus et speciosus, reginae et matrifamilias singulariter praeparatus” (201/12-14).104 
Finite verbs immediately preceding this line have appeared later in or at the end of their 
sentences (e.g. 201/7, 9, 12). Peter reverses the word order, placing the verb vacet in the 
sentence-initial position.  
The absence of the lady is jarring. Peter directs the reader’s affective response by 
describing the guests at the feast. The reader, like the dinner guests, is to eagerly anticipate 
the lady’s arrival: “[o]mnia interim et uultus et singultus sedis illius repletionem exoptent” 
(201/15-16).105 Peter once again emphasises the lack, the inconsistency in the picture of an 
otherwise perfect banquet. ‘Repletionem’ of the vacant seat is the object of expectation and 
not the arrival of the lady herself. 
                                               
102 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 130. 
103 Heath, “Absent Presences,” 28. 
104“… meanwhile, let the space that is spacious and beautiful before the others, singularly prepared for the queen 
and lady of the household, remain vacant.” 
105 “… meanwhile, both faces and sighs long for that seat to be filled.” 
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The lady arrives “[t]andem ueniens” (201/15).106 The sun and moon 
“pulchritudinem … mirantur” (201/17).107 Her name is finally revealed from “[s]crinia 
mystica” (201/18) after all of the anticipation and wonder has been established: “conscientia 
appellatur haec domina” (201/19-20).108 Peter then proceeds to describe her beauty and attire, 
“typice legens” (201/27).109 He thus pairs the lady’s physical features (usually drawn from the 
Song of Songs) with the abstract qualities they allegorically represent: “habet oculos 
smaragdinos propter castitatis perpetuum uirorem” (201/30-31) and “labia fauo et melle 
redundantia, propter mystici eloquii suauitatem” (201/34-35).110 
What, returning to Carruthers’ question, is this particular image ‘good for’? She 
concludes that “[t]he sequential phrases of this descriptio are used as a thematic outline for 
the rest of this whole section of the meditation. Biblical texts and commentary continue to be 
attached to the picture elements, in the manner of [this] brief excerpt … Peter refers to this as 
a habitual way of reading.”111 Her answer is certainly correct, but the passage is much more. 
Peter stipulates that he intends it to “ad inuisibilem contemplationem animam accendat” 
(200/37).112 The image accordingly relies on the power of the affective moment in enargeia 
to orchestrate anticipation and desire. The reader desires to see the lady of conscience while 
she is absent from the feast. The whole scene fades when she appears, since “gaps between a 
real absence and a vivid presence characteristically occasion a shift in thought and sentiment 
to desire for that which is absent.”113 The initial anticipation and desire to see the lady of the 
banquet amplifies the longing for what the imaginary scene as a whole signifies. 
We have seen that Peter defines conscience as an affective knowledge insofar as it 
                                               
106 “… coming at last” 
107 “… marvel at her beauty.” 
108 “… secret scrolls”; “… this lady is called ‘conscience.’” 
109 “… reading [them] figuratively.” 
110 “… she has emerald-green eyes because of the eternal freshness of chastity”; “her lips overflow with 
honeycomb and honey, because of the sweetness of mystical speech.”  
111 Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 207. 
112 “… kindle the soul to invisible contemplation from the visible example.” 
113 Heath, “Absent Presences,” 22. 
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is a kind of knowledge that desires or is affectively oriented towards different things. It is in 
need of moral education in order for it to desire as it ought. Peter asks rhetorically, “Putas si 
se agnosceret pulchra inter mulieres, quod deinceps post uestigia gregum … incideret?” 
(194/4-5).114 The image of the lady at the banquet presents the conscience as “pulchra inter 
mulieres.”115 The image thus shows the good conscience as desirable and thereby focuses 
desire on attaining it. The image creates an instantiation of conscience in the reader insofar as 
it creates desire for conscience in the reader, because conscience itself desires either good or 
bad.  
The image, therefore, is valuable as an image and not merely as an allegorical 
representation of the qualities that the reader ought to cultivate. Conscience is the kind of 
knowledge that an image can create and the condition that can be brought about by 
meditating on an image. Peter uses Solomon’s temple as an image for the conscience and 
writes: “De silua enim motuum ac phantasmatum nostrorum idonea et habilia structurae 
templi Salomonis ligna uelut bona materia sunt eligenda” (204/20-23).116 Reading and 
meditation are integral in shaping stirrings and fantasies. Peter thus writes four separate 
accounts of how to acquire conscience. Imagery and imaginative engagement are more 
important than doctrinal exposition or theological instruction. Peter is concerned to facilitate 
the acquisition of conscience and, as such, there is no need for him to avoid doctrinal 
repetition. This is the form that the acquisition of conscience takes. I will now turn to its 
content by comparing how each of Peter’s accounts characterises the three stages of 
conscience delineated earlier: fear, discipline, and love. 
i. The Chariot 
 
                                               
114 “… do you think, if it recognised itself as beautiful among women, that it would fall into the tracks of the 
herds?” 
115 “… beautiful amongst women.” 
116 “Even from the forest of our stirrings and fantasies, suitable and fit beams for the construction of Solomon’s 
temple must be chosen as good material.” 
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The sequence of discipline and love first appears in Peter’s introductory epistle. 
Discipline enables its possessor to ascend “non cursu praecipiti et inordinato ut Satan” 
(297/10-11) and makes its possessor a child of God (197/13-15).117 Peter therefore commands 
his reader “[a]pprehende itaque disciplinam ubi caeduntur et dolantur ligna cedrina” (297/12-
13).118 This is the first appearance of the image of cutting wood for construction which, as we 
have seen, takes on vital importance in Peter’s approach to the cultivation of conscience. The 
soul is “[c]aesura uero disciplinae conquadratus et coaptatus” (197/15).119 The use of the 
image connects this earlier passage with the later, “[d]e silua enim motuum ac phantasmatum 
nostrorum idonea … ligna … sunt eligenda” (204/20-23).120 The necessary discipline thus 
consists of both moral observance and disciplined thought. 
Peter stresses the desire for discipline more than discipline itself, citing Wisdom 
6:18-21 to say that “initium illius uerissima est disciplinae concupiscentia” (197/3-4) and 
“concupiscientia itaque sapientiae deducet ad regnum perpetuum” (197/6-7).121 Peter urges 
“[d]esideras regnum et praecipue perpetuum” (197/9-10).122 The kingdom is reached by a 
horse-drawn chariot, an image that recurs throughout Peter’s treatise: “sapientia scilicet et 
conscientia, tanquam uehiculum proprium animam deducunt” (196/37-38).123  
Peter adapts Jerome’s image of the soul as a heaven-bound chariot, and urges his 
reader: “Ecce currus igneus et equi ignei” (197/8).124 Wisdom and conscience are the two 
horses that draw it, replacing the virtues in Jerome’s text.125 Jerome has the chariot carry the 
                                               
117 “… not by a precipitous and disorderly course, like Satan.” 
118 “… therefore seize discipline, where cedar beams are cut and hewn.” 
119 “… truly squared and assembled by the cutting of discipline.” 
120 “Even from the forest of our stirrings and fantasies, suitable and fit beams for the construction of Solomon’s 
temple must be chosen as good material.” 
121 “… the beginning of wisdom is the truest desire for discipline”; “thus desire for wisdom shall draw [you] to 
the Eternal Kingdum.” 
122 “… you desire a kingdom and particularly an eternal one.” 
123 “… clearly wisdom and conscience draw the soul like its own vehicle.” 
124 “Behold the flaming chariot and flaming horses.” 
125 Jerome, Epistolae 52:13, (PL 22:538). See István B. Bejczy, The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: A 
Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century, vol. 202, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual 
History (Boston: Brill, 2011), 18. 
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person “velut aurigam Christi,” but Peter makes God the charioteer (197/8).126 Peter does not 
specify what the chariot itself signifies. His only clue is that God and the two horses 
“deferunt non amphoram, sed animam” (197/8-9), making the chariot the disciplined life that 
is necessary in order to attain the “regnum … perpetuum” (197/9).127 Several lines later, Peter 
enjoins the reader to “[r]egna ergo in regno conscientiae” (197/27).128 Peter’s injunction is the 
first of his equations of conscience and the Kingdom of Heaven. The attainment of 
conscience is therefore more than a monastic discipline performed with the goal of eventually 
attaining the vision of God in heaven. Peter collapses the means and the end. God is present 
within the conscience. 
Discipline aims to attain freedom from corruption and “[i]ncorruptio facit 
proximum esse Deo” (197/6).129 Peter writes, “[s]ed uenienti Domino oppone et expande 
palliolum incorruptionis, ut inuoluas sindone tali, non iam corpus Iesu, sed ipsam Trinitatis 
gratiam ad te uenientem et in te manentem” (197/22-25).130 Peter references the Resurrection 
of Christ in Matthew 27:59 but replaces Christ’s body in the shroud with the grace of the 
Trinity. The effect is twofold. Peter invokes Christ bodily and causes the reader to think about 
Christ’s body even by negating its presence. The reader becomes the burial shroud, free from 
corruption because dead to the world. The second effect replaces the envisioned body with 
the living grace of the Trinity. It draws the reader’s attention to the presence of God within 
the conscience. The image thus, like that of the banquet, “de uisibili exemplo ad inuisibilem 
contemplationem animam accendat” (200/36-37).131  
Love completes the creation of the conscience because love and discipline are 
                                               
126 Jerome, Epistola 52:13, (PL 22:538), “… as Christ’s charioteer.” 
127 “… carry not a jug but the soul”; “eternal kingdom.” 
128 “… reign, therefore, in the kingdom of conscience.” 
129 “… freedom from corruption makes one close to God.” 
130 “… but set out and spread out a cloak of incorruptibility before the approaching Lord, so that you may 
enwrap with fine linen not now the body of Jesus but the very grace of the Trinity coming to you and 
remaining within you.” 
131 “… kindles the soul to invisible contemplation from the visible example.” 
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synonymous. Peter’s citation of Wisdom 6:18-21 introduces discipline first, but then reveals 
it to be love, “[c]ura ergo dsciplinae, dilectio est, et dilectio custodia legum illius est” (197/4-
5).132 The discipline that equates to love – namely, the observance of the law – is also the 
freedom from corruption Peter discusses, “[c]ustoditio autem legum, consummatio 
incorruptionis est” (197/5-6).133 
Peter elucidates the congruence of love and discipline with an allegorical reading 
of the New Jerusalem. He alludes to the apocalyptic description of the heavenly city in 
Revelation 21:16, “quae in quadro posita est” (197/16).134 He replaces the city with the 
person shaped by the cutting and hewing of discipline (197/15). The heavenly city’s 
dimensions become the “latitudinem, longitudinem, profunditatem et altitudinem charitatis” 
(197/16-17).135 Caritas is Peter’s innovation; it is absent from the biblical text he references. 
Its presence in Peter’s text converts the work of discipline into love and renders them both the 
dwelling place of God. Peter accordingly instructs the reader, “apprehende et tene ipsam 
dilectionem” (197/17-18) in the same way that he instructs, “[a]pprehende itaque 
disciplinam” (197/13).136 Love is present within discipline. The relationship between the 
presence of God and the conscience becomes clearer in light of Peter’s subsequent accounts 
of the acquisition of conscience. 
ii. The Guest Chamber 
 
The second of Peter’s accounts returns to the theme of incorruptibility embracing 
grace. It comes after Peter discusses the soul’s apprehension of the imago Dei. Then 
“[p]uritas uero suscipit praeparare animam, ne uerbi maiestas recuset gremium cordis” 
                                               
132 “… therefore, concern for discipline is love, and love is the keeping of its laws.” 
133 “… observance of laws is the consummation of freedom from corruption.” 
134 “… which has been built in a square.” 
135 “… width, length, depth, and height of charity.” 
136 “… seize and hold love itself”; “therefore seize discipline.” 
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(200/17-19).137 Peter does not expressly discuss discipline in this passage, but his emphasis 
on purity of heart clearly implies it. Purity works hand-in-hand with grace to effect “hanc 
animae nostrae et uerbi Dei refusionem” (200/16) because “uelit Deus in nobis infundi” 
(200/17).138 The conscience is thus the soul’s capacity for receiving God. 
Peter depicts the good conscience as God’s guest-chamber: “Istae quae … 
conscientiam gratam Deo exhibent angelis et hominibus reuerendam, sibi ipsi pacatam et 
quietam.”139 The things referenced are grace (200/19, 20), piety (200/19), and purity (200/17, 
20). All collaborate: “Gratia deducit Deum ad hopsitium nostrum, pietas satagit circa fidele 
obsequium” (200/19-20).140 Peter once again alludes to the life of Christ. His verbiage recalls 
Christ’s visit to the home of Mary and Martha in Luke 10:40: “Martha autem satagebat circa 
frequens ministerium.”141 The invocation of the scene from the gospel once again draws the 
reader’s mind meditatively to the earthly life of Christ and thus, once more, shapes thought in 
the necessary pattern for conscience. The use of the verb satago links Peter’s passage with 
the scriptural text, but unexpectedly compares the preparation of conscience with the active 
life of Martha. The implication, however, is that the resulting “conscientiam … pacatam et 
quietam” (200/22-23) parallels the contemplative life of Mary.142 
The conscience as a chamber recalls Peter’s earlier characterisation of it as an 
inner room. Peter interprets Christ’s commandment to “[i]ntra in cubiculum tuum” (194/30) 
in Matthew 6:6 as a command to withdraw into the chamber of conscience: “Quod est 
cubiculum tuum nisi conscientiae secretum?” (194/30-31).143 The withdrawal into conscience 
is implicitly synonymous with freedom from corruption insofar as withdrawal into 
                                               
137 “… truly, purity undertakes to prepare the soul, lest the majesty of the Word reject the bosom of the heart.” 
138 “… this outpouring of the Word of God and our soul”; “God wishes to be poured into us.” 
139 “Those very things which present the conscience as pleasing to God, worthy of reverence to angels and men, 
and peaceful and restful to itself.” 
140 “Grace leads God to our guest chamber, piety busies about faithful obedience.” 
141 “… but Martha was busying about constant service.” 
142 “… peaceful and quiet conscience” 
143 “… enter into your room”; “What is your room but the secret place of conscience?” 
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conscience keeps the conscience from desiring the miseries that would otherwise make it 
wicked – namely, the temptations of worldly vanity (194/13-15) and prosperity (194/16-17).  
Entry into conscience requires the shutting out of all external things: “clauso ostio 
exteriorum sensuum” (195/1).144 It also requires silence: “[q]uod ostium nisi os tuum?” 
(194/31-32).145 It is undertaken “ut uoce sua cor clamet ad Dominum” (194/35).146 Peter 
depicts someone who has withdrawn into conscience as a wife who speaks to her husband 
silently, “[u]xor enim illa quae non per arterias gutteris aerem istum molestat, sed secreto 
itinere spiritus in spiritu et ueritate Spiritum Sanctum pulsat” (195/1-3).147 Her silent prayers 
contrast with spoken prayers, “[a]uditur autem sine pulsu soni” (195/4), and she is much 
more effective at prayer, “efficacior est in petitionibus suis” (195/3).148 Her silent, spiritual 
prayers consist of affections rather than ordered words, “cito mouetur affectio cordis” 
(195/5).149 The stirring of affection is powerful because “[a]ffectio enim … Deo et sibi 
concordat” (195/5).150 
Peter turns immediately from the description of conscience as guest chamber to a 
heavenly scene in the throne room of God. The purity and grace that have prepared the guest 
chamber suddenly become the “duae oliuae et duo candelabra lucentia ante Dominum” 
(200/23-24) of Revelation 11:4.151 The two candelabras and trees affect the eyes of both God 
and the contemplative: “una qua compassione miserarium nostrarum reflectitur sublimis ille 
oculus maiestatis” (200/24-25) and “altera qua … oculus faciei nostrae conturbatus ad 
medelam inungitur” (200/26-28).152 Their eyes are drawn together in a mutual gaze. 
                                               
144 “… with the door of the exterior senses closed.” 
145 “… what is the door but your mouth?” 
146 “… so that the heart may cry to God with its voice.” 
147 “… indeed, the wife who does not burden the very air with the passages of her throat, but strikes the Holy 
Spirit with a secret journey of the spirit, in spirit and in truth.” 
148 “… but she is heard without a pulse of sound”; “she is more efficacious in her petitions.” 
149 “… the affection of the heart is swiftly stirred up.” 
150 “… affection, indeed, … brings God and itself into harmony.” 
151 “… two olive trees and two candelabras shining before the Lord.” 
152 “… one by which that eye of sublime majesty is turned back with compassion for our miseries”; “the other 
by which the diseased eye of our face is anointed for its cure.” 
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The transformation of the house servants to the candelabras and trees is abrupt, 
without transition or explanation. The inner room, which is simultaneously God’s guest 
chamber that must be prepared for him, is also the court of heaven. Peter’s interiority is more 
affective than intellectual and, as such, imagination and the use of images are appropriate for 
it.  
iii. Solomon’s Temple 
 
Peter returns to the image of the chariot in the third of his four accounts of 
conscience. The meaning of the image has undergone a shift. The chariot earlier represented 
the disciplined life, drawn by the two horses of conscience and wisdom. The chariot now 
represents the soul (203/17). God remains the charioteer (203/16), but now – as in Jerome’s 
image – he “in quatuor equis principalium uirtutum, id est prudentia, iustitia, fortitudine, 
temperantia ad suam dirigat uoluntatem” (203/17-19).153 The chariot is “ad coelum tollitur” 
(203/21).154 Peter uses the movement of the horses to envision the disciplined life that leads 
to heaven, “frena ab anteriori parte trahit prudentia; a dextra, iustitia; a sinistra, fortitudine; 
posteriori, temperantia non discordi motu, sed consono” (203/19-21).155 Peter concludes his 
discussion of the chariot by equating the life of discipline he has just described with heaven: 
“Parum denique est bonae conscientiae esse in coelis nisi et ipsa coelum fiat” (203/22-23).156 
He once more transposes the earthly life of the conscience with the life of heaven. God 
becomes present within the conscience by transforming the conscience into heaven: “Efficitur 
enim coelum per inhabitantem Spiritum eius qui fecit coelum et terram et habitat in coelis” 
(203/24).157 
                                               
153 “… directs it to his will in the four horses of the cardinal virtues – that is, prudence, justice, fortitude and 
temperance.” 
154 “… carried to heaven.” 
155 “… prudence draws the reins from the front part, justice from the right, fortitude from the left and 
temperance from behind – not with discordant movement, but  harmonious movement.” 
156 “Finally, it is insufficient for the good conscience to be in heaven unless it, itself, becomes heaven.” 
157 “Indeed, it is turned into heaven through the habitation of the Spirit in it of the one who made heaven and 
earth and who dwells in the heavens.” 
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Peter explains the transformation of conscience into heaven with his most 
extensive and complex description of the acquisition of conscience. The description envisions 
the conscience as a construction project: “Fundamentum iacit timor, parietes construit humilis 
subiectio, tectum superaedificat sublimis dilectio” (204/15-17).158 Peter stresses that the 
human activity necessary to acquire conscience corresponds to divine activity. God is present 
and involved from the earliest stages of the process: “scilicet Verbum, Dominus et Spiritus 
oris eius creant, formant et ornant caelum conscientiae: Dominus quidem creat, Verbum 
firmat, Spiritus ornat” (203/26-28).159  
Peter interprets each stage as evidence of God’s specifically Trinitarian presence. 
His account of conscience results in a decidedly non-Augustinian interpretation of the imago 
Dei when “ad conscientiae trinitatem uel dispositionem intentionem nostram uertamus” 
(203/33).160 Peter thus equates the arrangement or dispositio of conscience with a trinity of 
sorts. The rightly ordered conscience is a trinitas creata. Its three constituents differ sharply, 
however, from Augustine’s ternary of reason, memory, and will.161 Peter’s are fear, 
submission, and love. Peter’s use of the word dispositio recalls his earlier use of the verb 
pono to construct the scene of the lady at the banquet. The image of the banquet was an 
exercise in focusing and shaping thought. Fear, submission or obedience, and love are the 
goals of the exercise. I shall consider Peter’s handling of fear, obedience, and love. 
The process of constructing conscience begins with the conscience in its naturally 
corrupt moral state, since “[n]isi timeat conscientia, facinus quodlibet attentat uel perpetrat” 
(204/12-13).162 Fear is therefore vital. It corresponds to the desire for discipline with which 
Peter began his first account of conscience. In the first instance, “initium illius uerissima est 
                                               
158 “Fear lays the foundation, humble subjection constructs the walls, sublime love builds a roof over the top.” 
159 “… clearly, the Word, the Lord, and the Spirit of his mouth create, form and ornament the heaven of 
conscience: the Lord indeed creates, the Word makes strong, the Spirit ornaments.”  
160 “… let us now turn our intention to the trinity or arrangement of conscience.” 
161 See Augustine, De Trinitate X.12, (PL 42:984). 
162 “… the conscience attempts or perpetrates whatever crime it pleases, unless it is afraid.” 
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disciplinae concupiscentia” (197/3-4).163 In the present instance, the desire for discipline 
originates with fear since fear lays the foundation of conscience and “certe machinam huius 
aedificii timor componit” (204/17).164 The work of fear – “de compoisitione quam timor 
facit” (204/31) – consists in the preparation and arrangement of the raw materials it finds 
within the heart, the hitherto undirected cordis scientia: “Timor ad ista omnia tanquam bonus 
accedat dolator, ut susceptam a corde, quasi a silua, cogitationum materiam disponat eam” 
(204/23-25).165 The presence of fear implies the presence of God, “Dominus timore suo 
conscientiam creat” (203/33).166  
Obedience, corresponding to discipline, builds walls upon the foundation laid by 
fear. Obedience consists in adherence to divine commandments (205/5). It is initially 
prompted by fear, “cum enim a timore ad mandata currimus” (204/33-34).167 It is also largely 
penitential. Peter calls upon his reader to envision another scene: “Ecce aliquis forte timore 
malorum suorum concussus, ad cor redit, culpam et paenam reatuum suorum in mensuram 
apponit … ac de his incipit paenitentiae et conuersionis muros aedificare” (205/5-8).168 Fear 
worked upon the resources of the cordis scientia; obedience uses the resources of past action, 
“de malis prioribus, murum construit, qui ad seipsum conuersus ueteres erratus in nouae uitae 
meliorationem corrigit” (205/12-13).169 Obedience brings the penitent sinner into harmony 
with God, “[c]um quo facimus concordiam si legem mandatorum implemus” (205/24).170 It 
thus provides a counterbalance to fear, mitigating fear’s severity, “duritiam timoris 
                                               
163 “… the beginning of wisdom is the truest desire for discipline.” 
164  “… fear certainly assembles the machine of this edifice.” 
165 “… the composition which fear makes”; “Fear comes to all these things, like a good woodcutter, in order to 
arrange the material of our thoughts, taken up from the heart as from a forest.” 
166 “The Lord creates the conscience with his fear.” 
167 “… when we run from fear to the commandments.” 
168 “Behold someone struck with strong fear of his evils, he returns to his heart, he sets out his fault and 
punishment for his charges in measure … and from these things he begins to build the walls of penance and 
conversion.” 
169 “… he builds a wall from earlier evils who, having turned to himself, straightens old errors into the 
improvement of new life.” 
170 “… with whom we make concord if we fulfil the law of the commandments.” 
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exasperantis animam emollit” (204/36).171 It crucially “ualliculos imperfectionis 
complemento spei ad aequalitatem unitatis et [unanimitatis] conducit” (204/36-37).172 Peter 
cites Psalm 118:104 to emphasise that knowledge of divine law is essential for the attainment 
of this condition, “a mandatis tuis intellexi” (104/33).173 Obedience, like fear, implies the 
presence and activity of God: “Sed quis ad haec idoneus?” (205/16), “quis non deficiat, nisi 
Spiritus adiuuet infirmitatem nostrum, nisi uirtus supponat manum suam?” (205/19-20).174 
The monk would not be able to live out the life of obedience without the assistance of the 
Holy Spirit to support and sustain him. 
Love finally adorns the structure of the conscience by painting the temple walls 
(205/29). The pursuit of conscience was begun with imaginative meditation, and now it also 
concludes with imaginative meditation. Peter designates love’s painting the work of the Holy 
Spirit, in the same way that fear was the work of God the Father, and submission the work of 
the Son (203/26-28). The imagery in Peter’s discussion of painting is appropriately visual. 
Peter renders it especially ocular and corporeal by describing the physiological operation of 
sense perception. He transfers the imagery of sense perception from physical sight to virtue: 
“Viui et ueri colores caritatis, non uolucrum, non quadrupedum, non serpentum 
phantasticas, immo fanaticas imagines imaginis Dei signaculo exprimunt, sed 
conformitatem adoptionis filiorum et gratiae raparatiuo genere pingendi et per 
neruos et uenas principalium uirtutum in anima componunt” (205/20-24).175 
The painting of love, the culmination of the good conscience, thus consists in 
imaginative visualisation akin to the enargeia Peter employs throughout the treatise. The 
painting begins by adorning the temple, but the temple disappears in the course of Peter’s 
                                               
171 “… it softens the hardness of the fear that irritates the soul.” 
172 “… it brings the hollows of imperfection to the equality of unity and concord  by filling them with hope.” 
Leclercq’s text reads ‘unanimitatem.’ I have followed Feiss’s emendation, ‘unanimitatis.’ Peter, Selected Works, 
39.  
173 “… I have understood by your commandments.” 
174 “But who is capable of these things?”; “…who would not fail unless the Spirit helped our infirmity, unless 
strength placed its hand beneath [him]?” 
175 “The living and true colours of charity do not express imaginary pictures  of birds, of four –footed animals, 
nor of serpents, with the seal of the image of God, but the likeness of the sons of adoption and grace.  They 
arrange these images in the soul by a reparative kind of painting, through the nerves and veins of the cardinal 
virtues. ” 
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discussion. A sculpture emerges in its place: “in statua sua caritas pingit” (205/37-206/1).176 
Peter imbues the statue’s attributes with moral significations, just as he did with the lady at 
the banquet. The statue’s “[c]aput sphaericum et rotundum, … quia intentionem puram et 
perfectam” (205/37-206/1), its “manus tornatiles per eleemosynam” (206/2), its “aures 
patulas per obedientiam” (206/3-4), and its “pedes rectos per incessum misericordiae” (206/4-
5).177 
Peter finds the presence of God within the moral attributes of the statue. Thus 
love makes the head round to signify its pure intention, and also “[p]ingit trinum et unum 
Deum in capite, pingit Iesum passum in oculis, pingit librum Euangelii in auribus” (206/6-
7).178 The list continues, containing nineteen clauses beginning with ‘pingit,’ each listing an 
event from the life of Christ and ending with the Last Judgement (206/6-15). Peter concludes 
with an exhortation: “Ecce sculptura, ecce pictura caritatis” (206-15-16).179 The passage 
causes the reader to visualise each of the items it enumerates. It thus brings about the painting 
of love, painting the images within the imagination. 
The “[u]iui et ueri colores caritatis” (205/20) are the principal instruments in the 
painting of love. Peter details them after describing the individual scenes that love paints.180 
He synaesthetically associates the scenes with different colours: “rubeum habet colorem in 
sanguine, nigrum in passione seu in morte, uiride in resurrectione, hiacinthinum in 
ascensione,” and so on (206/20-21).181 He then repeats his exhortation, “[e]cce colores” 
(206/23).182 
Each of these coloured paints is stored within the horn of conscience: “cornua 
                                               
176 “… charity paints on its statue.” 
177 “… spherical and round head, because its intent [is] pure and perfect”; “… hands finished through 
almsgiving”; “… ears open through obedience”; “… feet right through  the walk of compassion.” 
178 “… it paints the triune and one God on the head, it paints Jesus suffering on the eyes, it paints the book of the 
Gospel on the ears.”  
179 “… behold the sculpture, behold the picture of charity.”  
180 “… living and true colours of charity.” 
181 “… it has the colour red in his blood, black in his Passion or in his death, green in his resurrection, hyacinth 
in his ascension.” 
182 “… behold the colours.” 
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iustitiae colores continent” (206/25), and “humilis conscientia quae sicut cornu de carne 
quidem procedit” (206/29).183 Peter specifically likens the conscience to “illud modicum 
humilitatis cornu de quo Daniel loquitur” (206/27).184 The horn in question appears in Daniel 
8:9, in the midst of a series of visions involving horns and horned animals. The small horn of 
Daniel 8:9 resembles the “cornu aliud parvulum” of Daniel 7:8, which appears before the 
throne of judgement when the “libri aperti sunt” (Daniel 7:10).185 
Eric Jager notes that Ambrose of Milan uses the text of Daniel 7:10 to 
characterise “the ‘secrets of the heart’ expressly as a book to be opened at the Last 
Judgement.”186 Likewise, Jager notes that “[t]he notion of the individual life as a secret 
narrative destined eventually to be revealed also informs Augustine’s account of the Last 
Judgement,” and although “Augustine does not mention the heart here, … he associates this 
very individualised record with conscience (conscientia), memory (memoria), and the mind 
(mens).”187 Augustine’s “ideas would powerfully shape the medieval book of the heart, which 
incorporated many other Augustinian notions as well.”188  
Peter’s conception of the conscience differs from Augustine’s, in that Peter’s 
conscience is much more than a record of one’s life. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the moral 
quality of life directly impacts the moral quality of the cordis scientia (e.g., 227/4-5).  Life 
shapes conscience. The traditional association between the apocalyptic Books of Judgement 
and the conscience likely informs Peter’s decision to make the conscience the little horn of 
Daniel’s vision. 
The coloured paints that love uses, kept within the “[u]num cornu in quo melius 
                                               
183 “… the horns of the righteous contain the colours”; “the humble conscience, which proceeds from the flesh 
like a horn.” 
184 “… that small horn of humility, concerning which Daniel speaks.”  
185 “… other very small horn”; “the books have been opened.” 
186 Eric Jager, The Book of the Heart (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 24. Jager here refers to 
Ambrose of Milan, Enarrationes in XII Psalmos Davidicos I.52, (PL 14:994). 
187 Jager, The Book of the Heart, 42; 43. Jager here refers to Augustine of Hippo, De Civitate Dei XX.14, (PL 
41:680). 
188 Jager, The Book of the Heart, 43. 
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reponuntur” (206/26), are thus the thoughts of the cordis scientia.189 They are the resources 
for meditation that the disciplined life of humility provides. True contemplative meditation 
draws upon the life of discipline. It becomes a “reparatiuo genere pingendi” (205/32-33) that 
works “per neruos et uenas principalium uirtutum in anima” (205/33).190 It differs from 
earlier meditations that produce fear, in that “[p]ingit enim dilectio non stilo ferreo timoris in 
ungue adamantino obstinati cordis, sed penniculo uolitante ad supereminentem scientiae 
caritatem Christi” (205/34-36).191 The former produce the fear that serves as the foundation 
of conscience, the latter are the products of the properly cultivated conscience. 
Peter comments on the Mosaic prohibition of images in Deuteronomy 5:8 
(207/31-33) to demonstrate the necessity for discipline in the use of meditative images. The 
Old Testament law prohibits the creation of images “ne uanitatibus istis occupemur” (208/3-
4), since meditation on an image shapes or engraves the “tabula … internae imaginationis” 
(208/6-7).192 It is therefore necessary to ensure that images are used appropriately. Mary 
Carruthers notes that “Peter interprets this stricture [of Deuteronomy 5:8] ethically, as 
referring to cognitive uses of painting. We can paint pictures and make statues for ourselves 
to use in contemplation so long as we are not sidetracked into error.”193 Peter holds that, “for 
cognitive purposes, we need to remember all kinds of artefacts. But we should also freely 
‘refashion’ these remembered images as our cognitive focus requires.”194 
Love is able to discern and make the necessary adjustments to meditative images, 
as Peter exclaims, “[q]uam pulchras et quam decoras nouit depingere formas dilectio!” 
(205/36-37) and “[u]itia artis lex ostendit, scientiam et consummationem uirtutis caritas 
                                               
189 “… the one horn in which they are better stored.” 
190 “… a reparative kind of painting”; “in the soul, through the nerves and veins of the cardinal virtues.” 
191 “… love paints, not with the steel stylus of fear on the adamant claw of the obstinate heart, but with a feather, 
flying toward the love of Christ that overtops knowledge.” 
192 “… so that we should not be occupied with vanities”; “tablet of the internal imagination.” 
193 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, 209. 
194 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, 209. 
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reddit” (208/1-2).195 The unity of life and meditation that constitutes Peter’s conscience is 
thus interpretative. It enables its possessor to rightly interpret and then use the images and 
events of life for contemplation. 
Peter provides a gruesome illustration of the conscience’s interpretative work, 
early in his treatise. Torture and martyrdom do not harm the conscience, “[s]ubigatur ergo 
corpus in paena … quid ad conscientiam?” (196/4-6).196 Suffering adorns the body rather 
than harms it. Peter exploits the similarity between the Latin verbs pungo and pingo: “Quo, 
inquit conscientia, tortor maligne, acrius pungis, eo decentius pingis pellem carnis meae quae 
est una de pellibus Salomonis” (196/9-10).197 Peter places the two verbs in close proximity 
and rapidly alternates between them, melting their sounds and meanings together, “ut pingas 
cum pungis; pungendo enim et pungis et pingis” (196/11-12).198 The correctly attuned 
conscience reinterprets the external wounds, “[p]unctura tua est mihi pictura” (196/10-11).199 
The wounds become images, “candentia lilia … rosam de spina” (196/15).200 They are thus a 
means of meditation, transforming the outward reality into the locus of union with God, 
“singulas depingunt mansiones caelestium cellarum; quid gloriae, quid gratiae tunc prae 
gaudio superebullit conscientia?” (196/17-18).201 
An unspoken element underlies Peter’s characterisations of fear, obedience, and 
love: they are conditions that the reader must cultivate. They are practical aspects of monastic 
thought and discipline. They do not depend on any extraordinary spiritual experience. Peter, 
nevertheless, sees God present in their acquisition. God is ultimately behind them, and the 
condition that results from them is heaven on earth. Peter’s characterisation of the acquisition 
                                               
195 “… how beautiful and how honourable are the forms that love knows how to depict!”; “… the law shows the 
vides of art, love returns the knowledge and consummation of virtue.” 
196 “… the body is subjugated in punishment, … what is it to conscience?” 
197 “Puncture”; “paint”; “The conscience says, ‘O spiteful torturer! As sharply as you puncture me, so 
honourably you paint the skin of my flesh, which is one among the skins of Solomon.’” 
198 “… so that you paint when you puncture, indeed, by puncturing you paint and puncture.” 
199 “… your puncture is a picture to me.” 
200 “… fair lilies, … a rose from the thorn.” 
201 “… they paint individual mansions of celestial chambers, then the conscience bursts for joy at such glory and 
grace.” 
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of conscience thus has strong parallels with Turner’s reading of Augustine’s acquisition of 
self-knowledge within the Confessiones: God is present within the search. The divine 
presence drives and motivates it. Turner writes, “Augustine’s seeking God is of God. From 
the beginning of his life, even when Augustine was far from consciously seeking God, God 
was in his seeking.”202 Peter is seeking conscience rather than God, but God exists within the 
search for conscience. The outcome of Peter’s search is not Augustine’s reflective self-
knowledge, but a trinitas creata that pertains to the soul’s moral character rather than its 
essential nature.  
iv. The Tower, Temptation, and Confession 
 
The fourth and final of Peter’s accounts concretises the human involvement in the 
acquisition of conscience. The most practical of Peter’s descriptions of the attainment of 
conscience significantly comes last. The imagery has done its work; the mind has been 
treated and cultivated as necessary. Peter still relies on vivid imagery, but his instructions are 
much clearer than in the previous descriptions of conscience. The structure of the fourth 
account imitates the sequence of accounts: Peter begins by describing the conscience as the 
construction of a tower. He explains the image’s significations afterwards, once he has 
finished describing the tower’s construction. He does not, however, specify that he is 
explicating the image of the tower. Instead, the explanation repeats words used in the 
description. Peter relies on the shared vocabulary to connect the image and the explanation. 
Clarity, practicality, and imagery all combine to make this final of Peter’s accounts distinctly 
homiletic. 
The fourth account contrasts with the third. The third describes the human role in 
passive terms; God builds the temple of conscience in the reader. The fourth account provides 
the other side of the story. Fear laid the foundation before. Now “fundamentum suum ponit 
                                               
202 Turner, The Darkness of God, 66. 
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conscientia bona trinum et unum Deum in personis trinum, in essentia unum” (211/4-5) and 
“super hoc fundamentum conscientia turrim seu fabricam conuersationis suae constituere 
uoluerit” (211/28-29).203 The third account had love paint the triune God on the head. Now 
God is the foundation (206/6-7). The action is inverted as in the “mutua reuolutione” that 
Peter describes earlier in the treatise (200/14).  
Peter also inverts the structure of the third account. The third began with the list 
of God’s actions in the creation of conscience (203/28-29). Peter’s image of the construction 
of Solomon’s Temple came after the list, illustrating it (204/15-17). The fourth account begins 
with construction of the tower. Peter then specifies that “[t]ria denique ista concurrunt ut 
constituant conscientiam puram, sanctam, deuotam et integram, bona uidelicet actio, protensa 
oratio et desiderium ardens in Deum” (212/2-4).204 The explanation of the constituents of 
conscience only comes after the image of the tower has been completed. The fourth account 
works in tandem with the overarching structure of the treatise, replicating it in microcosm. 
The reader’s imaginative cooperation with the text is necessary to shape thought and affect, 
before the discursive explication of doctrine becomes appropriate, “non ut infletur de scientia, 
sed ut adificetur in conscientia” (211/13-14).205 
Good action corresponds to discipline, purity, and obedience in each of Peter’s 
preceding accounts of conscience. It consists in monastic observance – “[f]raterna obsequia et 
quotidiana manuum opera, quae in claustro siue in agro aguntur” (212/9-10), but Peter also 
uncharacteristically describes the good works of those outside the cloister – “eleemosynarum 
largitio, infirmorum uisitatio, desolatorum consolatio, uiduarum sustentatio, pauperum et 
peregrinorum susceptio, oppressorum defensio” (212/11-14).206 Each of these good works 
                                               
203 “… the good conscience places the single and triune God as its foundation – three in person, one in essence”; 
“… upon this foundation, it wishes to establish the tower or construction of its way of life.” 
204 “… finally, these three things come together in order to establish the pure, holy, devout, complete conscience: 
clearly, good action, extensive prayer and burning desire for God.” 
205 “… not so that it becomes puffed up with knowledge, but rather so that it becomes built up in conscience.” 
206 “… fraternal obedience and daily works of the hands, whether those which are done in the cloister or in the 
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contributes to the transformation of the conscience into heaven insofar as each “ad 
manifestationem Spiritus pertinet” (212/15-16).207 The good actions performed outside the 
monastery also recall Peter’s allusion to the active life of Martha in his second account of 
conscience (200/19-20). Good action thus corresponds to the purity that prepared God’s guest 
chamber earlier in the treatise. 
Peter especially emphasises resistance to temptation. It is as vital as positive 
action. Peter describes the effects of sin much more vividly than the good works he lists. The 
conscience desires, and as a desiring capacity must be kept pure: “ab omni prurigine mali 
desiderii tamquam a putredine cor castigandum” (212/19).208 Lust is thus especially harmful, 
“a leprae immunditia corpus refrenandum est” (212/20), and “prurigo corrumpit messem 
castitatis, luxuria seu immunditia exterminat uirorem et uigorem honestatis et boni nominis” 
(212/21-22).209 Good works “rami sunt huius arboris non mortis, sed uitae” (212/14), but 
“[m]alitia enim urit siluam bonitatis” (212/20-21).210  
The forest of goodness invokes Peter’s earlier treatment of the forest of 
inclinations and thoughts, from which the materials for building conscience must be taken 
(204/20-23). Peter’s use of the image unifies thought and action. The destructive forces are 
malitia, a prurigo, and luxuria. They are desires rather than actions, but they undermine good 
action and render it impossible. They also oppose the third constituent of the good 
conscience: “desiderium ardens in Deum” (212/4).211 Temptation is therefore a threat to the 
good conscience insofar as it is a temptation or a corrupted desire, even if it does not lead to 
sinful action. I will discuss this further below, in conjunction with Peter’s treatment of desire. 
                                                                                                                                                  
field”; “… generosity of alms, visitation of the sick, consolation of the lonely, sustaining of widows, taking in 
the poor and pilgrims, and defence of the oppressed.” 
207 “… pertains to the manifestation of the Spirit.” 
208 “… the heart must be corrected from every itch of evil desire  as from putrefaction.” 
209 “… the body must be restrained from the uncleanness of leprosy”; “the itch corrupts the crop of chastity, lust 
or uncleanness exterminates the greenness and vigour of honesty and a good name.” 
210 “… are branches of the tree, not of death, but of life”; “malice, indeed, burns the forest of goodness.” 
211 “… burning desire for God.” 
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Peter interweaves the first and third constituents of the good conscience. 
The second constituent of the good conscience – protracted prayer – also relates 
to both good action and desire. Peter says little about prayer. He only writes that “orat ut de 
carcere caeco ad tam lucidas mansiones transferatur” (211/36-37).212 He therefore closely 
aligns it with desire inasmuch as the conscience “cupit ut inhabitet in domo Domini omnibus 
diebus uitae suae ut uideat uolputatem Domini et maneat in atriis Dei” (211/37-212/1).213 
Burning desire for God, the third constituent of conscience, is the most important 
for Peter. It corresponds to love in the previous accounts of conscience. Desire is the means 
by which the good conscience pursues God. The good conscience “[s]i uero caput infra nubes 
retulerit, oculo non pede, desiderio non incessu corporeo post eum uadit” (211/22-23).214 
Christ is the object of desire, “donec homo ille ad opus sui iudicii redeat, ad postes eius 
obseruat uigil et deuotus” (211/23-24).215 Peter reveals that the exchanges between God and 
the conscience are specifically with the person of Christ, “[i]ntroitus tamen et exitus Dei seu 
reditus personae Filii specialiter attribuitur quae per incarnationem Verbi a Patre exiuit et in 
mundum uenit” (211/24-26).216 The conscience is especially devoted to him, as we have seen 
from Peter’s copious allusions to the earthly life of Christ. Peter writes that “lectulum 
conscientiae in ea collocare praeparare et ornare regni Salomoni cuius ultum desiderat 
uniuersa terra debemus” (210/35-37).217  
Desire is corrupted when temptation inclines it away from Christ, its proper 
object. Peter illustrates the process later in his treatise: sexual temptations are like “facibus 
                                               
212 “… [the conscience] prays to be transferred from its dark prison to such bright mansions.” 
213 “… desires to dwell in the house of the Lord for all the years of its life, to see the pleasure of the Lord and 
remain in the courts of God.” 
214 “… if its head withdraws beneath the clouds, it follows after him with the eye and not with the foot, with 
desire and not with bodily walking.” 
215 “… vigilant and devout, it watches its doorway until that man returns to the work of his judgement.” 
216 “… however the entrance and exit of God or his return are specially attributed to the person of the Son, who, 
through the incarnation of the Word, went out from the Father and came into the world.” 
217 “… we ought to arrange, prepare, and adorn the bed of conscience within it for king Solomon, whose face the 
whole earth desires.” 
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uerborum quae totam siluam occupant cogitationum seu desideriorum” (218/24-25).218 The 
forest of thoughts and desires that the torches occupy recalls the “siluam bonitatis” (212/20-
21) that malice burns, and connects it with the “silua … motuum ac phantasmatum 
nostrorum” (204/20) that provides the resources for the construction of conscience.219 
Pure desire unites the conscience with God. Impure desire, even in the form of 
temptation, is therefore inimical to conscience. It is vital to conscience that desire remains 
pure from temptation. Peter is so concerned that he draws upon homiletic martial imagery to 
describe the assault of temptation and the necessary resistance to it. Martial imagery is 
notably scarce in the treatise. Peter, as we have seen, prefers imagery of construction or of the 
temple and private chamber. The text configures its contemplative reader as an “uxor” 
(195/1-3) rather than a miles Christi.220 The conscience is a cell besieged by the world. Its 
only proper course of action is to shut temptation out, rather than to openly combat it 
(194/20-23, 194/130-32, 194/35-195/1). 
The fourth account reinforces temptation’s threat by depicting the devil as a 
military attacker who “suggestionum aculeos immittit” (212/28).221 The devil possesses a 
“malitiarum suarum pharetram” (212/26) and he “de nouis adinuentionibus elimare iacula sua 
in incude insidiarum suarum non desinit (212/26-28).222 The reader remains on the defence, 
passively besieged by external temptations. The reader is powerless against their assault, 
unless God intervenes: “Vincis enim, sed per Deum, uinceris, sed ex te” (213/6).223 The 
conscience is vulnerable because of its bodily weakness and therefore in need of divine aid: 
“Secura sis, sed in Creatoris auxilium, suspecta, sed propter fragile corpus tuum” (213/5-
                                               
218 “… torches of words, which occupy the whole forest of our thoughts or desires.” 
219 “… forest of goodness”; “… forest … of our stirrings and fantasies.” 
220 “Wife.” 
221 “… hurls the barbs of temptations.” 
222 “… quiver of his malice”; “… does not cease to refine his spears from new inventions on the anvil of his 
snares.” 
223 “You conquer indeed, but through God; you are conquered, but because of yourself.” 
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6).224 
Peter intermittently returns to the theme of resisting temptation throughout the 
remainder of his treatise. His discussions of it are not a part of the action-prayer-desire 
sequence that constitutes the fourth account of conscience. Peter links them with it, however, 
through the repeated use of fire and martial imagery. Peter briefly deviates from his practice 
of characterising the contemplative as defensive when he stipulates that some vices demand 
active combat, for instance “[u]itium autem impatientiae non ita euincitur, scilicet si 
materiam patientiae subtrahes” (218/28-29).225 Likewise, “superbia uincitur consuetudine” 
(218/30) and “gula usu ieiunandi et abstinentia ciborum” (218/32-33).226 The ‘vices’ that call 
for active resistance are not temptations. Peter cites 1 Corinthians 6:18, and insists that 
temptation must be fled rather than resisted (218/20).  
Peter follows the conventional wisdom that people within the cloister are more 
vigorously tempted than those outside it; the devil “tentat eremitas et claustrales nostros” 
(221/28).227 He reframes the struggle against temptation by situating the battle within the 
conscience: the conscience is tempted, rather than being the voice that condemns temptation. 
Claustrals and hermits are especially attacked by fleshly lusts: “Violentior namque ex inuidia 
daemonum tentatio carnis, impetusior ex otio quietis impulsio passionis, contumelia ex uetito 
inconcessae libidinis surgit ardentior” (220/35-37).228 Peter depicts these temptations as fire 
that the devil kindles: “collectis sarmentis malitiae et nequitiae caminum succendit tentationis 
diabolus” (221/12-13).229 The various kinds of kindling, “stuppa … sarmentum … malleolus” 
(221/17-18), and the flames unite the present image with Peter’s earlier forests of desire and 
                                               
224 “You should be secure, but in the help of your Creator; you should be doubtful, but because of your fragile 
body.” 
225 “… but clearly the vice of impatience is not thus overcome, if you withdraw the matter for patience.” 
226 “… pride is conquered by custom”; “… gluttony by the use of fasting and abstinence from foods.” 
227 “… tempts our hermits and claustrals.” 
228 “For the temptation of the flesh is more violent because of the envy of demons, the impulse of passion more 
impetuous because of the peace of quiet, the insult of forbidden lust rises more ardently because it has been 
forbidden.” 
229 “… after the twigs of malice and of wickedness have been collected, the devil lights the furnace of 
temptation.” 
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the fires of temptation that set them ablaze (204/20, 212/20-21, 218/24-25).230 These 
temptations, like the earlier temptations in the treatise, threaten conscience because they are 
corrupt desires and the conscience is the part of the person that desires. 
The devil is ultimately behind the temptations. Peter reveals the only weapons 
that can combat him: “iacula orationum et confessionum spicula” (221/33).231 Peter does not 
relate them to temptation, which must be fled, but his discussion of them follows immediately 
on the heels of his discussion of temptation. The structure and sequence of images implies 
that, if the devil is removed, so are the temptations. Peter strikingly reverses the roles. The 
devil “[n]oua et exquisita multiplicat consilia” (221/31-32).232 These are paradoxically 
pictured as simultaneously “clypeum, loricam et scutum … nouae oppugnationis et 
reluctationis” (221/31-32) and “gladiis” (221/35) with which the devil “[i]mpedit denique 
puritatem confitentis uel intentionem confitendi” (221/33-34).233 The devil’s attacks are 
simultaneously his defences against confession. Confession, the remedy for sin, is therefore 
also an attack against the devil which he hopes to elude (221/33). Confession has positive 
value: it counters the devil, “princeps mundi per ueram confessionem eiicitur foras” (224/26-
27), and therefore temptation as well.234 Confession becomes a means of purifying desire, the 
integral component of conscience. 
b. A Rule of Life 
 
Discipline and love are the two key constituents of conscience. They are 
inseparably joined and interwoven with one another, and they unite the soul with Christ. 
Careful, meditative reading cultivates them, but discipline implies more than meditation and 
                                               
230 “… flax … twigs … brushwood.” 
231 “… the spears of prayers and the arrows of confession.” 
232 “… multiplies new and carefully devised  plans.” 
233 “… buckler, mail, and shield … of a new attack and resistance”; “swords”; “… finally, he impedes the purity 
of one confessing, or the intention to confess.” 
234 “… the prince of the world is thrown outside through true confession.” 
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spontaneous good works. Peter specifies that the conscience needs a rule of life: “anima quae 
legem non habet, quae sub regula non est, cum consummauerit peccatum, fertur in 
damnationis baratrum” (213/31-32).235 The rule works in conjunction with meditative 
reading. Both are instruments for the production of conscience. 
The rule corrects the errors of both insufficient and excessive zeal. Peter 
particularly emphasises the perils of excess in novices who “uno [anhelitu] stadium aestimet 
se totum euolare quod triginta tribus annis Iesus proficiens cum patientia longanimitatis suae 
cuccurit et consummauit” (218/38-219/2).236 Their motivations are misguided, since they are 
“sui cordis leges uoluntarias sequens” (219/8).237 Zeal and love are not synonymous, 
“[t]aedio enim, non desiderio, afficiuntur qui non ad metas praedestinationis patienter 
tendunt” (219/2-3).238 The rule restrains them and fosters authentic desire.  
The rule’s restraints facilitate imitation of Christ and union with him. Christ lived 
according to a rule: “Christus enim non uenit facere uoluntatem suam, quae utique bona erat, 
sed uoluntatem eius qui misit eum” (219/10-12).239 The contemplative reader must do 
likewise, otherwise “Christum … non apprehendit” (219/9-10).240 The rule keeps the 
contemplative on the correct path, in pursuit of Christ “neque ad dexteram in prosperis 
excedens, neque ad sinistram in aduersis diuertans” (219/13-14).241 Moderation is the key to 
pursuing Christ: “Semper medium tene quia medius est, immo mediator Dei et hominum 
Iesus Christus” (219/35-36).242 
The rule and meditation come together when Peter returns from his discussion of 
                                               
235 “… the soul which does not have a law, which is not under a rule, is carried into the hell of damnation when 
it has completed its sin.” 
236 “… he thinks with one gasp to rush over the whole course which Jesus  ran and completed with his patience 
and forbearance – completing it over thirty-three years.” Leclercq’s text reads ‘anhelita.’  I have followed Feiss’s 
emendation, ‘anhelitu.’ Peter, Selected Works, 39. 
237 “… following the voluntary laws of his own heart.” 
238 “… indeed, they are stirred by boredom and not by desire who do not patiently strive for the goals of 
predestination.” 
239 “Indeed, Christ did not come to do his own will, which was good, but the will of the one who sent him.” 
240 “… he does not take hold of Christ.” 
241 “… neither passing to the right in prosperity, nor turning away to the left in adversity.” 
242 “Always hold the middle, because Jesus Christ, the mediator of God and men, is the middle.” 
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moderation to the image of the lady at the banquet: “Haec, o anima, ad discretionem bonae 
conscientiae pertinent qua crines actionum et motuum suorum discriminat et aequa 
liberatione omnia sua temperat” (219/36-37).243 The rule is the practical outworking of life 
that accompanies imaginative meditation. It structures and ensures the cultivation of love 
since, as Peter said towards the opening of his treatise, “[c]ura ergo dsciplinae, dilectio est, et 
dilectio custodia legum illius est” (197/4-5).244 
4. Conclusion 
 
Peter’s conscience is neither the anterior conscience (the moral director of 
scholastic philosophy), nor the subsequent conscience (the personal record of antiquity). 
Peter’s conscience desires and knows. It is an affective knowledge that is synthesised from 
the raw material of cordis scientia, which is the pre-condition of knowledge, the experience 
that accrues from life. Imaginative meditation works upon the cordis scientia to produce 
discipline and love, which constitute the good conscience. Peter’s accounts of conscience 
arrange discipline and love sequentially. Peter, however, interweaves the two together, so that 
they cannot be separated from each other. The sequence works for narrative and imaginative 
effect, but in reality discipline and love are inextricable and work alongside one another. The 
life of conscience is worked out practically through obedience to a rule of life. Obedience to 
the rule is also love. The intersection of discipline and love, focused and shaped by 
meditation, becomes the dwelling place of God. God is present within the good conscience, 
in the way that God’s law was present within the patristic conscience. The patristic 
conscience applied God’s law to ordinary life in order to make moral decisions. God’s 
presence in the contemplative conscience informs and illuminates images, experiences, and 
events that would otherwise be mundane and part of ordinary life. 
                                               
243 “These things, O soul, pertain to the discretion of the good conscience, by which it separates the hairs of its 
actions and stirrings, and tempers all its things with equal freedom.” 
244 “… therefore, concern for discipline is love, and love is the keeping of its laws.” 
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The contemplative conscience exemplifies and embodies Bernard McGinn’s 
concept of mystical consciousness. McGinn writes that “[a]ll forms of consciousness involve 
both the consciousness of the objects intended by operations of feeling, knowing, and loving, 
as well as the consciousness or self-presence of the agent in such acts,” but “[m]ystical 
consciousness … adds another dimension that transforms the usual components.”245 God 
becomes “active in the human agent as the source, or co-author, of our acts of experiencing 
(that is, the reception of inner and outer data), knowing, and loving.”246 
Peter accordingly sees God’s presence within conscience, from the earliest stages 
of its inception though to its perfection, when it is finally able to recognise his presence. 
Peter’s text is therefore mystical in that it fosters awareness of God’s presence within 
ordinary thought and life. Mark McIntosh describes the “fundamental assumption of earlier 
eras … that living, practical involvement in reality is not a recipe for subjective beclouding of 
our understanding but is rather the prerequisite for true insight in conceptualisation.”247 This 
assumption is at work in Peter’s treatise. Cordis scientia is pre-reflexive, experiential 
knowledge. Conscience, as cordis scientia synthesised by practice and meditation, informs 
reflexive thought and awareness. Conscience therefore becomes the basis for a scheme of 
mysticism that is not based around extraordinary experiences or paradigms of graduated 
ascent. Peter makes the conscience the point of exchange and communion with God, and 
particularly Christ. 
The permeation and illumination of the ordinary by the extraordinary gives rise to 
Peter’s distinctive literary style, a style that McGinn notes is simultaneously “poetical and 
concrete.”248 The twin elements of the poetical and the concrete fuse together, and produce a 
textual structure governed by imagery rather than logic.  Concrete, sensual images evoke 
                                               
245 McGinn, “Mystical Consciousness,” 47. 
246 McGinn, “Mystical Consciousness,” 47. 
247 Mark McIntosh, Mystical Theology: The Integrity of Spirituality and Theology (Malden: Blackwell, 1998), 
24. 
248 McGinn, Growth of Mysticism, 343. 
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Christ’s earthly life and intersect with the spiritual, as when Peter describes the spiritual grace 
of the Trinity enwrapped in Christ’s bodily burial shroud.249 One image leads to another by 
associational play, which Peter uses to guide the reader’s meditation through an affective 
landscape that will cultivate a good conscience. Peter works to transfigure concrete material 
imagery by infusing it with spiritual meaning for the conscience to unlock as it progresses.  
Peter’s text thus anticipates the style as well as the thought of the AW author, who similarly 
utilises mundane, sensual imagery to stimulate his readers’ reinterpretation of their physical 
situation. The AW author, like Peter, sees this reinterpretation as the function of the 
conscience inhabited by God. The English author most likely encountered Peter’s thought via 
its circulation and dissemination in other texts, especially De Interiori Domo. The next 
chapter of this thesis explores those texts. 
                                               
249 See p. 73 of this thesis. 
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Chapter Two 
Two Pseudo-Bernardine Conscience Texts 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Two texts incorrectly attributed to Bernard of Clairvaux exhibit the contemplative 
approaches to conscience available to twelfth-century writers. They both treat the conscience 
as the means by which the person encounters God, and the way that person’s interpretation 
and experience of life is transformed as a result. The conscience is the realm of thought, and 
especially imagination. Imaginative meditations shape and prepare it for the divine encounter. 
Reading thus facilitates the transformation of its experience of life, insofar as it imaginatively 
engages the reader. This chapter examines the definition and characterisation of conscience in 
each text. I argue that the first of these texts, the Tractatus de Conscientia, does not draw 
from Peter of Celle, and is formally very different from Peter’s De Conscientia. It 
nevertheless demonstrates a similar understanding of the conscience as contemplative, and is 
therefore evidence that Peter’s ideas were not idiosyncratic but shared throughout the 
monastic world during this period.  This chapter then argues that the second text, De Interiori 
Domo, draws extensively from Peter’s work. De Interiori Domo lifts several passages directly 
from Peter’s De Conscientia, but also shows signs of his influence elsewhere. It is a more 
overtly contemplative text than Peter’s De Conscientia, and is therefore evidence that Peter’s 
thought was favourably received and consequently transmitted within the monastic world, 
and deemed especially applicable to the contemplative life. 
2. Tractatus de Conscientia 
 
The author of the Tractatus, like Peter of Celle, ostensibly writes in response to a 
request. The Tractatus attempts to resolve the contradiction between two Pauline texts on 
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conscience. 1 Corinthians 4:3 reads, “mihi autem pro minimo est ut a vobis iudicer aut ab 
humano die sed neque me ipsum iudico,” and 2 Corinthians 1:12 reads, “nam gloria nostra 
haec est testimonium conscientiae nostrae.”1 The author of the Tractatus states the problem 
by saying that the apostle Paul “ex parte intelligit, et ex parte non intelligit” (Tractatus 2).2 
The author’s solution consists of a systematic exposition on the different kinds of 
conscience. His treatise is clearer, more succinct than Peter’s De Conscientia, and its imagery 
is sparser. The Tractatus neither explicitly defines conscience, nor provides instructions for 
attaining one, although it describes the different kinds of conscience available. It does not use 
the expression cordis scientia, but treats the heart and conscience as interchangeable from the 
first chapter, where “conscientia hominis” and “cor hominis” alternate freely (Tractatus 1).3 
Nor does the text emphasise the presence of God in the way that Peter does, and it is almost 
wholly devoid of his Christocentric affectivity. The Tractatus, nevertheless, shares a number 
of features with Peter’s text, without referring to or citing it. The Tractatus author’s 
presentation of the conscience arises from his reading and exegesis of the two New Testament 
passages in question. The points of concurrence between the Tractatus and Peter which are 
simultaneously points of divergence from their philosophical predecessors and successors are 
evidence that Peter’s conscience did not exist in isolation and was not unique to him.   
The Tractatus presents the conscience as the soul’s orientation, either towards 
what is good or what is evil. Its conscience, like Peter’s, is born of life but characterised by 
what it desires in addition to what it has done. It is ultimately unknowable, but manifests 
itself in the way its possessor experiences life.  
There is no one type of conscience that everyone possesses. There are, rather, 
                                               
1 “For me, it is the smallest thing that I be judged by you, or by human judgement, nor do I judge myself”; “… 
for our glory is this: the witness of our conscience.” 
2 PL 184:554A, “He understands in one instance and he does not understand in the other.” 
3 PL 184:553B, “Conscience of a man”; PL 184:553B, “heart of a man.” 
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“quatuor conscientiarum rivi de voluntatis fonte currentes” (Tractatus 8).4  The different 
consciences are good and tranquil, good and disturbed, bad and tranquil, and bad and 
disturbed (Tractatus 3).5 The goodness or badness of the conscience describes what that 
conscience desires, rather than its innocence or guilt in past conduct.  
The good conscience “et praeterita peccata punit, et punienda committere refugit” 
(Tractatus 3).6 The clause “punienda committere refugit” implies that the conscience could, 
theoretically, commit acts worthy of punishment. The conscience of the Tractatus differs, 
then, from the later scholastic synderesis. Douglas Langston describes Bonaventure’s 
synderesis “as that which stimulates us to the good.”7 It follows that “synderesis can be found 
in what is corrupted without itself being corrupted.”8 The person who fails “to follow the 
principles of conscience effectively thwarts the desire for good, and the frustration of this 
desire leads to the emotions of guilt and remorse.”9 The conscience of the Tractatus is 
therefore not a director that indicates which choice is right and which is wrong, nor a natural 
inclination towards the good. It could choose to do what it knows to be bad if it wanted. The 
good conscience is good because “etsi peccatum sentiat, peccato non consentit” (Tractatus 
3).10 The bad conscience, on the other hand, “nec Deum timet, nec hominem reveretur” 
(Tractatus 6).11 The conscience is not a person’s moral director, but moral direction.  
The tranquillity or disturbance of the conscience describes its attitude towards 
external life, and not a state of moral satisfaction or torment. Thus the good conscience is 
tranquil if “ipse Spiritus testimonium perhibet spiritui ejus quod filius Dei sit” and it, in turn, 
“omnibus dulcis est, nulli gravis; utens amico ad gratiam, inimico ad patientiam, omnibus ad 
                                               
4 PL 184:558A-B, “… four streams of conscience flowing from the fount of the will.” 
5 PL 184:554D. 
6 PL 184:554D, “… punishes past sins and flees back from things worthy of punishment.” 
7 Douglas Langston, “The Spark of Conscience: Bonaventure’s View of Conscience and Synderesis,” 
Franciscan Studies 53, no. 1 (1993): 80. 
8 Langston, “Spark of Conscience,” 91. 
9 Langston, “Spark of Conscience,” 87. 
10 PL 184:554D, “If it senses sin, it does not consent to sin.” 
11 PL 184:556D, “… neither fears God nor reveres man.” 
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benevolentiam, quibus potest ad beneficentiam” (Tractatus 3).12 The good conscience is 
disturbed, by contrast, when “[d]ura enim videtur ei via rectior, et austerior vita” because 
“videt quod carni displicet” (Tractatus 4).13 The troubled conscience is not afflicted by guilt; 
it is afflicted by temptation. 
The bad conscience is tranquil when “mundi hujus prosperitas alludit et illudit; 
cum laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae, et iniquus benedicitur” (Tractatus 7).14 Once 
again, its tranquillity does not derive from a sense of moral satisfaction, but from its response 
to its external situation. The bad conscience is disturbed when “dum pasci se voluptatibus 
credit, anxietatibus cedit humanis, pudoribus” (Tractatus 8).15 This is the closest the 
Tractatus comes to a traditional accusing conscience. The anxieties, however, are human 
anxieties rather than moral ones. They are the “verecundiam et angustiam hominis qui 
hominem et vivit, et sapit” (Tractatus 8).16 The conscience does not torment. It desires illicit 
pleasure and is tormented, much like Peter’s uninformed conscience which “amat tenebras et 
quod miserius est, quaerit etiam miseriam cum miseria” (194/10-11).17 
Eric D’Arcy writes that, according to classical and early Christian thought, “[t]he 
evil man has a conscience too; it knows his wrongdoing and condemns it, and torments him 
with its memory.”18 The Tractatus does not share this view. Its conscience is judged; it is the 
object and not the agent of judgement. It remains purely human, and is not anchored in any 
transcendent knowledge of divine law: “Hoc autem tertium judicium Dei, quod etiam illa 
                                               
12 PL 184:555B, “… the Spirit himself gives testimony to its spirit that it is a son of God”; PL 184:555B-C, “… 
is sweet to everyone, harsh to none, enjoying a friend for grace and an enemy for patience, all for kindness, 
whomever it is able for generosity.” 
13 PL 184:555C, “The more righteous way and more austere life seem hard to it”; PL 184:555C, “It sees that 
[such a life] displeases the flesh.” 
14 PL 184:557B, “… the prosperity of this world toys about with it and dupes it. The sinner is praised in the 
desires of his soul and the unjust is blessed.” 
15 PL 184:557D, “It yields to human anxieties and shames as long as it believes itself to be fed with pleasures.” 
16 PL 184:558A, “… the shame and anguish of a man who lives and knows himself to be a man.” 
17 Peter of Celle, De Conscientia, in La Spiritualité De Pierre De Celle, by Jean Leclercq, OSB, vol. 7, Etudes 
De Theologie Et D’Histoire De La Spiritualité (Paris: J. Vrin, 1946), 194, “… loves darkness and – what is more 
woeful – it even seeks out woe with woe.” 
18 Eric D’Arcy, Conscience and Its Right to Freedom (London: Sheed and Ward, 1961), 7. 
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purgatissima non comprehendit conscientia, nesciens juxta Scripturam, utrum amore an odio 
digna sit” (Tractatus 1).19  
The conscience of the Tractatus bears a partial resemblance to the subsequent 
conscience, the conscience that lets the person know whether they have conducted 
themselves in a morally sound way or not.  The conscience of the Tractatus comes into being 
as a result of its possessor’s living, much like the subsequent conscience, and it describes the 
way in which the person experiences their present situation as a result of their past conduct.  
Its difference from the subsequent conscience is, however, acute: the conscience 
of the Tractatus is not self-aware. The text emphasises the unknowability of conscience and 
its potential for evil, even more than Peter does. Its contents are ultimately inscrutable: 
“Conscientia hominis abyssus multa. Sicut enim profundum abyssi exhauriri non potest, ita 
cor hominis evacuari non potest a cogitationibus suis” (Tractatus 1).20 Likewise, “in hominis 
conscientiam venenatae cogitationes suaviter intrant et exeunt; ut nesciat homo unde veniant, 
aut quo vadant” (Tractatus 1).21 The conscience is therefore incapable of evaluating action, 
even though it exists as a result of action. D’Arcy finds that, classically, “[a]fter an action is 
performed conscience passes moral judgement upon it … If its verdict is favourable, peace of 
soul is our reward; if unfavourable, we suffer the pangs of remorse.”22 Linda Hogan notes 
similarly that “[t]he conscience is so powerful an accuser that, according to Cicero, it is the 
judgement of conscience and not the fear of the gods that determines and regulates our 
conduct.”23 Likewise, “[t]hemes of anguish and remorse that result from wrongdoing 
frequently occur in [patristic] texts … leaving the faithful in no doubt as to the torment 
                                               
19 PL 184:553D, “Even the most purified conscience cannot comprehend this third judgement, the judgement of 
God. The conscience is ignorant – according to Scripture – whether it is worthy of love or hatred.” 
20 PL 184:553B, “The conscience of man is a great abyss. As even the depth of the abyss cannot be drained, so 
the heart of man cannot be emptied of its thoughts.” 
21 PL 184:553B, “… poisonous thoughts sweetly enter and exit the conscience of man. The man knows neither 
whence they come nor where they go.” 
22 D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 8. 
23 Linda Hogan, Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition (London: Darton, Longman and 
Todd, 2001), 43. Hogan here cites Cicero, De Natura Deorum III.85. See Cicero, De Natura Deorum 
Academica, trans. H. Rackham, vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann, 1961), 370. 
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visited by the conscience as a result of bad behaviour.”24 The conscience of the Tractatus, 
however, does not share any of these attributes. Its bad conscience is a corrupted conscience, 
a conscience that does not care: “cum venerit in profundum malorum, contemnit” (Tractatus 
6).25 C. S. Lewis observes of more recent uses of English conscience that “[w]e can still have 
a ‘guilty conscience,’ that is [an awareness] of guilt; for it is certainly not the inner lawgiver 
who is guilty.”26 The Tractatus, by contrast, maintains that the soul’s moral direction has 
become evil. 
Timothy Potts notes that “a person who has successfully examined his conscience 
is then in a position to witness as to what he did or failed to do.”27 Such an evaluation is not 
possible for the Tractatus since, as we have seen, its contents are not knowable. The 
conscience is our “in ignorantiam concaptivans” (Tractatus 2).28 The author describes the 
apostle Paul as “unicum scrutatorem conscientiae suae,” (Tractatus 1) and yet even he 
“[d]eficit … scrutinio conscientiam suam” (Tractatus 2).29 Jeremiah 17:9 reads: “Pravum est 
cor hominis et inscrutabile; et quis, inquit, cognoscet illud?” (Tractatus 1).30 The Tractatus 
author comments that “[n]ec dicit quis, pro difficili, sed pro impossibili: quia quod 
scrutationem non recipit, nec cognitionem” (Tractatus 1).31  
Eric Jager notes that Ambrose of Milan, who was influential on the development 
of the heart-as-book metaphor, held that “the heart also contains a personal record of sins that 
will be opened at the Last Judgement” and “intensifies the picture of the heart as a record of 
hidden things.”32 The Tractatus deviates from the traditional Ambrosian picture. Its 
                                               
24 Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 56. 
25 PL 184:556D, “… when it has come into the depth of evil, it only shows scorn.” 
26 C. S. Lewis, Studies in Words, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 196. 
27 Timothy C. Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 4. 
28 PL 184:554C, “… fellow captive in ignorance.” 
29 PL 184:553C, “… the only scrutiniser of his conscience”; PL 184:554C, “… fails the scrutiny of his 
conscience.” 
30 PL 184:553B-C, “The heart of man is crooked and inscrutable, and who can know it?” 
31 PL 184:553C, “He does not ask ‘who?’ to express difficulty but rather impossibility, because the heart is not 
receptive to scrutiny or thought.” 
32 Eric Jager, The Book of the Heart (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 24. Jager here refers to 
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conscience bears a closer resemblance to the divergent strand in patristic thought that 
Philippe Delhaye identifies. The conscience sometimes ceased to be “the impartial judge that 
we are conscious of possessing within ourselves” and instead becomes “the responsible 
subject that we are ourselves.”33 The conscience is thus shaped by action, whether or not it 
keeps a record of each individual act: “after having been the responsible agent of sin, the 
conscience becomes in a manner of speaking its seat or receptacle.”34  
The conscience of the Tractatus functions in a similar capacity. It is more 
repository than record. It contains things rather than documenting them, “[c]onscientia 
hominis est quasi mare magnum et spatiosum, ubi reptilia quorum non est numerus” 
(Tractatus 1).35 The contents betray their quality by colouring the person’s experience of life 
in the present, but they cannot be read like a book. The Tractatus thus reverses the 
conventional order of moral examination. According to convention, if you want to know the 
moral quality of your life you need to consult your conscience. According to the Tractatus, if 
you want to know the moral quality of your conscience you need to examine your life at the 
moment. The Tractatus furnishes the reader with tools for identifying the quality of their 
conscience. The descriptions of the four kinds of conscience serve as benchmarks that the 
reader can use to measure their own life. If the reader’s life meets any of the descriptions, 
they may reasonably infer that they have the corresponding conscience. 
The author’s formulation prompts the question: why does the conscience matter? 
Does this scheme not demote it to something secondary? The author does not explicitly 
answer. The text implies, however, that everyone will be judged according to their conscience 
at the Last Judgement. This does not mean that they will be judged by their own standards, 
                                                                                                                                                  
Ambrose of Milan, Enarrationes in XII Psalmos Davidicos I.52, (PL 14:994). 
33 Philippe Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (New York: Desclee Company, 
1968), 94. 
34 Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 97. 
35 PL 184:553B, “The conscience of man is as a ‘great and spacious sea’ where ‘there are reptiles beyond 
number.’” 
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but that their conscience is the part of them that will be judged. As noted earlier, the four 
consciences are “rivi de voluntatis fonte currentes” (Tractatus 8).36 The conscience originates 
in the will, and the author claimed earlier in the Tractatus that “propriam voluntatem … quae 
salvationis et damnationis est causa” (Tractatus 2).37 The person is saved or damned by the 
conscience which flows from the will because “in quibus justi purgantur, inquinantur injusti” 
(Tractatus 8).38 The conscience cleanses or stains the person and not vice versa.  The 
conscience, then, is responsible for the outcome of the Final Judgement. 
The author solves the Pauline dilemma by charting a progression of judgements. 
Paul is not concerned about the judgements of others in 1 Corinthians 4:3 because, according 
to the author of the Tractatus, “humanum judicium evaserat, nihil dubitans ab his qui foris 
sunt” (Tractatus 1).39 The apostle does not judge himself either. In the following verse, 
“[n]ihil, ait, mihi conscius sum” (Tractatus 1).40 Hogan concludes from this and similar New 
Testament passages that “Paul can make these astoundingly positive statements because of 
his sense that he is doing God’s will” and as such “[h]is judgements are not purely personal 
and autonomous.”41 
Paul’s affirmation of his own innocence prompts the author of the Tractatus to 
exclaim that “[f]elix conscientia non sibi in aliquo conscia, quae nec proprium judicium, nec 
alienum veretur” (Tractatus 1).42 He does not linger on the thought long, however. His 
reading of Paul is sharply different from Hogan’s. Human judgement counts for very little 
since it inevitably falls short of God’s judgement which has the final say in the matter of 
salvation and is impenetrable to the conscience: “Etsi enim exi judicium mundi, et judicium 
                                               
36 PL 184:558A-B, “… streams flowing from the fount of the will.” 
37 PL 184:554B, “… our own will, which is the cause of salvation and damnation.” 
38 PL 184:558B, “The just are cleansed in these streams and the unjust are polluted.” 
39 PL 184:553C, “… he escaped human judgement, not hesitating at all on account of external things.” 
40 PL 184:553C, “… he says, ‘I am conscious of nothing against myself.’” 
41 Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 52. 
42 PL 184:553C-D, “… the blessed conscience is not aware of anything against itself. It fears neither its own 
judgement, nor another’s.” 
104 
 
mei; restat tamen judicium Dei, quod me non sinit intelligere quod operor, quia nescio si 
acceptet illud quod operor” (Tractatus 1).43 Paul is still able to maintain that his conscience is 
his glory “quia et suum aliorum supergressus est judicium” (Tractatus 2).44 He is not aware of 
any problems with his conscience, and neither is anyone else. 
Paul’s condition of innocence according to temporal judgements “quodammodo 
certa significatio est … futurae glorificationis, cum nos in ipso erimus et ipse in nobis, cum 
ipse erit omnia in omnibus” (Tractatus 2).45 The clause “certa significatio est” should not be 
taken to mean that eternal salvation is somehow guaranteed, since the author almost 
immediately contradicts it by saying that “[d]eficit ergo Apostolus scrutans scrutinio 
conscientiam suam” because “incurrit profundum, scilicet judicium Dei penetrare non 
valens” (Tractatus 2).46 The certa significatio is thus not a guarantee of salvation but an 
indication that the present situation is in some way analogous to salvation. The conscience 
facilitates something akin to heaven in the present life. Humility and fear are still necessary 
because the conscience may easily contain evils of which its owner is unaware. The 
combination of unknowability and glorification creates a sense of urgency and incites the 
reader to follow the narrow middle road between hope and despair that Peter’s De 
Conscientia describes as the road to union with God. 
The Tractatus author also shares Peter’s interest in the use of thoughts to cultivate 
the conscience. He warns that harmful thoughts can spontaneously appear in the good 
conscience. He later reveals that this is spiritual warfare at work, since “[h]is omnibus 
cogitationibus cordium humanorum quatuor spiritus loquuntur assidue: spiritus mundi, 
                                               
43 PL 553D-54A, “And so the judgement of God remains, even if I leave behind both the judgement of the world 
and my own judgement. God’s judgement does not permit me to understand what I do, for I do not know if he 
will accept what I do.” 
44 PL 184:554A, “… because he has passed beyond both his own and others’ judgement.” 
45 PL 184:554B, “… in some way, a sure sign … of future glorification, when we shall be in him and he in us, 
when he shall be all in all.” 
46 PL 184:554C, “… the searching apostle fails the scrutiny of his conscience”; PL 184:554C, “he ran into the 
depths, clearly not strong enough to penetrate the judgement of God.” 
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spiritus carnis, spiritus diaboli, Spiritus Dei” (Tractatus 12).47 The imagery becomes 
uncharacteristically sensory and corporeal: “sed velit nolit, irruit in oculos mentis muscarum 
Aegypti pestilentia, et perstrepunt ranae in penetralibus cordis ejus” (Tractatus 9).48 The 
various kinds of thoughts impact the heart in different ways, and thus they each play a role in 
shaping the conscience: “Aliae namque cor inflant, aliae elevant, aliae perturbant, aliae 
dissipant, aliae confundunt, aliae distendunt, aliae ligant, aliae inquinant, aliae contrahunt, 
aliae corrumpunt” (Tractatus 11).49 Harmful thoughts call for a two-stage defence. They must 
be shut out, and then “mens purgatur, si sanctis cogitationibus jugiter exerceatur” (Tractatus 
11).50 The author alludes to Proverbs 2:11 to demonstrate that holy thoughts become 
defensive weapons: “Cogitatio sancta custodiet te” (Tractatus 11).51 
Holy thoughts are useful insofar as they evoke an affective response in the reader. 
Thus “[d]ebemus enim cogitare de Deo, ut delectemur in illo,” and similarly “de Redemptoris 
nostri passione, quam pro nobis sustinuit in crucis patibulo, ut et nos parati simus 
tribulationes et angustias libenter sustinere pro illo” (Tractatus 11).52 The four final things – 
death, judgement, heaven, and hell – also make good weapons in the fight against the assaults 
of unwelcome thoughts and the evil spirit behind them (Tractatus 11). They invoke the 
presence of God inasmuch as “Spiritus Dei loquitur, quando dulcia meditamur et loquimur” 
(Tractatus 12).53 
The spiritual component to thought reveals that the conscience of the Tractatus, 
like Peter’s conscience, is a point of intersection between divine and human life. The 
                                               
47 PL 184:559C-60A, “… four spirits continually speak by these thoughts of the human heart: the spirit of the 
world, the spirit of the flesh, the spirit of the devil, and the spirit of God.” 
48 PL 184:558C, “Whether [the righteous man] wishes it or not, the pestilence of the mice of Egypt rush into the 
eyes of his mind, and frogs echo in the inner chambers of his heart.” 
49 PL 184:559B, “Some inflate the heart, others elevate it. Some perturb it, others dissipate it. Some confound it, 
others busy it. Some bind it, others stain it. Some contract it, others corrupt it.” 
50 PL 184:559B, “… the mind is cleansed if it is continually trained with holy thoughts.” 
51 PL 184:559B, “Holy thought shall protect you.” 
52 PL 184:559C, “… we ought to think about God, so that we should delight in him”; PL 184:559C,  “we ought 
to think about the Passion of our Redeemer, which he endured for us on the gibbet of the cross, so that we 
should be prepared to freely endure tribulations and anguish for him.” 
53 PL 184:560A, “The spirit of God speaks when we meditate on and speak sweet things.” 
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construction of the conscience requires the participation of God and the reader: God speaks in 
the conscience when the reader meditates on profitable things. The conscience is inscrutable 
yet identifiable by its impact on daily life. The good conscience thus results in the presence of 
God within the life of the reader, shaping and transforming ordinary perceptions and 
experiences. The text makes no mention of or allusion to Peter, and yet it arrives at a very 
similar picture of the conscience. Its main differences from Peter are points of emphasis 
rather than points of doctrine. Both Peter and the Tractatus differ radically from the 
scholastic philosophical thought on conscience that came after them. 
3. De Interiori Domo 
 
De Interiori Domo has been most recently attributed to Bernard. It was, however, 
the third of four books in a De Anima compendium earlier attributed to Hugh of St Victor. 
Hugh’s authorship of the text is almost impossible. The four books were printed together as 
part of Hugh’s Opera Omnia by Ioannis Berthelin in 1648. The editor notes that the first and 
third books “ob summum in eis rutilantem piae deuotionis affectum, sub meditationum & de 
interior domo titulis, deuoto Doctori beato Bernardo Claraeuallensis ascripti sunt.”54 Migne 
reproduced the note from Berthelin’s edition in the works of Hugh, but included the text of 
De Interiori Domo itself in the works of Bernard. A note accompanying De Interiori Domo in 
the Patrologia Latina suggests that the author of the text was most likely a Cistercian (and 
not an Augustinian) because he refers to wearing a cowl and therefore likely followed the 
Benedictine Rule.55 The same note rules out Bernard’s authorship with the terse observation 
that the text is “sine ordine et methodo,” and that it frequently resorts to compiling other texts 
and repeating itself.56  
                                               
54 Hugh of St Victor, Opera Omnia Tribus Tomis Digesta, ed. Ioannis Berthelin, vol. 2 (Area Palatij.: Rothmagi, 
1648), 132. “have been attributed to the devout doctor, St Bernard of Clairvaux, under the titles “Meditations” 
and “On the Inner House,” because of the  highest golden love of righteous devotion in them. 
55 PL 184:508. For the reference to the cowl see Domo 37, (PL 184:528A) 
56 PL 184:508, “… without order or method.” 
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Doubts about Hugh’s authorship of the De Anima appear at least as early as the 
fifteenth century. The first of the four books was translated into English by a student at 
Cambridge, who then had his translation printed by Wynkyn de Worde in 1496 “in the hope 
of displacing an unauthorised earlier version circulating in manuscript.”57 Some of its subject 
matter overlaps with De Interiori Domo: both discuss the image of God and the importance 
of restoring its likeness, stress the superiority of the inner life over the outer life of the body, 
and the necessity of confession.58 The first book of the De Anima, however, makes the inner 
life the life of the soul, whereas De Interiori Domo makes it the life of the conscience.59 The 
first book generally places much more emphasis than De Interiori Domo on the original 
dignity of human beings. It resembles Anselm’s first meditation in that its emotive force 
consists in juxtaposition of humanity’s original goodness and present fallen condition. The 
conscience only appears eleven times. It generally acts as the subsequent conscience, the 
conscience that bears witness to sinful actions and then accuses its possessor of them at the 
Last Judgement.60  
The second book of the De Anima is more in keeping with typical medieval 
philosophical treatments of the soul.61 It offers definitions and discusses the nature of the 
soul’s powers and senses, but also includes a discussion of the imago Dei.62 It was sometimes 
attributed to Augustine. The editor of Berthelin’s edition notes that’s Augustine’s authorship 
is impossible, since the text cites Boethius.63 A note in the Patrologia Latina further identifies 
                                               
57 George R. Keiser, “The Mystics and the Early English Printers: The Economics of Devotionalism,” in The 
Medieval Mystical Tradition in England Exeter Symposium IV: Papers Read at Dartington Hall, July 1987, ed. 
Marion Glasscoe (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1987), 23. For the text itself, see Medytac[i]ons of Saynt 
Bernarde (Westminster: Wynkyn de Worde, 1496), Early English Books Online [ProQuest]. 
58 The first book of the De Anima appears in the Patrologia Latina under the title Meditationes Piisimae, (PL 
184:485). 
59 See, for instance, Meditationes Piisimae III.7, (PL 184:489C). 
60 There is one notable exception which refers to carrying Christ in the conscience. Piisimae Meditationes I.2, 
(PL 184:486A). 
61 The second book of the De Anima appears in the Patrologia Latina under the title De Spiritu et Anima (PL 
40:779). 
62 De Spiritu et Anima VI, (PL 40:783). 
63 Hugh, Opera Omnia, 132. 
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material drawn from Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville, Bede, Alcuin, Hugh of St Victor, 
Bernard of Clairvaux, Isaac of Stella, and others. The text appears to be little more than a 
collection of citations, which the note describes as being “quasi arenam sine calce.”64  
The fourth book of the De Anima mostly consists of meditations on the goodness 
and power of God, and the joys of heaven.65 Chapters 13-15, “De Custodia Interioris 
Hominis,” depict the conscience as a house, “cujus familia sint cogitationes et motus earum, 
sensus quoque et actiones, tam exteriores quam interiores,” which must be protected against 
the thief of Hell.66  These chapters became the basis of the thirteenth-century English Sawles 
Warde.67 
De Interiori Domo, the third book of the De Anima, shares some passages in 
common with Peter of Celle, and with the Tractatus de Conscientia. Delhaye suggests that De 
Interiori Domo was the last of the three to be written, and that it borrows the passages in 
question from the other texts.68 
De Interiori Domo comprises roughly five sections. The first section (the preface 
to the ninth chapter) uses the traditional penitential image of the conscience as a house.69 The 
construction of the house gives the text its title and its central theme. The second section 
(chapters 10-15) continues to describe the conscience and the struggle to attain a good 
conscience. The remainder of the text consists of the first-person reflections of an ‘everyman’ 
monk. Thus the third section (chapters 16-19) is devoted to the speaker’s psychological 
anguish as he describes his helplessness in the face of a sin so pervasive that it is even present 
                                               
64 PL 40:780, “… like sand without lime.”  
65 The fourth book of the De Anima appears in the Patrologia Latina under the title De Anima Liber Quartus 
(PL 177:165). 
66 De Anima Liber Quartus, PL 177:185B, “… whose household are thoughts and all their sitrrings, each sense 
and action, the external ones as much as the internal ones.” 
67 Anne Savage and Nicholas Watson, Anchoritic Spirituality: Ancrene Wisse and Associated Works (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1991), 210; Anne Eggebroten, “Sawles Warde: A Retelling of the De Anima for a Female 
Audience,” Mediaevalia 10, no. 1 (1984): 27. 
68 Philippe Delhaye, “Dans Le Sillage De S. Bernard Trois Petits Traites De Conscientia,” Citeaux in Der 
Nederlanden, no. 5 (1954): 100-103. 
69 Susan R. Kramer, “The Priest in the House of Conscience: Sins of Thought and the Twelfth-Century 
Schoolmen,” Viator 37 (2006): 150. 
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in his good works. The fourth section (chapters 20-36), begins a dialogue between the monk 
and his confessor. The monk makes his confession and the confessor provides consolations 
and remedies against sins. He does not prescribe penance, but rather advice for preventing 
these sins from recurring. This section is often repetitive: chapters 23 and 32-33 both treat the 
sin of envy. Chapters 26 and 31 both deal with gluttony, and the judgement scenes of chapter 
18 and chapter 22 share some material. Wandering in thought is the most frequently visited 
subject throughout both this individual section and the treatise as a whole. The fifth and final 
section (chapters 37-41) turns to the contemplation of God and the relationship between God 
and the soul.  
The author of De Interiori Domo adapts several passages from Peter’s De 
Conscientia in chapters 10-11. The order of the passages differs from their order in Peter’s 
text, and they are seldom verbatim. They are clearer and more concise in De Interiori Domo, 
simplified from Peter’s prolix original. Close reading of the passages confirms that they are, 
in fact, originally Peter’s. It also reveals that the author of De Interiori Domo was careful in 
his adaptation. The work overall may be “sine ordine et methodo,” but the author was careful 
in his appropriation of other texts.70 
The tenth chapter opens with a combination of three separate passages from 
Peter:  
“Multi quaerunt scientiam; pauci vero conscientiam. Si vero tanto studio et 
sollicitudine quaereretur conscientia, quanto quaeritur saecularis et vana scientia, 
et citius apprehenderetur, et utilius retineretur. Cogitare namque de conscientia, 
sensus est consummatus; et qui custodit illam, semper erit securus. Salva 
reverentia sapientiae, utilius est currere ad conscientiam, quam ad sapientiam; nisi 
sapientia illa sit quae aedificet conscientiam. Tunc enim se intelligit anima, cum 
illustratur conscientia; tunc impletur cor bona conscientia, cum in se Deum, et in 
Deo mutua revolutione seipsam receperit imago creata. Creatrix imago in imagine 
creata, nihil aliud est nisi sapientia in anima, nisi gloria in conscientia, nisi 
sanctificatio in arca.” (Domo 17).71 
                                               
70 “…without order and method.” 
71 PL 184:516B-C, “Many people seek knowledge but few seek conscience. But if conscience were sought with 
as much zeal and concern as worldly and empty knowledge is sought, it would be more swiftly apprehended and 
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Peter’s text reads: 
“Vnum dico, quia cogitare de illa sensus consummatus est, etiam qui uigilauerit 
ad illam semper erit securus. Salua reuerentia sapientiae, utilius est currere ad 
conscientiam quam ad sapientiam, nisi sapiens sit quae aedificat conscientiam 
(196/30-3). Multi proinde quaerunt scientiam, pauci conscientiam. Et si forte 
tanto labore et sollicitudine quaereretur conscientia, quanto sine dubio uana et 
saecularis scientia, et citius apprehenderetur et fructuosius retineretur” (200/4-6). 
Quid enim est creatrix imago in imagine creata nisi sapientia in anima, nisi gloria 
in conscientia, nisi sanctificatio in arca? Tunc enim se intellegit anima, tunc 
illustratur conscientia, tunc cordis inpletur scientia, tunc in se Deum et in Deo 
mutua reuolutione recipit se ipsam imago creata (200/11-5).72 
The differences in the first of these passages mostly amount to the omission of 
adverbs and the contraction of adverbial phrases. Thus the first sentence is almost identical in 
the two texts, except for De Interiori Domo’s omission of Peter’s “proinde.” It likewise omits 
Peter’s “sine dubio” in the second sentence. The meaning of the second sentence is 
essentially the same, although De Interiori Domo replaces Peter’s “labore” and “fructuosius” 
with “studio” and “utilius” respectively. The substitution of “utilius” for “fructuosius” is 
particularly significant. A similar statement appears later when Peter defines conscience as 
the cordis scientia that “in corde melius moratur et utilius consecratur” (199/33).73 De 
Interiori Domo thus demonstrates its author’s care to adapt Peter’s thought into something 
more internally consistent by applying “utilius” to the conscience in this passage as well. 
Usus is also doctrinally preferable. Usus and fructus are traditionally opposed to one another. 
One ought to enjoy (frui) God alone and use (uti) created things in the service of that 
                                                                                                                                                  
more usefully preserved. For to meditate on conscience is perfect sense, and whoever guards conscience shall 
always be secure. With a healthy reverence for wisdom, it is more useful to run to conscience than to wisdom, 
unless it is the wisdom which builds conscience. Indeed, the soul understands itself when conscience is 
illuminated. The heart is filled with good conscience when the created image has received God in itself and 
itself in God by a mutual exchange. The creator image in the created image is nothing other than wisdom in the 
soul, glory in the conscience, sanctification in the ark.” 
72 “I will say one thing: that to think about it is perfect sense, he who watches for it shall always be secure. With 
a healthy reverence for wisdom, it is more useful to run to conscience than to wisdom, unless it is wisdom which 
edifies conscience. As many seek knowledge, so few seek conscience. If, perchance, they would seek 
conscience with as much labour and anxiety as they doubtlessly do empty and secular knowledge, it would be 
more swiftly seized and more enjoyably retained. What is the Creator image in the created image except wisdom 
in the soul, glory in the conscience, and sanctification in the ark? The conscience is illuminated, then the 
knowledge of the heart is fulfilled, then the created image receives God in itself, and in the same way, itself in 
God. 
73 “… stays in the heart better and is more usefully set apart”  
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enjoyment.74 The conscience in De Interiori Domo facilitates the enjoyment of God, rather 
than being a source of enjoyment in itself. 
A partial citation from Wisdom 6:16 – (“Cogitare namque de conscientia …”) – 
follows the second sentence in De Interiori Domo. The quotation appears prior to the first 
sentence of Peter’s text, and includes verse 15 as well. Peter’s citation is closer to the 
wording of the Vulgate, which reads: “cogitare ergo de illa sensus est consummatus et qui 
vigilaverit propter illam cito erit securus” (Wisdom 6:16).75 Peter preserves the demonstrative 
“illa,” but De Interiori Domo substitutes its referent, “conscientia.” Both Peter and De 
Interiori Domo omit “propter” and “cito.” Peter retains the verb “uigilauerit,” but De Interiori 
Domo replaces it with “custodit.” Wisdom, personified as a woman, is the object of 
“uigilaverit” in the scriptural text, but “custodit” makes more sense with regard to 
conscience. Conscience is not looked out for as something approaching externally, but 
guarded internally. Thus the author of De Interiori Domo makes the same omissions as Peter, 
but further modifies the biblical quotation. His modification supports the priority of Peter’s 
text. His hand is once again at work editing and clarifying Peter’s writing. 
The following line – (“Salva reverentia sapientiae…”) – is similar in both Peter’s 
De Conscientia and De Interiori Domo. The main difference is the presence of “illa” in De 
Interiori Domo. The demonstrative renders De Interiori Domo more specific than Peter. It 
also more explicitly indicates that there is a kind of wisdom that does not edify conscience. 
This accords with Delhaye’s observation of the difference between practical or worldly 
wisdom that can be directed towards immoral living and the virtuous prudence that is 
oriented towards living a moral life.76 Peter, as seen in Chapter 1, often treats wisdom and 
conscience interchangeably. De Interiori Domo does not: there is a kind of wisdom that 
                                               
74 Thomas M. Osborne, Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2005), 20. 
75 “… therefore to think about it is perfect sense, and he who watches for it shall swiftly be secure.” 
76 Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 60. 
112 
 
“aedificet conscientiam” but does not constitute conscience. 
De Interiori Domo then proceeds to adapt Peter’s sequence of four clauses 
beginning with “tunc,” each describing the attainment of conscience. Peter lists the soul 
understanding itself, the cordis scientia being fulfilled, and the soul receiving God into itself. 
He places these events alongside the illumination of the conscience, and therefore allows the 
possibility that they are distinct from it. The vagueness evaporates in De Interiori Domo. The 
“tunc” clauses alternate with “cum” clauses; the statements now correlate with one another 
and explain their relationship to the conscience. Peter’s verb forms are preserved except for 
his present indicative “recipit,” which becomes the perfect subjunctive “receperit,” indicating 
that God’s presence within the soul is a necessary condition of the good conscience. 
Peter moves immediately from the passage cited to his image of the conscience as 
a guest chamber. De Interiori Domo includes a similar image adapted from Peter, but delays 
it by several lines.77 It introduces a new idea first. God is not merely a guest in the house of 
conscience, but the reader gives birth to Christ within the conscience:  “Qui creavit nos, 
creatur in nobis: et quasi parum esset nos Deum patrem habere, vult etiam nos fieri sibi 
fratrem et matrem” (Domo 17).78 God becomes more intimately related to the soul than 
Peter’s guest does. The reader assumes the role of the Virgin Mary when the author urges: “O 
fidelis anima, expande sinus, dilata affectus; ne angustieris in visceribus tuis concipere, quem 
totus orbis non potuit comprehendere, donec Virgo beata illum fide concepit” (Domo 17).79 
The birth of Christ in the conscience allegorically maps onto daily monastic life. The reader 
becomes Christ’s “mater, per aliorum instructionem” (Domo 17).80 Further, “[f]ide namque 
Christus concipitur, verbi praedicatione nascitur, devotione nutritur, amore tenetur” (Domo 
                                               
77 Peter, De Conscientia, 200/19-23 becomes Domo 17, (PL 184:516D-17A). 
78 PL 184:516C-D, “He who created us is created in us. And, as if it were not enough for us to have God as our 
Father, he even wishes for us to become his brother and mother.” 
79 PL 184:516D, “O faithful soul, open wide your bosom, spread your affection. Do not be distressed to 
conceive within your innermost parts the one whom all the world was not able to embrace until the Blessed 
Virgin conceived him by faith.” 
80 PL 184:516D, “… mother, through the instruction of others.” 
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17).81  
The author returns to and elaborates on the theme of familial relations with God 
when God becomes the reader’s “amicus et sponsus, frater et filius” (Domo 80).82 The soul 
gives birth to Christ when the human will is aligned with God’s, since “[v]oluntas hominis 
nihil aliud est, quam quaedam proles mentis” (Domo 80).83 It follows that “[s]i igitur eadem 
est voluntas tua, et voluntas Patris; idem est filius tuus, et filius Patris” (Domo 80).84 The 
process is straightforward and uncomplicated: “Nosti voluntatem Dei? consenti ei, et 
concepisti” (Domo 81).85 The author maps the spiritual birth onto concrete activities. Thus, in 
the first instance, it equates to the “aliorum instructionem” (Domo 17).86 The second instance 
likewise specifies that “[p]otes namque eum gignere in corde tuo, et in corde alieno” when 
“veritatem intelligis, vel alium intelligere facis, Christum gignis” (Domo 81).87 The 
understanding involved is affective rather than intellectual or speculative, since it is 
understanding of and alignment with the will, or love, of God. The spiritual birth thus 
describes an internal condition that correlates with external behaviour. 
The alignment of the human will with the will of God is especially characteristic 
of Bernardine mysticism. Étienne Gilson describes “mystical union and unity as St. Bernard 
conceived them” as the point when the human and divine wills become “two wills … in 
which intention and object coincide to such an extent that the one is a perfect image of the 
other.”88 Union is “a perfect accord between the will of the human substance and the will of 
                                               
81 PL 184:516D, “Christ is conceived by faith, born by the proclamation of the Word, nourished by devotion, 
and held by love.” 
82 PL 184:548A, “… lover and spouse, brother and son.” 
83 PL 184:548A, “The will of man is nothing other than a certain offspring of the mind.” 
84 PL 184:548A, “If, therefore, your will is the same as the will of the Father, your son is the same as the Son of 
the Father.” 
85 PL 184:548B, “Do you know the will of God? Consent to it, and you have conceived.” 
86 PL 184:516D, “… instruction of others.”  
87 PL 184:548B, “For you are able to give birth to him in your heart, and in the heart of another”; PL 184:548B, 
“you understand truth, or you make another understand, you give birth to Christ.” 
88 Étienne Gilson, The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Sheed & Ward, 
1940), 123. 
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the Divine substance.”89 De Interiori Domo thus reinterprets Bernard’s mystical union within 
Peter’s spirituality of the conscience: Peter’s house guest becomes the Christ child of the 
mind. De Interiori Domo situates Bernard’s union of wills within Peter’s guest chamber of 
the conscience, and maps the inner relations between God and the conscience onto the outer 
relations that are involved in daily monastic life. It embodies Mark McIntosh’s description of 
early Christian spirituality as “inherently mutual, communal, practical and oriented towards 
the God who makes self known precisely in this new pattern of life called church.”90 The 
spiritual union is inseparable from love for one’s neighbour and good works, both of which 
constitute its material flesh and bones: “Amando parturis, operando nutris” (Domo 81).91 
Conscience is the connection between them, joining the two together and reading the spiritual 
in the material. 
De Interiori Domo also incorporates Peter’s definition of conscience as cordis 
scientia. Chapter 11 of De Interiori Domo contains four passages from Peter. The first is 
Peter’s description of cordis scientia (199/34-8). The second is his extensive list of images of 
the conscience (195/26-34). The third is his description of the conscience’s indifference 
towards worldly suffering (196/2-6), and the fourth is his discussion of the conscience as a 
mirror (209/30-210/3).  
Peter’s recursive and contradictory definition of the conscience as “sui ipsius 
scientia” (199/26) is omitted.92 De Interiori Domo retains Peter’s distinction between scientia 
and conscientia, but simplifies it (Domo 18). Peter’s list of images of the conscience is 
mostly intact. His superfluous verbiage has been excised: the clause “bona conscientia est” no 
longer precedes each item on the list.93 The only image missing is the obscure “scyphus 
                                               
89 Gilson, Mystical Theology, 125. 
90 Mark McIntosh, Mystical Theology: The Integrity of Spirituality and Theology (Malden: Blackwell, 1998), 7. 
91 PL 184:548B, “You give birth by loving, you nourish by working.” 
92 “… knowledge of itself.” 
93 “… the good conscience is...”  
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Ioseph, in quo auguriari, imo inebriari solet” (195/29).94 There are three additions to the list: 
the “aureum reclinatorium,” “gaudium Angelorum,” and “habitaculum Spiritus sancti” 
(Domo 18).95 The additions are, however, not entirely new. They appear very close to the list 
in Peter’s text. Thus, before the list commences, Peter cites Luke 15:7: “Gaudium est enim 
angelis in coelis” (195/20).96 Peter’s chariot image appears shortly after the list (197/8), 
although it is a currus rather than a reclinatorium. Finally, the “habitaculum Spiritus sancti” 
is a transformation of the “cubiculum” (194/35) of conscience which Peter instructs the 
reader to enter in order to “Spiritum Sanctum pulsat” (195/3).97 The list in De Interiori Domo 
is thus a compressed and more straightforward form of Peter’s. It reveals that the author of 
De Interiori Domo holds Peter’s thought in high regard, and seeks to incorporate it even 
when he does not cite it. His list preserves the affective impact of Peter’s, but the stranger and 
more alien image (the cup of Joseph) has been left out. 
The introduction of “secura” in De Interiori Domo is the main difference between 
the two descriptions of the conscience’s indifference towards external tribulation. Peter 
enumerates the bodily tortures and then asks rhetorically, “quid ad conscientiam?” (196/6).98 
De Interoriori Domo substitutes the clause “et secura erit conscientia” (Domo 18).99 The 
author repeats the expression several times to establish the internal security in contrast to 
external harms: “Bona conscientia secura erit cum corpus morietur; secura, cum anima coram 
Deo praesentabitur; secura, cum utrumque in die judicii” (Domo 18).100  
The emphasis on security reflects the author’s embellishment of Peter’s material 
for his purposes rather than the simplification or clarification of Peter’s text. Inner security 
                                               
94 “… cup of Joseph in which he is accustomed to do divination and become intoxicated.”  
95 PL 184:517A, “The golden chariot”; PL 184:517B, “The joy of angels”; PL 184:517A, “The dwelling place of 
the Holy Spirit.” 
96 “There is joy to the angels in heaven.” 
97 “… dwelling place of the Holy Spirit”; “chamber”; “… knock upon the Holy Spirit.” 
98 “What is that to conscience?” 
99 PL 184:517B, “… and conscience shall be secure.” 
100 PL 184:517B, “Good conscience shall be secure when the body dies, secure when the soul shall be presented 
in the presence of God, secure also when it is placed before the terrifying judgement seat of the just Judge on the 
Day of Judgement.” 
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and the establishment of a firm boundary between the inner house of conscience and the outer 
world are the central ideas that underlie De Interiori Domo as a whole. Thus, the author 
writes that “[b]eata illa anima, quae in pace Christi fundata est et in Dei amore solidata: quae 
cum exterius bella patitur, pax interius non turbatur” (Domo 2).101 The soul is “tota per 
amorem intus requiescit” because “nihil est quod foris appetit” (Domo 2).102 It has everything 
it needs within the enclosed house of conscience. The author contrasts it with the soul which 
“nec in amore Dei desiderium figere” but leaves the safety of the conscience when “per 
oculos et aures, aliosque corporis sensus foras egreditur, atque in his exterioribus delectatur” 
(Domo 3).103 That soul “mundi consolationem quaesivit,” and as such “illam quae a Deo intus 
in conscientia datur, non habebit” (Domo 3).104 The soul must abstain from company and 
pleasure in the present, in order to remain within its conscience through love of God. Present 
company is only transitory and passing, “[c]ogita ergo in societate aliorum nunc positus, quia 
non poteris semper manere cum illis,” therefore the author instructs “elige tibi socium 
illum … Deus tuus ille est, quem eligere debes” (Domo 3).105 The reader may be assured, 
“Ipse enim frequenter visitat et libenter inhabitat tranquillitatem cordis,” but first “te 
praepara, ut tecum adsit Deus; sit in ore, sit in corde” (Domo 4).106 Thus, “qualicunque 
mentis vagatione inde abstractus fueris, illuc semper redire festina” (Domo 12).107 The 
necessary preparation is withdrawal into the secret and secluded chamber of conscience. The 
                                               
101 PL 184:509C, “The soul is blessed which has been established in the peace of Christ and made strong in the 
love of God. Its inner peace is not disturbed when it suffers external conflicts.” 
102 PL 184:509C, “… it rests all within, through love”; PL 184:509C, “… when there is nothing outside that it 
desires.” 
103 PL 184:509D, “… does not fix its desire in the love of God”; PL 184:509D-10A, “… it goes out through the 
eyes and the ears and the other corporeal senses. It delights in these external things.” 
104 PL 184:510A, “… sought the consolation of the world”; PL 184:510A, “… it shall not have the consolation 
which is given by God within, in its conscience.” 
105 PL 184:510A, “Consider now, while you are situated in the society of others, because you shall not always be 
able to remain with them”; PL 184:510A-B, “… choose for yourself that companion … He is your God, whom 
you ought to choose.” 
106 PL 184:510B, “… he frequently visits and gladly dwells within tranquillity of heart”; PL 184:510B, “… 
prepare yourself in such a way that God will come to be with you, so that he shall be in your prayer, so that he 
shall be in your heart.” 
107 PL 184:513D, “… regardless of whatever wandering of mind draws you away from it, always hasten to 
return there.” 
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withdrawal does not compete with or contradict the communal monastic observance 
discussed above. On the contrary, “[s]tudeamus ergo templum Deo aedificare in nobis: primo 
quidem ut in singulis nobis, deinde ut in omnibus simul inhabitet” (Domo 5).108 
The text contrasts the conscience with both the body and the soul. The conscience 
is distinct from the body in that it is the “alia nobis est aedificanda” whereas the body is 
“[d]omus haec, in qua habitamus” and it “ruinam nobis minatur” (Domo “Prologue”).109 The 
conscience is like the soul in that “[c]onscientia vero perpetua est, quae nunquam finitur, 
sicut nec anima” and “sicut non potest esse non anima, sic nunquam potest esse sine 
conscientia” (Domo “Prologue”).110 It is, however, also distinct from the soul in that 
conscience is the house “in qua anima perpetuo mansura est” (Domo 1) as opposed to the 
body in which the soul now dwells.111 The relationship between the conscience and the soul 
is likened to the relationship between the soul and the body: just as “[v]ult habere anima 
corporis sui domum integram, et exire eam necesse est, si fuerint a se invicem membra 
dispersa,” so the person who desires a conscience must “videat et sollicite caveat, ne a se 
invicem membra ejus dissideant; id est, ratio, voluntas, et memoria” (Domo 5).112 The 
enumeration of reason, will, and memory indicates that conscience does not exist within any 
one of the three powers of the rational soul and is not a fourth power alongside them. It is, 
rather, the condition that results from all three operating rightly and harmoniously: “Dignum 
habitaculum parat Deo, cujus nec est ratio decepta, nec voluntas perversa, nec memoria 
inquinata” (Domo 5).113  
                                               
108 PL 184:510C, “Let us strive, therefore, to build the temple of God within us: first, so that he may 
simultaneously dwell within each of us, then so that he shall dwell in all of us.” 
109 PL 184:507C, “… other house that we must build up”; PL 184:507C, “… the house in which we dwell”; PL 
184:507C, “… threatens us with ruin.” 
110 PL 184:508C, “Conscience is eternal. It never ends, just like the soul”; PL 184:508C, “… as the soul is not 
able to not exist, so it is not possible to exist without conscience.” 
111 PL 184:509A, “… in which the soul shall eternally remain.” 
112 PL 184:510C-D, “The soul wishes to have the house of its body intact, and it is necessary for the soul to 
leave it if its members have each been separated from it”; PL 184:510D, “… look and take care anxiously, lest 
its members (that is, reason, will, and memory) are each separated from it.” 
113 PL 184:510D, “The one whose reason is not deceived, nor his will perverse, nor his memory polluted, 
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The final borrowing from Peter, the description of the conscience as a mirror, 
differs slightly from its original. The passage in Peter’s text involves the conscience as both a 
mirror and a tablet. Peter’s soul “in tabulis conscientiae relegit et intellegit” (209/34-35).114 
The tablets are absent from De Interiori Domo. Its soul “in conscientia relegit et intelligit” 
(Domo 19).115 The traces of Peter’s tablet remain. It makes sense to read in a tablet; it does 
not make sense to read in a mirror. The author thus collapses Peter’s dual image of mirror and 
tablet into the simpler image of a mirror. This mirror otherwise fulfils much the same purpose 
as Peter’s. The conscience is able to reflect the moral quality of life, but only once it has been 
cultivated to do so. It enables the soul to recognise “in quibus vestigia creatricis imaginis 
recipiat” (Domo 19).116 The conscience must be cleansed in order for this to happen, 
otherwise the soul’s moral vision is obscured and its capacity for reflection diminished. The 
author writes earlier in the treatise that “[h]aec ergo conscientia, in qua anima perpetuo 
mansura est, aedificanda est, sed prius mundanda” (Domo 1).117 De Interiori Domo then 
follows Peter in saying that, once properly cultivated, “[s]peculum mundum, clarum et purum 
totius religionis, bona conscientia” (Domo 19).118 
The description of conscience thus far closely resembles the subsequent 
conscience, the conscience that judges past action. The conscience comes about as a direct 
result of how one has lived: “ille recte militat, qui per militiam quam exercet in corpore, 
domum aedificat conscientiae” (Domo “Prologue”).119 Several other references throughout 
the text indicate that the author has the subsequent conscience in mind. Jager notes chapter 18 
of De Interiori Domo as an instance of the trope of “an inner scribe who writes down every 
                                                                                                                                                  
prepares a fit dwelling for God.” 
114 “… rereads and understands in the tablets of conscience.” 
115 PL 184:517C, “… rereads and understands in its conscience.” 
116 PL 184:517C, “… in which things it may recover the traces of the creator image.” 
117 PL 184:509A, “This conscience in which the soul shall eternally remain must be built up, but first it must be 
cleansed.” 
118 PL 184:517D, “The good conscience is the clean, bright and pure mirror of all religion.” 
119 PL 184:508B, “… he fights well who builds the house of conscience through the fight which he exercises in 
the body.” 
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deed in … a book,” a trope that was “used to interpret the opened books of the Last 
Judgement.”120 The book, however, does not pronounce judgement. It merely records, and the 
record it keeps will be set on display at the Final Judgement: “aperto libro conscientiae, 
omnis culpa ante oculos reducetur” (Domo 30).121 Then “cogente conscientia, unusquisque 
erit accusator et judex suus” (Domo 30).122 This state of affairs only comes about once the 
conscience has been exposed for all to see, and thus it is the contents of conscience and not 
any judgements that conscience pronounces that force everyone to become their own judge. 
The conscience itself does not judge one way or the other. Thus, when the speaker exclaims 
that “[d]amnat me conscientia mea, quanquam divinum judicium nondum me damnet” 
(Domo 30), he refers to the contents of the conscience which he independently recognises to 
be guilty.123 The speaker is therefore equally able to say that “[c]onscientia mea meretur 
damnationem” (Domo 35).124 This is the meaning of conscience when the speaker also says, 
“[p]roprii reatus conscientia non me requiescere sinit, sed de die in diem vehementer me 
torquet, et de die judicii vehementius terret” (Domo 30).125 The torment is fear of future 
judgement upon recognising that the contents of the conscience are morally deficient. 
The conscience of De Interiori Domo thus follows Peter and collapses the 
subsequent moral conscience with the other variant of the patristic conscience that Delhaye 
describes: “the subject retains deep within himself the imprint of his acts. Choice after choice, 
he builds his ‘self’; he fashions for good or ill his moral interior.”126 De Interiori Domo 
contains both ingredients of the contemplative conscience. The moral interior becomes the 
space of thought, imagination, and affection. It becomes the most intimate meeting place 
                                               
120 Jager, Book of the Heart, 54. 
121 PL 184:523D, “… every fault shall be brought back before the eyes by the open book of conscience.” 
122 PL 184:524A, “… everyone’s conscience shall force him to become his own accuser and judge.” 
123 PL 184:524A, “My conscience condemns me, even though divine judgement does not condemn me yet.” 
124 PL 184:526B, “My conscience merits damnation.” 
125 PL 184:523D, “Awareness of my own guilt does not permit me to rest, but tortures me vigorously from day 
to day, and terrifies me more vigorously about the Day of Judgement.” 
126 Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 97. 
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between man and God. 
The good conscience is not natural or inborn. It must be pursued and constructed. 
De Interiori Domo, like Peter, maintains that the acquisition of conscience requires the 
collaborative effort of God and man. The author asks: “Et quis eam mundabit?” to which he 
answers, “Profecto Deus et homo: homo, per cogitationes et affectiones; Deus vero, per 
misericordiam et gratiam” (Domo 1).127  
The conscience, then, as the realm of thought and affection, is shaped by thought 
and affection. The pillars that support the house of the good conscience are “bona voluntas, 
memoria, scilicet memorem esse beneficiorum Dei; cor mundum, animus liber, spiritus 
rectus, mens devota, ratio illuminata” (Domo 6).128 Memory supports the conscience insofar 
as it evokes love: “Recordemur ergo misericordiarum Dei, ut sic accendamur in ejus 
amorem” (Domo 7).129 The cleansed heart is the conscience in microcosm. The author applies 
the same descriptions and instructions to it as he does to the conscience as a whole. It must be 
cleansed, like the conscience, “ut totius immunditiae spurcitias respuens, cogitationum sicut 
actionum peccata deploret” (Domo 8).130 It also “[s]it purum, ut nihil morari intra se patiatur 
mali” (Domo 8).131 It is therefore a moral space in addition to an affective one: “eum, a quo 
tanta beneficia accepimus, toto corde diligamus” (Domo 8).132 The soul similarly “[s]it 
consummatus in Dei dilectione” (Domo 9).133  
Reason is more affective than intellective. Its role is determining action, rather 
than understanding or conceptual knowledge. It overlaps with the will in that “[s]i vero 
aliquem motum ad id quod non debet, vel quomodo non debet, moveri senserit, non 
                                               
127 PL 184:509A, “And who shall wash it?”; PL 184:509A, “Surely, God and man – man through thoughts and 
affections, but God through mercy and grace.” 
128 PL 184:511A, “… the good will, memory – that is, to be mindful of the gifts of God – a cleansed heart, a free 
soul, a right spirit, a devout mind and illuminated reason.” 
129 PL 184:511C, “Let us therefore remember the mercy of God, so that we shall be set afire with love for him.” 
130 PL 184:512B, “… so that it deplores the sins of thought as of action, rejecting the filth of all uncleanness.” 
131 PL 184:512A, “Let it be pure, so that it suffers nothing evil to remain within itself.” 
132 PL 184:512A, “We should love with a whole heart him from whom we have received such great gifts.” 
133 PL 184:512C, “Let it be complete in the love of God.” 
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consentiat, sed illico resistat” (Domo 15).134 Consent is the preserve of reason and not the 
will: “Tunc enim anima mori, sicut scriptum est, dicitur cum ipsa ratio ad peccatum per 
consensum curvatur” (Domo 15).135 The author notes that “solus consensus reos nos facit, 
etiamsi aliquid impediat ne opera subsequantur” and as such “[n]on nocet sensus, ubi non est 
consensus” (Domo 15).136 
The house of conscience is constructed by reading the text. The image of the 
seven pillars has mnemonic value. Mary Carruthers notes that, in medieval memory 
technique, “[t]he fundamental principle is to ‘divide’ the material to be remembered into 
pieces short enough to be recalled in single units and to key these into some sort of rigid, 
easily reconstructable order.”137 The seven pillars representing the seven qualities constitutive 
of the conscience meet these criteria. The image is an instance of ekphrasis. Carruthers notes 
comparable instances in early Christian writers who used the Heavenly Jerusalem to similar 
effect: “The various details are moralised and spiritualised on the basis of an internal picture 
which the words paint in our mind. We have an internal temple and tabernacle….”138 Reading 
and internalising the pillars of conscience effectively builds the house within the mind. De 
Interiori Domo thus engages the imagination in much the same way as Peter in order to build 
the conscience, as it says, “per cogitationes et affectiones” (Domo 1).139  
The reader must also take on a practical and involved role in constructing 
conscience. The work is hampered by the mind’s propensity to wander and become 
distracted. Thus, in addition to reading, self-examination and confession are the primary 
                                               
134 PL 184:515C, “If it perceive any motion stirred against it – either that ought not to be stirred up, or in a way 
that it ought not be stirred – let reason not consent, but let it resist there.” 
135 PL 184: 515C-D, “Then, indeed, the soul is said to die, as it is written, when the reason itself is bent towards 
sin through consent.” 
136 PL 184:515C, “… consent alone makes us guilty, even if something impedes works from following”; PL 
184:515D, “The temptation does no harm where there is no consent.” 
137 Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture, vol. 10, Cambridge Studies 
in Medieval Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 7. 
138 Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200, vol. 34, 
Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 133-34. 
139 PL 184:509B, “… through thoughts and affections.” 
122 
 
mechanisms for the edification of conscience. The author urges the reader to envision a 
judgement scene: “se ante se statuat, et tanquam alium se judicet; se equidem culpatum, ante 
se afflictum; se reum, ante se judicem severum; se impium, ante se ad pietatem reversum” 
(Domo 20).140 Remaining within the conscience means remaining within examination of 
one’s life: “De diversis igitur mundi partibus, in quibus cor vagum et profundum tenetur, vel 
vane occupatur, ad seipsum redeat, et seipsum discutiat: cumque invenerit culpam, timeat 
poenam” (Domo 20).141 
The author portrays the struggle for conscience vividly in the first-person 
reflections that begin in chapter 16. The speaker is powerless to control his heart and its 
thoughts, which are captivated and led astray by external temptations. He laments, “[n]on 
enim est in potestate mea cor meum et cogitationes meae,” but “[i]dcirco crebra terrenarum 
cupiditatum illecebra, et vanitatum effusio ita cor meum occupant” (Domo 25).142 He 
confesses to God, “[a]udi quam saepe de memoria mea te expulit irruens turba plurimarum 
cogitationum” (Domo 25).143  
The worst temptations are external, because they draw the mind outside the 
enclosure of the conscience. Lustful thoughts are therefore especially pernicious: “quod saepe 
mihi nocuit mortifera delectatio” (Domo 26).144 Lust “caeteris vitiis est mihi familiarior,” and 
he confesses that “[c]arnis libidinem nunquam fugere potui” (Domo 26).145 He is similarly 
afflicted by vengefulness for past insults and injury, fantasising about getting even: “Saepe 
namque aliqua injuria commotus, densis cogitationum tumultibus in corde premor” (Domo 
                                               
140 PL 184:518A, “… let it set itself before itself for punishment and let it judge itself as though it were another: 
the culpable self before the troubled self, the guilty self before the severe judge self, the wicked self before the 
self turned back to piety.” 
141 PL 184:517D-18A, “Therefore, let the wandering and insatiable heart return to itself from the diverse parts of 
the world in which it is held or pointlessly occupied, and let it examine itself. When it has found a fault, let it 
fear punishment.” 
142 PL 184:521A, “My heart and my thoughts are not in my power”; PL 184:520D, “the constant allure of 
earthly desires and the profusion of vanities so occupy my heart.” 
143 PL 184:520D, “Hear how often the rushing crowd of many thoughts expels you from my memory.” 
144 PL 184:521C, “… death-bearing delight has often harmed me.” 
145 PL 184:521C, “… is more familiar to me than other vices”; PL 184:521C, “I have never been able to escape 
the lust of the flesh.” 
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27).146 He is similarly guilty of idle gossip: “Verbositati deserviens, detractioni studens, os 
meum mendacio et detractione inquinavi” (Domo 28).147 He laments that his motivation has 
been evil, even when doing good or necessary things: “[s]aepissime namque comedi et bibi 
non ad necessitatem, sed ad voluptatem” (Domo 28).148 The threat to conscience is still 
external. His intention is at fault because it was externally oriented; it desired sensual 
pleasure. He was concerned about external appearances rather than internal realities, “[s]aepe 
jactavi me fecisse quod non feceram” and “[d]issimulavi etiam me non fecisse quod feceram” 
(Domo 37).149 
The confessor does not prescribe penance for these sins, but instead he proposes 
remedies against them. The remedies are imaginative meditations that can keep the 
conscience free from sin because “[i]bi namque est cogitatio tua, ubi est affectio tua; ibi cor 
tuum, ubi est desiderium tuum” (Domo 47).150 They keep thought from straying outside the 
conscience: “Quoties te sentis turpibus cogitationibus pulsari, et ad illicitam delectationem 
allici; toties pone ante mentis oculos quomodo Christus in cruce crucifixus est pro te” (Domo 
44).151 The author proceeds to paint the scene “ante mentis oculis,” as Peter had suggested 
(206/6-7).152 Thoughts of Christ’s Passion evoke a strong affective response. They keep 
desire within, and noxious thoughts out: “Sufficere posset haec cogitatio ad excludendas 
omnes illicitas cogitationes” (Domo 44).153 
Meditation on the Final Things is also an effective antidote to wandering 
                                               
146 PL 184:522A, “Often, provoked by some injury, I am overwhelmed by constant disturbances of thought in 
my heart.” 
147 PL 184:523A, “Devoting myself to verbosity and eager for slander, I have stained my mouth with deception 
and slander.” 
148 PL 184:522D, “For I have eaten and drunk most often not for necessity, but for pleasure.” 
149 PL 184:527C, “Often I have put myself forth as having done something which I did not do”; PL 184:527C, “I 
have even pretended not to have done what I had done.” 
150 PL 184:532B, “For your thought is the place where your affection is, where your heart is, and where your 
desire is.” 
151 PL 184:530B-31A, “As often as you feel yourself beaten with poisonous thoughts and allured to illicit 
delight, place before the eyes of your mind how Christ was crucified on the cross for you.” 
152 “… before the eyes of the mind.” 
153 PL 184:531A, “This thought shall be sufficient to exclude all illicit thoughts. But behold, let us pass to 
others.” 
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thoughts. The author devotes much more time (one full column of the Patrologia Latina) to 
graphically describing death and the Last Judgement than he does to the Passion (a quarter of 
a column in the Patrologia Latina). His preference for the macabre scenes of death, 
judgement, and hell accords with the earlier injunction to envision a trial scene as a means of 
evaluating past conduct (Domo 20).154 The meditation also fulfils the same purpose as 
meditation on the Passion in that it evokes an affective response in the reader. Fear restrains 
the wandering mind as much as love, and keeps it within the conscience. The author borrows 
a passage from Anselm of Canterbury’s second meditation to describe the judgement: “Hinc 
erunt accusantia peccata; inde, terrens justitia: subtus, patens horridum chaos inferni; desuper, 
iratus Judex: intus, urens conscientia; foris, ardens mundus” (Domo 46).155 The conscience 
mirrors the outer world in its destruction. Both are destroyed for sin. The purpose of the 
meditation, however, is to keep sin from the conscience. The image of the burning conscience 
thus reinforces that the conscience can contain either sin or love for God. It is the instrument 
of union with or separation from God, and thus the space of both. 
The meditation on Final Things performs three functions simultaneously: it 
facilitates the self-knowledge that constitutes the withdrawal into conscience, it arouses the 
affection of fear that keeps the mind within, and it solidifies the idea that conscience is the 
sphere occupied both by sin and love of God. If the conscience is not properly constructed 
and fortified, and if God is not properly loved within it, “eritque templum Dei spelunca 
diaboli” (Domo 47).156 
These meditations are also vital for prayer. De Interiori Domo defines prayer: 
“[o]ratio est mentis devotio; id est conversio in Deum per pium et humilem affectum” (Domo 
                                               
154 PL 184:517D-18A. 
155 PL 184:531D, “Here your sins shall be accusing, there justice terrifying. The horrible chaos of Hell shall be 
below; the angry Judge shall be above. Conscience shall burn within; the world shall burn outside.” For the 
passage from Anselm’s meditation see Anselm of Canterbury, Liber Meditationum et Orationum II, (PL 
158:724B). 
156 PL 184:532B, “… the temple of God shall be the cave of the devil.” 
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56).157 The meditations are intended to evoke right affective responses and thus turn them 
towards God. Prayer is more difficult “dum converti ad Deum post perpetrata vitia studeo” 
because “occurrunt cordi phantasmata peccatorum quae feci” (Domo 57).158 Imaginative 
meditation provides images to counter the phantasms of previous vices and thus bring the 
conscience into a position for prayer. Meditation, the weapon for combating sinful thoughts, 
and prayer go hand in hand because “[o]ratio cordis est, non labiorum,” and “[n]eque enim 
verba deprecantis Deus intendit; sed orantis cor aspicit” (Domo 56).159 All of this takes place 
within the house of conscience. 
God visits the soul once it has withdrawn into the enclosure of conscience. The 
author describes union with God as a momentary ascent: "[p]ia devotione ascendat, et visitet 
supernas sedes, et multas quae in domo Patris sunt mansiones" (Domo 10).160 The language 
of ascent, however, is brief and metaphorical. The ascent of the conscience is simultaneously 
God’s descent into the conscience. Thus the conscience must be cleansed and guarded so that 
“qui ad ostium stat et pulsat, quacunque hora intrare voluerit, receptaculum mundum 
inveniat” (Domo 11).161 The author then describes contemplation as a flight, rather than an 
ascent. Withdrawal and flight occur concomitantly. The author instructs the reader: “redi ad 
cor tuum, et ibi intrare et habitare omni modo stude” so that they “potest ad ea quae supra 
ipsam sunt, penna contemplationis evolare” (Domo 13).162 Withdrawal into conscience and 
contemplative flight are in apposition to one another: “jam fortassis ascendisti, jam ad cor 
                                               
157 PL 184:536A, “Prayer is devotion of the mind: i.e., turning to God through faithful and humble affection.” 
158 PL 184:536D, “… when I desire to turn back to God after I have committed sins”; PL 184:536D “… 
phantasms of the sins I have committed assail my heart.” 
159 PL 184:536C, “It is prayer of the heart, not of the lips”; PL 184:536C “God does not reach out for the words 
of the intercessor, but he looks at the heart.” 
160 PL 184:512D, “Let it ascend by faithful devotion, and let it visit the high seats and the many mansions which 
are in the house of the Father.” 
161 PL 184:513B, “he who stands at the door and knocks may find a clean shelter at whichever hour he wishes to 
enter.” 
162 PL 184:514A, “… return to your heart and strive in every way to enter and to dwell in it”; PL 184:514B, “be 
able to fly up by the wing of contemplation to the things which are above themselves.” 
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tuum rediisti” (Domo 12).163 The flight is not a hierarchical ascent towards union. Rather, the 
presence of God within the conscience transforms experience of external things: “Huic itaque 
qui sic affectus est, non est onerosa paupertas: iste non sentit injurias: ridet opprobria, 
contemnit damna, mortem lucrum reputat” (Domo 14).164 
De Interiori Domo depicts conscience as an inner chamber prepared for the 
meeting of God and the soul. It is the point of continuity between the present and future life 
of beatitude. All the powers of the rational soul contribute to it. Every action of life shapes it 
and determines its moral quality. Outward conduct is therefore key to the conscience, even 
though the conscience itself is internal. Exteriority remains vital to interiority. The person 
who wants to attain a good conscience must exert considerable effort in keeping it free from 
impure thoughts. The conscience is the realm of thought, and its impure thoughts are 
combated by imaginative meditation on the Passion and the Final Things. Wholesome 
thought orients the conscience towards God. Orientation towards God brought about by 
wholesome thought is the text’s definition of prayer. Meditation and prayer are inseparable. 
The author of De Interiori Domo evidently found Peter of Celle’s thought on 
conscience a fruitful resource for the contemplative life. He integrates Peter’s contemplative 
conscience with Bernardine mysticism, but relies more heavily on Augustine’s anthropology 
than Bernard did.165 Richard Upsher-Smith Jr. has argued that Augustine’s ternary of 
understanding, memory, and will plays an important part in Bernard’s thought, that “the 
Augustinian triad is deeply woven into the fabric of Bernard’s spirituality.”166 Bernard, 
nevertheless, emphasised the role of the will in attaining union with God. He more often 
                                               
163 PL 184:513D, “… perhaps you have already ascended, already returned to your heart.” 
164 PL 184:514C-D, “To one thus affected, poverty is not burdensome. He does not feel injuries. He laughs at his 
shame, scorns his loss, and considers his death as profit.” 
165 De Interiori Domo particularly echoes Bernard’s emphasis on self-examination and knowledge. For an 
overview of the role self-knowledge plays in Bernard’s thought, see Gilson, Mystical Theology, 34-35. 
166 Richard Upsher-Smith, Jr., “Saint Bernard’s Anthropology: Traditional and Systematic,” Cistercian Studies 
Quarterly 46, no. 4 (2011): 427. Upsher-Smith analyses a selection of Bernard’s writings. He bases this 
conclusion particularly on Bernard’s sermons In Festivitate Omnium Sanctorum. For a brief account of 
Augustine’s ternary of memory, understanding, and will as expressed in his De Trinitate, see Upsher-Smith, 
“Saint Bernard’s Anthropology,” 423. 
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“speaks of the location of God’s image and likeness in the will.”167 Illia Delio writes that, for 
Bernard, “[t]he human person becomes a distorted image of God when the free will, the 
image of the Word in the soul, clings voluntarily to what is evil and turns away from what is 
good.”168 De Interiori Domo, by contrast, emphasises all the Augustinian powers of the 
rational soul coming together within the house of conscience. The soul interprets external 
asceticism as giving birth to Christ within the house of the conscience. God’s presence within 
the conscience in turn shapes perception and experience of external things. De Interiori 
Domo uses the paradigm of conscience as an alternative to the paradigm of contemplative 
ascent based on the hierarchical tiers of purgation, illumination and union. 
4. Conclusion 
 
The Tractatus de Conscientia and De Interiori Domo reveal a spirituality of 
conscience that lies outside the main tradition of medieval contemplation. Both texts arrive at 
their picture of conscience by different means, and for different purposes. The Tractatus 
reaches its view of conscience by biblical exegesis, and offers a practical guide to life in light 
of its conclusions. It places less emphasis on contemplation or contemplative prayer than 
either Peter of Celle or De Interiori Domo, yet it maintains that the present, earthly life of the 
good conscience is analogous to eternal life in heaven. The conscience is not directly 
accessible, but its contents inform and shape ordinary experiences. Thus, the conscience does 
not apprehend God as the direct object or phenomenon of spiritual experience. Rather, the 
good conscience reinterprets ordinary life in order to recognise God’s presence. The analogy 
between earthly and heavenly life lies in the transformation of thought and perception rather 
than isolated mystical experiences. 
De Interiori Domo is a treatise on the inner life and contemplation that eschews 
                                               
167 Ilia Delio, “Bonaventure and Bernard: On Human Image and Mystical Union,” Cistercian Studies Quarterly 
34, no. 2 (1999): 254. 
168 Delio, “Bonaventure and Bernard,” 255. 
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the ascending triad of purgation, illumination, and union. It bases its definition of conscience 
on Peter of Celle, but absorbs elements of Bernardine mysticism. Peter receives priority over 
Bernard. The text’s governing metaphor is a house that is closed to the outside world. The life 
of conscience is the life of solitude, and yet this solitude is mapped onto life in the monastic 
community.  
The conscience in both texts is the product of the synthesis of different patristic 
approaches to conscience, which in turn build on ambiguous Pauline conscience texts and the 
Stoic tradition. The contemplative conscience draws on the idea of the anterior conscience, 
the moral director, but replaces the law of God with the presence of God. The contemplative 
conscience also draws from the idea of the subsequent conscience, in that it is shaped by past 
conduct. The contemplative conscience differs from the patristic conscience in that it is not 
inborn, but needs to be constructed and edified if God is to dwell within it. Moral living is 
only one of the tools for its creation. The conscience is the domain of thought and affect, and 
thus meditations that engage imagination and emotion are also vital to shaping it. 
De Interiori Domo circulated as part of a popular De Anima attributed to Hugh of 
St Victor. It is almost certain that the English author of the AW had read it. Mari Hughes-
Edwards notes that anchoritic “guidance writers wish to enclose [their readers] within an 
elaborate system of metaphor and simile, intending such descriptions to be affective 
actualisations and codifications of … their perceptions of the vocation.”169 The discourse of 
interiority based on the image of a house closed to the world thus proved to be an optimal 
structure for conceptualising the inner life of anchoritic readers who literally inhabited small 
houses closed to the world wich were also understood as “an antechamber to heaven.”170 The 
AW author found the contemplative conscience the perfect inner appropriation of the outer 
                                               
169 Mari Hughes-Edwards, Reading Medieval Anchoritism: Ideology and Spiritual Practices (Cardiff: University 
of Wales Press, 2012), 36. 
170 Tom Licence, Hermits and Recluses in English Society, 950-1200 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 123. 
129 
 
anchoritic situation. Metaphor and reality become one and the same, and thus the kind of 
contemplation the AW author intends for his readers is the type of contemplation found in the 
conscience texts.  The next chapter of this thesis explores the AW author’s adaptation of the 
contemplative conscience. 
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Chapter Three 
The Ancrene Wisse 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The author of the AW instructs his readers to accompany the Mass with several 
Latin prayers. The prayers include a series of lines adapted from the beginning of Augustine’s 
Confessiones. Augustine and the anchoress at prayer ask how it is possible for the heart to 
contain God: “Angusta est tibi domus anime mee, quo uenias ad eam; dilatetur abs te. 
Ruinosa est; refice eam” (AW I.227-28).1 Anna McHugh notes this passage as “one of many 
metaphors of enclosed space” in the AW that “rely on the poetics of space to give form to 
concepts of memory and mental activity.”2 The house, for McHugh, is the house of memory 
“which the text seeks to train and improve. It is delegated to memory to manipulate the 
significance of the outer world.”3 The AW author’s overt discussion of memory is minimal, 
but inner space figures prominently in his work. He prefers discussion of the heart to 
discussion of the memory, and he equates the heart with the conscience. The heart in the AW 
is imagined in terms closely analogous to the conscience in the monastic texts considered in 
the first two chapters. This chapter argues that the heart relates to the powers of the rational 
soul in the same way that the conscience relates to them in the contemplative monastic 
conscience texts. The heart-conscience becomes the inner house that the anchoress must learn 
to inhabit with God. McHugh is correct that memory is important in that, as she observes, 
“the work will be read and re-read every day for years, perhaps decades” and as such “it 
                                               
1 “The house of my soul is too narrow for you. Where can you come into it? May you enlarge it? It is ruined. 
Restore it.” See Augustine of Hippo, Confessionum Libri Tredecim I.5.6, (PL 32:663). 
2 Anna McHugh, “Inner Space as Speaking Space in Ancrene Wisse,” in Rhetoric of the Anchorhold: Space, 
Place and Body within the Discourses of Enclosure, ed. Liz Herbert McAvoy (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 2008), 84. 
3 McHugh, “Inner Space as Speaking Space,” 84. 
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forms a paradigm within which other material will be organised.”4 This chapter maintains, 
however, that the role of memory in the AW echoes its role in De Interiori Domo. It is one of 
many pillars. The inner house of the AW, the house of the soul that is ruined and must be 
remade, is the conscience. The spirituality of the AW is the spirituality of the contemplative 
conscience texts. 
The heart possesses a range of attributes and performs a range of functions: the 
heart is a moral faculty, the heart is the locus of desire and love, the heart is the locus of 
thought and memory, and finally the heart is the dwelling place of God. All of these 
categories are closely intertwined with one another and this chapter demonstrates that they all 
operate in the AW as they do in the contemplative conscience texts. By reading the AW as a 
conscience text, this discussion contributes towards a resolution of the debates within 
scholarship as to what sort of spirituality the author intends for his anchoritic readers. 
2. The Heart as a Moral Faculty 
 
The AW author equates purity of heart with a clean inwit. The inwit makes its first 
appearance in the text as the subsequent conscience, the judge evaluating past action and 
behaviour. It tells the anchoress: “‘Her þu sunegest,’ oþer ‘þis nis nawt ibet ȝet as wel as hit 
ahte’” (P.14-15).5 Its moral judgements are always post factum. The author stipulates that 
adherence to a rule mitigates its accusations. It follows that the inwit does not provide moral 
direction, but needs it. Inwit, like Peter of Celle’s conscience, needs a rule of life in order to 
be good.6 Inwit, or the heart, does surprisingly little accusing throughout the Rule. Its moral 
function is usually closer to the conscience that has become inclined towards evil and 
requires education and cultivation. The author presents the heart as morally vulnerable. It is 
more likely to be wounded than to evaluate. Moral wounds and sicknesses come in two 
                                               
4 McHugh, “Inner Space as Speaking Space,” 84. 
5 “‘Here you sinned,’ or ‘This has not yet been atoned for as well as it ought to be.’” 
6 See p. 91 of this thesis. 
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varieties that frequently overlap. 
The first type of wound involves the heart being injured by the wrongdoing of its 
possessor. Thus the author discourages the sisters from taking any vows in addition to 
poverty, chastity and fixity of place, lest breaking them “walde to swiðe hurten ower heorte.” 
(P.84).7 Vowing additional observances would convert them from observances into 
obligations. Failure to keep those obligations would then be a moral wrong and therefore a 
moral wound. 
The second type of moral injury is much more prevalent in the text. The heart’s 
wounds are the cause and not only the results of sinful actions. The idea derives from Christ’s 
words in Matthew 15:19: “de corde enim exeunt cogitationes malae homicidia adulteria 
fornicationes furta falsa testimonia blasphemiae.”8 Good and evil have their origin in the 
heart. The author’s imagery vividly depicts a corrupt heart as diseased, recalling Peter’s 
image of the putrified conscience.9 The “[p]rude ant onde ant wreaððe, heorte sar for 
worltlich þing dreori of longunge, ant ȝisceunge of ahte … ant al þet of hem floweð” are 
“heorte wunden.” (IV.1398-400).10 The backbiter likewise “speoweð ut his atter … þet te attri 
heorte sent up to þe tunge.” (II.594-95).11 A life “bittre ant attrie, wið heorte tobollen” 
(II.894) is the antithesis of spiritual life.12 The “neddre atter” makes the “heorte wið luue falle 
to eani þing eawt ouer mete.” (IV.1689-91).13 
The brief allegory in Part II of the text illustrates how the two categories of moral 
wound overlap one another. It presents Lechery laying siege to the Lady of Chastity in a 
                                               
7 “… would too greatly hurt your heart.” 
8 “… out of the heart indeed come evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies and 
blasphemies.” 
9 See p. 56 of this thesis. 
10 “Pride and envy and wrath, grief of heart for worldly things, misery of longing and avarice for possessions … 
and all that flows from them [i.e., all that flows from the evils just enumerated]”; “… heart wounds.” 
11 “… spews out his poison, which the poisonous heart sends up to the tongue.” 
12 “… bitter and poisonous, with a puffed-up heart.” 
13 “… snake poison”; “… the heart fall with love to anything excessively.” 
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castle reminiscent of Peter’s tower.14 Lechery makes use of three weapons. “[Þ]e arewen of 
þe licht echnen” that “stikeð i ðere heorte,” (II.166-67) are the first.15 Lechery is the vice 
personified for the purposes of allegory. The victim, of course, is the anchoress. The point 
wants some clarification because the allegory is preceded in the text by the stories of Dinah 
and Bathsheba, the fault of whom was that they showed themselves to lustful eyes. The 
allegory then opens with a citation from Augustine, “inpudicus oculus inpudici cordis est 
nuncius,” (II.151) and the author elaborates “þet þe muð ne mei for scheome, þe licht echȝe 
spekeð hit” (II.151-52).16 The biblical narratives combine with the quote from Augustine to 
suggest that the victims of lechery’s arrows must be anyone led astray by the light eyes, 
anyone who sees the anchoress but not the anchoress herself. The corrupt anchoress shoots 
the arrows. 
The allegory also has a second meaning. The author concludes his depiction of 
the inner struggle between lechery and chastity with a practical warning that the anchoress 
should not look out her windows. The anchoress who pays no heed to the injunction is like a 
“chang … þe hald hire heved baltliche forð vt i þe opene carnel hwil me wið quarreus vtewið 
assaileð þe castel.” (II.175-76).17  The heart that falls prey to lechery’s arrows belongs, in this 
reading, to the anchoress rather than those who see her. Her heart is wounded by the arrows; 
theirs are not. 
The light eyes are thus both the eyes that are careless of being seen and the eyes 
that are careless of seeing. Neither are gravely sinful in themselves. The grave sin comes 
about when Lechery deals the sword-blow of physical contact which “ȝeveð deaðes dunt” 
                                               
14 See p. 85 of this thesis. 
15 “The arrows of the light eyes”; “… stick into the heart.” 
16 “… the shameless eye is the herald of the shameless heart”; “… the light eye says what the mouth cannot for 
shame.” 
17 “… fool … who holds her head boldly forth, out in the open battlements while people outside assail the castle 
with arrows.” 
134 
 
(II.170).18 The eyes are dangerous because they blind the heart and “ablinde þe heorte, ho is 
eað to ouercumen” (II.182-83).19  On the other hand, the light eyes are “as erende-beorere of 
þe licht heorte” (II.152-53).20 Their danger, in this second sense, is that they entice others. 
The author equates the two, once again borrowing from Augustine, “[n]on solum appetere sed 
et appeti uelle criminosum est” (II.157-58).21 The light eyes do not just wound the heart, 
rather they are the heart’s wound. They are symptomatic of lechery’s victory in the heart. 
Janet Grayson notes the interrelationship of the allegory’s two meanings when she observes 
that “sin is reciprocal in a very real sense in this colourful passage, and the darts of wanton 
looks strike the heart itself.”22 She leaves it there, but the implications of the two meanings 
reach further. The two types of moral wound overlap: the anchoress conducts herself 
improperly because her heart has been wounded by lechery, but the heart is also wounded by 
the improper conduct when the blinded heart is “ibroht sone þurh sunne to grunde” (II.183).23 
The wounded heart does not condemn improper conduct. The wounded heart perpetrates it, 
and receives further wounds as a result.  
The heart of the AW thus operates in the same way as the contemplative 
conscience. Its direction either towards good or evil characterises it, but it is also a repository 
or – to use Philippe Delhaye’s term – a ‘receptacle’ of good or evil actions. The conscience of 
the Tractatus de Conscientia is evil if it desires what is wrong, regardless of whether or not it 
feels any emotion of guilt, accuses itself, or recognises itself to be guilty. It would be 
subjected to scrutiny at the Last Judgement and found to contain evil.24 The heart of the AW is 
the same.  
                                               
18 “… gives death’s blow.” 
19 “… blind the heart and it is easy to overcome.” 
20 “… as the errand-bearer of the light heart.” 
21 “Not only to desire, but to wish to be desired is shameful.” 
22 Janet Grayson, Structure and Imagery in Ancrene Wisse (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1974), 
45. 
23 “… soon brought to the ground by sin.” 
24 See pp. 102-103 of this thesis for discussion of this concept in the Tractatus. 
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The author develops the moral wound further in Part IV of the text. Sexual sin 
takes place in the heart, not in physical contact. The author develops the temptation to lust as 
a wound: “[f]lesches lust is fotes wunde,” (IV.1389) which is only a “lah wunde” (IV.1393) 
and harmless enough in itself.25 It need only be feared if “hit to swiðe swelle þurh skiles 
ȝettunge, wið to muchel delit up toward te heorte” (IV.1393-94).26 The author cites Gregory 
the Great’s depiction of lechery’s violence, reminiscent of the allegory in Part II, though his 
adaptation of Gregory is telling. 
Gregory equates the physical action with an inner wound. Both occur 
simultaneously: “In inguine ferire est uitam mentis carnis delectatione perforare” (IV.1354-
55).27 Est, the copula, is the only finite verb in the passage. The AW author renders the two 
infinitives as finite verbs in his English gloss and introduces the temporal preposition hwen: 
“þe feond þurhsticheð þe schere hwen delit of leccherie þurleð þe heorte” (IV.1355-56).28 The 
rearrangement introduces causality as well as temporality into the passage. Hwen leaves the 
first clause contingent upon the second. The fiend would not injure the body if lechery did 
not pierce the heart. The impetus to sin begins within the heart in the same way that evil 
affection begins within the conscience of the monastic texts. 
The sequences in the castle allegory and the image borrowed from Gregory are 
fundamentally similar. The allegory in Part II represents improper activity (looking, speaking, 
handling) as the symptoms of lechery’s attack on the heart. The second allegory, in Part IV, 
likewise presents the physical actions as having a prior and corresponding condition of heart. 
The second portrayal of lechery’s assault also introduces the heart’s most vital 
moral function. The heart’s condition imbues actions with moral goodness or badness. 
“Flesches lust” is inconsequential without the attendant “delit” of heart (IV.1389-94). The 
                                               
25 “… the lust of the flesh is a foot wound”; “… low wound.” 
26 “… it should swell too greatly up towards the heart by reason’s consent.” 
27 “To wound in the groin is to pierce the life of the mind with delight of the flesh.” 
28 “… the fiend pierces the groin when the delight of lechery pierces the heart.” 
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author explicates this concept more clearly when he discusses anger. 
Wrath, like lechery, assails the heart and “ablindeð swa þe heorte” with the added 
consequence that the heart “ne mei soð icnawen” (III.30-31).29 Right judgement is absent 
“hwil þe heorte walleð inwið of wreaððe,” (III.21-22) and the situation is the same when 
“lust is hat toward eani sunne” (III.22-23).30 Sin transforms the heart so that prayer and 
devotions are rendered ineffective. This clearly pertains to the heart as a moral faculty, but it 
also introduces the heart as nature or cunde of the person: “[s]one se he leoseð 
mildheortnesse he leoseð monnes cunde” (III.43-44).31 The passage presents the heart as the 
seat of virtue as well as vice. Virtue is interwoven with cunde, and cunde confers moral worth 
upon actions. The heart thus functions like wisdom or prudence which are closely related to 
conscience in the monastic texts as seen in the first chapter of this thesis.32 The heart, like the 
monastic conscience, can be trained and cultivated to discern correctly, but any moral 
judgements it makes are a result of its cultivation. It is not an authoritative guide grounded in 
a transcendent knowledge of divine law.  
The heart’s virtue, especially humility, appears elsewhere in the text as the 
antithesis of the wounded or sick heart. Thus “eadmodnesse of milde ant meoke heorte” 
(III.532-34) is the second of two virtues to which the anchoress must devote especial 
attention (the first is “þolemodnesse”).33 “[F]reolec of heorte” joins an array of armaments in 
the fight against temptation (IV.872).34 Fleshly temptations are powerless over those who are 
“swote iheortet, eadmod, ant milde” (IV.1507).35 The life of holiness is impossible without 
the “heorte þeawes” of “deuotiun, reowfulnesse, riht luue, eadmodnesse, ant uertuz oþre 
                                               
29 “… so blinds the heart”; “cannot know truth.” 
30 “… while the heart within boils with wrath”; “lust is hot towards any sin.” 
31 “… as soon as he loses mild-heartedness, he loses human nature.” 
32 See p. 60 of this thesis. 
33 “… humility of a mild and meek heart”; “endurance of suffering.” 
34 “Generosity of heart.” 
35 “… sweet-hearted, humble and mild.” 
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swucche” (VI.288-89).36 The anchoress is to imitate the contemplative Mary “wið 
griðfullnesse of heorte” (VIII.93-94).37 
The heart, and therefore inwit, is more than a moral judge. It, like the monastic 
conscience, is the moral centre of the person that is wounded by wrong actions and produces 
wrong actions when wounded. But even that is reductive. The moral faculty is nature or 
cunde. It is therefore insufficient to read the AW author’s stated emphasis on conscience as 
reductive because conscience in the text refers to the nature in which one exists and not just 
the impartial moral evaluation of actions. It is a nature that is wounded and diseased, but can 
be restored to spiritual health. The alignment of the moral faculty with cunde is thus an 
indirect affirmation of the goodness that endures in fallen human nature, a positive expression 
of human dignity that scholarship on the text has seldom acknowledged. The author does not 
dwell on the image of God within the soul to the extent that a writer like Bernard of 
Clairvaux does, but his affirmation of the soul’s initial goodness reflects Peter of Celle’s 
emphasis on the conscience that must come to know itself “pulchra inter mulieres” (194/4).38 
3. Will and Desire 
 
The author of the AW associates the will with the heart. He exhorts the sisters 
“beon aa wið annesse of an heorte ant of a wil ilimet togederes” (IV.1073-74).39 The 
commandment comes after an excursus on unity, than which the author claims “nis þing 
under sunne þet me is leouere, ne se leof þet ȝe habben” (IV.1016-17).40 The heart is therefore 
volitional. Its choosing facilitates unity and harmony between the anchoresses and, by 
implication, the larger Christian community from which they are physically isolated. The 
                                               
36 “… heart virtues”; “… devotion, compassion, right love, humility and other such virtues.” 
37 “… serenity of heart.” 
38 Peter of Celle, De Conscientia, in La Spiritualité De Pierre De Celle, by Jean Leclercq, OSB, vol. 7, Etudes 
De Theologie Et D’Histoire De La Spiritualité (Paris: J. Vrin, 1946), 194, “… beautiful amongst women.” See p. 
57 of this thesis. For an account of the role of the image and likeness of God in Bernard’s thought, see Étienne 
Gilson, The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940), 116. 
39 “… be always joined together with the unity of one heart and of one will.” 
40 “… there is nothing under the sun that is dearer to me, nor that you should hold so dear.” 
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heart thus chooses, prefers, and inclines towards things as the monastic conscience does.41 
The author instructs the anchoress to offer prayers in honour of the saints “as ow bereð on 
heorte” (I.181), indicating that the heart’s inclinations can be attuned so that pursuing them is 
beneficial rather than detrimental.42 Anyone who submits to temptation is, by contrast, is said 
to “buheð hire heorte” (IV.1274).43 The instrument that enables the outworking of the 
spiritual life, inclining the person towards God and beneficial things, is also the part of the 
person that consents to and participates in sin.  
The will, more importantly, is the principal victim of the heart’s moral wounds. 
Lechery’s arrows are the light eyes. In other words, the will is corrupted before corrupted 
action comes about; the eyes would not be light if the will did not make them light. The will 
makes them light because it is wounded, diseased, and morally infected by lechery. 
The heart’s choosing and preferring in particular foregrounds the identification of 
will with desire. The two were traditionally identified with one another, and are here as 
well.44 Desire is central to the anchoritic life and the spirituality of the text. The anchoress 
“fleoð uppart toward heouene” by means of “ȝirnunge of heorte to heouenliche þinges” 
(III.173-74).45 Desire also directly affects the heart’s moral capacity; the heart’s moral 
wounds principally involve desire. Spiritual blindness, in particular, comes about when “lust 
is hat toward eani sunne.” (III.22-23).46 The “beore of heui slawðe,” (IV.350) fourth of the 
deadly sins, has eight whelps, the first three of which are conditions of the heart’s desire.47 
Torpor is the “heorte vnlust to eni þing þe schulde leitin al o lei i luue of ure Lauerd” (IV.350-
                                               
41 See pp. 63, 88, and 97 of this thesis. 
42 “… as [it] come to you in the heart.” See also Alison Renshaw, “The Authoritative Conscience,” in Authority 
and Community in the Middle Ages, ed. Ian P. Wei, Donald Mowbray, and Rhiannon Purdie (Stroud: Sutton, 
1999), 145, for discussion of a similar phenomenon in later English confessional literature. 
43 “… bow her heart.” 
44 See, for instance, Martina Stepinova, OP, “Aquinas’ Solution of Aristotle’s Incontinent Man and Augustine’s 
Two Wills,” New Blackfriars 92 (2009): 325. 
45 “… flies upwards towards heaven”; “… yearning of heart for heavenly things.” 
46 “… lust [or desire] is hot towards any sin.” 
47 “… the bear of heavy sloth.” 
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52).48 Pusillanimitas is the heart that is too poor to hope for God’s help and grace (IV.352-
55). The third, Cordis Grauitas, affects the heart much like anger. It afflicts “hwa-se wurcheð 
god,” but does so “mid a dead ant mid a heui heorte” (IV.355-56).49  Desire, in this case, is 
vital since rightly directed desire is a flight toward heaven and wrongly directed desire 
prevents prayer, devotion, and any other good work.  The morally wounded heart inclines 
towards evil and bars itself from heaven because it cannot desire correctly. Moral wounds and 
corrupt desire are therefore one and the same; they cannot be distinguished. Since moral 
wounds are a property of the conscience, it follows that desire is as well. Cultivation of the 
conscience is therefore also cultivation of desire. 
Will and desire give rise to enjoyment. Augustine defines enjoyment as a function 
of the will, thus the person who enjoys “assumit … aliquid in facultatem voluntatis.”50 The 
AW author concurs, and this too appears in the discussion of morality. Hence fleshly lusts 
become culpable when they cause the heart “delit.” (IV.1394). 
Past scholarship on the AW has questioned the nature of desire in the text. 
Elizabeth Robertson argues that the AW focuses on bodily rather than spiritual desire. Union 
with God in the text involves “transformation of earthly desire into desire for Christ.”51 
Robertson argues that the text’s “experience of Christ is not a transcendence of the desires of 
the flesh, but rather a transference of those desires to Christ.”52 Robertson is certainly correct 
that the AW is rife with corporeal imagery. Her reading raises the question: is the heart’s 
desire only bodily, or can it also desire God? Is it simply a means of regulating spiritually 
troublesome bodily inclinations, making the most of defective resources, or does it have 
spiritually positive value as in the conscience texts? 
                                               
48 “… the heart not desirous for anything, which should blaze all on fire in the love of our Lord.” 
49 “… whosoever does good”; “… with a dead and heavy heart.” 
50 Augustine of Hippo, De Trinitate, X.17, (PL 42:982), “takes something up in the faculty of the will.” 
51 Elizabeth Robertson, Early English Devotional Prose and the Female Audience (Knoxville: The University of 
Tennessee Press, 1990), 58. 
52 Robertson, Early English Devotional Prose, 67. 
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Robertson’s reading employs modern rather than medieval categories and as such 
obscures the distinctions relevant to medieval readers. Her reading depends largely on a 
distinction between reason and emotion. The dichotomy of reason and emotion is certainly 
relevant to medieval literature. Alastair Minnis describes the thirteenth-century view that 
“human sciences work through the comprehension of truth by human reason, whereas sacred 
Scripture works through the inculcation of a pious disposition (secundum affectum pietatis) in 
men.”53 Robertson’s application of the reason-emotion dichotomy, however, is problematic. 
Robertson designates the mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux as intellectual, because Bernard 
uses material reality as a starting point for theological abstraction.54 The AW author stops 
short of teaching doctrine, instead preferring the material imagery of Christ’s Passion in order 
to evoke desire and love.55 Robertson thus classifies the AW author’s approach emotional. 
Intellect, according to Robertson, is more spiritual and emotion less. 
The problem with this reading becomes apparent when Bernard’s spirituality is 
considered in context.  Robertson is right to note a difference between Bernard and the AW, 
but the difference is not based on the opposition between intellect and emotion. Étienne 
Gilson has shown that Bernard’s mysticism focuses on the cultivation of a pure and selfless 
love.56 Gordon Rudy argues that, for Bernard, “the human person has a single sensorium that 
can be directed both to material and bodily things and to spiritual and divine things.”57 
Bernard accordingly “uses sensory language extensively to discuss how we know and achieve 
                                               
53 Alastair Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages, 2nd 
ed., The Middle Ages Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 119. 
54 See, for example, Robertson’s comparison of Bernard’s De Gradibus Humilitatis et Superbiae with the AW. 
Robertson, Early English Devotional Prose, 55. 
55 Robertson, Early English Devotional Prose, 69-70, 72. 
56 Gilson, Mystical Theology, 86. 
57 Gordon Rudy, The Mystical Language of Sensation in the Later Middle Ages (London: Routledge, 2002), 45. 
Rudy conducts an extensive survey of Bernard’s sensory language in the Sermones in Cantica Canticorum. Of 
particular note here, Rudy observes that “Bernard emphasises that ‘it is not our bodies but our sins that stand in 
the way’ of union with God … [obstant, non corpora, sed peccata].” Rudy, Mystical Language of Sensation, 47. 
See Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones in Cantica Canticorum LVI.3, (PL 183:1048). 
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union with God.”58 Gilson writes that Bernard’s aim is “to restore a love of God, corrupted 
into love of self, to its original state of a love of God.”59 Emotion is an integral part of the 
goal. Denys Turner finds an “emotional continuity between the language of the Song and the 
language of [Bernard’s] Sermons,” which is not always the case in the medieval Song 
commentary tradition.60 James Zona analyses Bernard’s varied lexis of love and finds that, 
for Bernard, “[d]esire should burn for the pleasure of the Beloved’s presence ardently and 
grow in the intensity of its longing for delight in him if it is to become love.”61 The final 
union with God remains spiritual rather than corporeal and is not devalued on account of its 
emotional qualities. Gilson notes that “union with God must be exclusively spiritual. … [I]t is 
not to be effected by any knowledge of God in the mirror of creatures, nor even by any vision 
of God clothed in sensible images.”62 Nevertheless, “the body is necessary for the acquisition 
of … science of God without which it would be impossible to hope for beatitude,” and the 
body “is so necessarily a part of man that it is no less than the cognitive instrument without 
which we could never attain our supernatural end.”63 Zona further concludes that “Bernard 
never leaves behind this psycho-physical feeling of passionate and desirous love.”64 Raffaele 
Fassetta similarly notes that Bernard’s nuptial allegory “expresses a profound truth, namely 
that our relationship with God involves not only our intellect but also our affectus, our 
affective powers, our desire.”65 
Later English mystics take a similar approach.  Walter Hilton, for instance, 
divides contemplation into three parts. The first part corresponds with Robertson’s 
                                               
58 Rudy, Mystical Language of Sensation, 45.  
59 Gilson, Mystical Theology, 86. 
60 Denys Turner, Eros and Allegory: Medieval Exegesis of the “Song of Songs” (Kalamazoo: Cistercian 
Publications, 1995), 171. 
61 James W. Zona, “‘Set Love in Order in Me’: Eros-Knowing in Origen and Desiderium-Knowing in Saint 
Bernard,” Cistercian Studies Quarterly 34, no. 2 (1999): 170. 
62 Gilson, Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard, 93. 
63 Gilson, Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard, 109. 
64 Zona, “Set Love in Order,” 180. 
65 Raffaele Fassetta, OCSO, “The Christocentric and Nuptial Mysticism of Saint Bernard in the Sermons on the 
Song of Songs,” trans. Paul Rowe, OCSO, Cistercian Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2014): 356-57. 
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intellectual spirituality. It consists of “knowynge of God and goosteli thynges geten by 
resoun” (Scale I.4). It is not a bad state of being, but Hilton designates it the lowest and least 
spiritual because “this maner of knowinge is comone to gode and to badde, for it may be had 
withoute charité” (I.4). 
Hilton’s second part of contemplation corresponds to Robertson’s emotional 
spirituality. It “lieth principali in affeccioun, withoute undirstondynge of gosteli thynges” 
(I.5). It is the superior of the two, because it “mai not be had without greet grace” (I.5) and 
yet is open to “simple and unlettrid men” (I.5). The feelings involved result from meditation 
on Christ’s “passioun or of ony of His werkes in His manhede” (I.5) but are nevertheless a 
“fervour of love and gostli swettenesse” (I.5). Hilton’s third and final stage of contemplation 
“lieth bothe in cognicion and in affeccion: that is for to seie, in knowyng and in perfight 
lovynge of God” (I.8). Hilton is only one example of affective piety but he is not alone.66 
The difference between Bernard and the AW, then, is not the opposition of reason 
and emotion. There is some contrast between emphasis on Christ incarnate and Christ 
ascended, but this is more a matter of emphasis than a matter of doctrine. The more 
significant difference between Bernard and the AW is an outgrowth of this different emphasis: 
the extent to which Christ is loved selflessly. Robertson’s reading maintains that the AW 
enjoins its anchoritic readers to love Christ on account of the goods he can give them.67 The 
emphasis falls on Christ incarnate, Christ as a man and therefore the material, corporeal 
goods his incarnation might yield. Christ’s wooing speech in the AW, for instance, 
enumerates the benefits an anchoress might obtain by returning his love (VII.186-94). 
Robertson argues that love of Christ in the AW is therefore self-interested. Bernard, by 
contrast, would have his reader love God selflessly, and not on account of any goods God 
                                               
66 See, for instance, Peter Dinzelbacher, “The Beginnings of Mysticism Experienced in Twelfth-Century 
England,” in The Medieval Mystical Tradition in England Exeter Symposium IV: Papers Read at Dartington 
Hall, ed. Marion Glasscoe (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1987), for an account of affective piety prior to the AW. 
67 Robertson, Early English Devotional Prose, 70. 
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might give. 
Robertson thus implicitly distinguishes two kinds of desire. She delineates the 
two kinds of desire based on the objects of desire. Desire for immaterial union with God is 
spiritual; desire for Christ depicted as a lover-knight is non-spiritual because bodily. 
Robertson’s distinction corresponds to Bernard’s distinction between caritas and cupiditas. 
Gilson describes Bernard’s cupiditas as “a decision to will nothing save for ourselves and for 
our own sake” with the result that the “will becomes alienated from God’s will.”68 It is, in 
short, “the twisting back upon self of a charity which has degenerated into cupidity.”69 
Bernard’s goal, then, is return right order by refocusing love back on God.70 
The distinction between caritas and cupiditas was heavily influenced by 
Augustine. Augustine divides love, amor, into two categories based on the object of love. 
Love directed to the creature is cupiditas but love directed towards the Creator is caritas.71 
Peter Burnell argues that Augustine does not understand “caritas and cupiditas as exactly the 
same emotion differently directed,” but rather that “each love is made what it is precisely by 
its object,” and “[b]y virtue of its object each kind of love differently informs the soul.”72 
Burnell goes as far as to argue that, for Augustine, the “soul’s shape, as it were, is changed” 
by the object of love.73 Caritas and cupiditas are therefore categorically different from one 
another. 
Thomas Osborne argues that Peter Lombard, as one of the most influential 
theologians of the twelfth century, “presented Augustine’s understanding of love in a context 
which was clearly influenced by Hugh [of St Victor].”74 Hugh “emphasised the connection 
                                               
68 Gilson, Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard, 55. 
69 Gilson, Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard, 55. 
70 Gilson, Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard, 86. 
71 Augustine, De Trinitate, IX.13, (PL 42:967-68). 
72 Peter Burnell, The Augustinian Person (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 60. 
73 Burnell, The Augustinian Person, 60. 
74 Thomas M. Osborne, Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2005), 23. See also Osborne, Love of Self and Love of God, 26. Osborne refers particularly to 
Peter Lombard Sententiarum Libri Quatuor, III.27, (PL 192:812). 
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between loving God and loving one’s own good.”75 This resulted in the conclusion that 
“created goods are to be loved because God can be loved by loving them.”76 The distinction 
between caritas and cupiditas depends on the ordering of love rather than purely on its 
objects. The AW author expresses a similar view when he defines the pure heart: “þet ȝe na 
þing ne wilnin ne ne luuien bute Godd ane, ant te ilke þinges for Godd þe helpeð ow toward 
him – for Godd, Ich segge, luuien ham, ant nawt for ham seoluen” (VII.31-33).77 Images of 
Christ as a lover-knight may be material images, but they direct love to Christ. Thus the 
distinction between caritas and cupiditas, in contrast to Robertson’s distinction, does not 
depend upon either the body or emotion. Robertson is right that the text exhibits a profusion 
of material, bodily images used as aids and means to spiritual devotion. Emotion and 
corporeality are not impediments to the cultivation of charity but, in fact, facilitate it.   
The images in the AW evoke desire, but since the desire leads to God, it would 
fall under the heading of caritas rather than cupiditas. Robertson’s characterisation of the 
desire as fleshly is therefore problematic because the desire of the AW does not belong to the 
sinful, fleshly, nature.78 The presence of corporeal imagery in the AW reveals what kind of 
desire the author wished his readers to develop. It is a desire that can appropriate material and 
bodily images for spiritual purposes, much like desire in the conscience texts discussed thus 
far.79 Robertson’s reading of the AW, however, contributes a valuable and important insight: 
both beneficial and harmful desires occupy the heart. Her reading falls short, because the 
incitement to beneficial desire for Christ is not merely a means of regulating the sinful desires 
of the body. It has positive value in the same way that the conscience must be focused on 
                                               
75 Osborne, Love of Self and Love of God, 23. 
76 Osborne, Love of Self and Love of God, 27. 
77 “… that you will nor love anything but God alone and the things for God’s sake which help you toward him – 
love them for God, I say, and not for themselves.” 
78 See Robertson, Early English Devotional Prose, 67. 
79 See pp. 65-69 of this thesis. 
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Christ in the monastic texts.80 
Desire for God and worldly desire both occupy the heart and therefore the 
conscience. The need to focus desire on God, as opposed to anything or anyone else, is 
consequently urgent. Thus the images of Christ as a knight are not supposed to inspire love of 
knights, but love of Christ. The monastic conscience was oriented towards either good or 
evil. It is only a good conscience once this focusing of desire has been achieved.81 The heart 
in the AW operates in the same way. 
The imagery used to depict desire in the AW differs from the closely related AB 
language text, Sawles Warde. Comparison of the two further reveals the continuity between 
the AW and the conscience texts. Sawles Warde depicts the person as an unruly household that 
must be regulated by the virtues. Two messengers visit the house. The first relates the terrors 
of hell; the second describes the joys of heaven. The heart has little to do in Sawles Warde 
until the text’s end, after the two messengers have finished speaking. The negligent man must 
“awecchen his heorte, þe i slep” by remembering the sights of hell and heaven.82 He must 
“habben farlac of þet an, luue toward þet oðer.”83 Thoughts of this kind “ontent his heorte 
toward þe blisse of heouene.”84 
The main players in the text prior to that point are the virtues defending the 
house. The house, however, is embroiled in a conflict between the husband and wife. Wit is 
the husband and Will is the “fulitohe wif.”85 Sawles Warde, then, draws a distinction between 
the will and the heart that desires. Will in Sawles Warde is concerned with decidedly 
unspiritual interests when it is left to itself, much like cupiditas. The text concludes with the 
will being made subject to and ordered according to reason. The desiring subject ceases to be 
                                               
80 See pp. 81 and 88 of this thesis. 
81 See pp. 97-98 of this thesis. 
82 R. M. Wilson, ed., Sawles Warde: An Early Middle English Homily (Leeds: Kendal, 1938), 186, 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/c/cme/Sawleswd, “Awaken his heart which is asleep.” 
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84 Wilson, Sawles Warde, 186, “… kindle his heart towards the bliss of heaven.” 
85 Wilson, Sawles Warde, 166, “… ill-mannered wife.” 
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the troublesome, querulous will, and instead becomes the heart. The heart is concerned with 
matters of eternity in the same way that caritas is. 
The AW, unlike Sawles Warde, envisions a strong connection between the heart 
and the will. The heart contains both caritas and cupiditas. Spiritually beneficial and harmful 
desires occupy the same space; desire for sin is an alternative to desire for Christ. Thus the 
heart can love Christ by meditating on his life and Passion, or it can escape into sin by way of 
the senses. King David’s heart, for instance, “edbrec … ut” at his sight of Bathsheba (II.17).86 
The heart in the AW, then, differs from the heart in Sawles Warde.  Sawles Warde 
treats the heart as a purely spiritual part of the person. It is the desire that has been awakened 
by thoughts of heaven or hell. The AW, by contrast, treats the heart as accessible by the 
senses, and thus it is the locus of both spiritual and non-spiritual desire.  
The reason for the difference between the AW and Sawles Warde stems from the 
organising image in Sawles Warde. The narrative of Sawles Warde centres on the protection 
of a house from the incursions of a thief. The text defines the house vaguely as “seolf þe 
mon.”87 The Latin original, by contrast, makes the house the conscience: “domus est 
conscientia.”88 If the vague “seolf þe mon” is, in fact, the conscience then the heart in Sawles 
Warde is not the conscience because the heart is not the house. The heart in the AW and the 
heart in Sawles Warde are therefore not the same entity. The conscience in Sawles Warde 
contains both the heart and the will which it identifies as the inclination towards good and the 
inclination towards evil respectively. The heart in the AW is the conscience and contains both 
caritas and cupiditas. Thus the English texts diverge in imagery and terminology but express 
the same underlying conception of desire and conscience which is also the same conception 
found in the contemplative conscience texts.89 
                                               
86 “… broke out.” 
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89 See, for instance, p. 98 of this thesis. 
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The AW also participates in the classical conception of caritas with regards to the 
fulfilment of desire. Augustine, for instance, makes the love of virtue its own satisfaction 
since “[q]ui … perfecte novit, perfecteque amat justitiam, jam justus est,” and thus “voluntas 
in ipsa … conquiescit.”90 One can therefore be satisfied in the absence of any action. 
Cupiditas lacks this property. Its satisfaction requires activity. It is not enough for greed 
“nosse et amare aurum, nisi et habeat.”91 Nevertheless, Osborne notes that the older 
“Augustine became pessimistic about the possibility of happiness in the present life” since 
“[t]he cardinal virtues are not of themselves sufficient for a happy life, because they involve 
an element of struggle or imperfection.”92 On the other hand, “charity will be augmented and 
fulfilled” in heaven, but not until then.93 Gilson similarly notes that, for Bernard, “never, in 
any state, is human love for God in this life an absolutely pure love.”94 
Rightly-directed desire is not fulfilled in the AW. The AW converts the chasm 
between desire and fulfilment into a spiritually beneficial condition, because it enables the 
heart or conscience to exist in a state of continual desire focused on God. Satisfaction of 
desire would, in fact, undermine desire. The author borrows from Gregory the Great’s 
Moralia in Iob and likens the spiritual life to digging for buried treasure: “eauer se he mare 
nahheð hit, se his heortes gleadschipe makeð him mare lusti ant mare fersch to diggin, ant 
deluen deoppre ant deoppre aðet he hit finde” (II.914-16).95 The treasure is in heaven, and 
thus the author explains the digging as “beon bisiliche ant ȝeornfulliche eauer her-abuten, wið 
anewil ȝirnunge, wið heate of hungri heorte waden up of unþeawes” (II.923-25).96 Desire 
                                               
90 Augustine, De Trinitate IX.14, (PL42:968), “… the one who perfectly knows and perfectly loves justice is 
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92 Osborne, Love of Self and Love of God, 21. 
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increases the closer its fulfilment becomes. The implication is, however, that the fulfilment of 
desire is not obtained because the anchoress must always cultivate desire. The digging image 
appears within the context of another image borrowed from Gregory: the boat rowing 
upstream. The treasure-digging is also “þe uprowunge aȝein þis worldes stream – þa þe 
heorte walde lihten lihtliche adun mid te stream, driven hire aȝeinward to deluen” (II.918-
21).97 The author links the two images together with the verb waden when he says that the 
anchoress must “waden up of unþeawes” (II.925).98 Desire is the means to counter the 
constant deluge of worldly vices. It is also the means by which the anchoress “fleoð uppart 
toward heouene” (III.173-74).99 Moral wellbeing and desire for God once again occupy the 
same space – namely, the heart-conscience. They result in an ongoing contemplative flight, 
rather than ascent to a final point of union. 
4. Charity 
 
Love, understood as caritas, belongs to the heart and therefore the conscience in 
the AW. The author makes it the basis of his text and spirituality. The Preface opens with a 
citation from Canticles 1:3: “Recti diligunt te” (P.1).100 The author explains “þeo beoð rihte 
þe liuieð efter riwle” (P.9).101 There are many kinds of rule, but the important one for the 
author is the inner rule, and “þeos riwle is chearite of schir heorte and cleane inwit” (P.17-
18).102 The object of the rule and therefore of the text is cultivating the love of God. The 
relationship between charity and inwit has been, as we have seen, a source of difficulty for 
modern readers of the AW. Mary Baldwin, in particular, problematizes the relation when she 
states that “[c]onscience receives a greater emphasis in the Introduction [to the AW] than 
                                                                                                                                                  
wade up from vices.” 
97 Millett, Ancrene Wisse, 2:97; “… the rowing against this world’s stream – though the heart would lightly fall 
down with the stream – and to drive against the stream, to dig.” See Gregory the Great, Regulae Pastoralis 
Liber III.34, (PL 77:118). 
98 “… to wade up out of vices.” 
99 “… flies upwards towards heaven.” 
100 “The righteous love you.” 
101 “… they are righteous who live according to a rule.” 
102 “… this rule is the charity of a pure heart and a clean conscience.” 
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love,” placing the conscience and love in opposition to one another.103 As we have seen from 
the preceding chapters, however, love and conscience should not automatically be regarded 
as opposing faculties. 
The moral life is indisputably central to the AW. The text’s longest section is 
devoted to combating temptation, and the two succeeding sections focus on confession and 
penance. The Concordance to Ancrene Wisse nevertheless notes that luue and its various 
forms appear at least two hundred and forty-eight times throughout the text.104 The love-
conscience relationship thus raises some important questions. Is it necessary, as Baldwin 
maintains, to reconsider “the meaning of charity in AW as a whole,” or would it be better to 
reconsider the meaning of conscience?105 What is the relationship between love and the moral 
life? 
The question has two potential answers. The implication of Baldwin’s reading is 
that love of God is associated with the heart because the heart is a moral faculty and it is a 
moral duty to love God. Love, according to Baldwin, “seems to consist in a pure heart and a 
clear conscience, and it rules the heart by keeping it free from sin.”106 Baldwin understands 
the AW author’s statement that a clean conscience is “freedom from sin that has not been 
amended in confession” as an exhaustive statement of his definition of conscience.107 
Conscience, in Baldwin’s reading, is a record of actions. If charity is reduced to conscience, 
then love of God simply means having a clean behavioural record. The author, in this reading, 
does not intend the anchoresses to love God in any sort of positive way.  
The alternative to Baldwin’s position is that the AW author associates love with 
the heart because he understands conscience in a way similar to, and influenced by, the 
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monastic conscience texts. The conscience is the capacity to love God.108 Heart and 
conscience are aligned and, as we have seen, the will and desire belong to the heart. 
Baldwin supports her position with the author’s enumeration of moral obligations 
in the Preface. The author, she argues, undermines love’s primacy by placing charity in the 
midst of a list of virtues and practices: “chearite, þet is luue, ant eadmodnesse ant 
þolemodnesse, treowschipe ant haldunge of alle þe ten heastes, schrift ant penitence, þeos and 
þulliche oþre, þe beoð summe of þe alde lahe, summe of þe neowe” (P.75-78).109 Everyone, 
but especially the anchoress, must carry out each of these practices. Baldwin rightly finds it 
“noticeable that charity is listed as a requirement on the same level with the other virtues and 
is not distinguished from the commandments of the old law, or from confession and 
penance.”110 Chearite comes first on the list, but is still only one of at least ten behaviours, 
some of which are categorical labels rather than individual commandments. The list’s 
conclusion – “for þeos riwlið þe heorte” (P.80) – implies that each of the obligations itemised 
is equal with the others and therefore equal to the love that constitutes the inner rule (P.17-
18).111 The arrangement thus, according to Baldwin, dethrones chearite from its earlier 
position as that which rules the heart. It only pertains to the heart insofar as the heart is a 
moral faculty, a record of unbecoming behaviour. Baldwin claims that conventionally 
understood charity cannot be central to the AW because “it does not emerge until Part 7.”112   
The list in the Preface, however, does not exist in a vacuum and is not isolated 
from the rest of the text. The remainder of this section uses a close reading of the AW to argue 
that, contrary to Baldwin’s position, the AW agrees with the contemplative conscience texts in 
its understanding of charity. 
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The author declares at the outset that the inner rule is charity, first in Latin then in 
English. The Latin passage is partially his own and partially an abbreviated biblical citation 
from 1 Timothy 1:5 (P.16-17). An English gloss follows: “[þ]eos riwle is chearite of schir 
heorte ant cleane inwit ant treowe bileaue” (P.17-18).113 
The citation differs from the author’s usual style. He customarily cites a text in 
Latin. If his citation is incomplete, he uses an et cetera as indication. Most of his creative 
appropriations of texts appear in his vernacular glosses. These become a useful avenue 
through which to approach the AW and the ideas within it as distinct from the sources it 
follows.114 The author modifies 1 Timothy 1:5 in Latin, however, instead of in English. He 
omits the first part of the quoted sentence rather than its end, and introduces it with an 
original Latin clause of his own. The modifications allow him to cite the biblical text 
verbatim, but altering the grammar and therefore the emphasis of the passage. 
The Vulgate text of 1 Timothy 1:5 reads: “finis autem praecepti est caritas de 
corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta.”115 The AW, by contrast, has: “Et hec est 
caritas quam describit Apostolus de corde puro et consciencia bona et fide non ficta” (P.16-
17).116 Charity is no longer the end or goal of instruction. It is the instruction itself, and the 
praeceptum is transformed into a riwle in English. Charity, then, is the heart’s discipline and 
not the outcome of discipline. The AW thus concurs with Peter of Celle, for whom love and 
discipline are ultimately synonymous, as the first chapter of this thesis demonstrates.117 The 
AW author revisits this claim in the seventh part of the text, which he devotes to love and the 
inner rule as “þe riwle þe riwleð þe heorte” (VII.167).118 
                                               
113 “… this rule is charity of a pure heart and clean ‘inwit’ and true faith.” 
114 See Nicholas Perkins, “Reading the Bible in Sawles Warde and Ancrene Wisse,” Medium Aevum 72 no. 2 
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The seventh part of the AW is the most relevant to our understanding of the 
relation between heart and love since it “is al of luue þe makeð schir heorte” (VI.497).119  The 
author clearly distinguishes love from the other virtues when he invokes Paul’s authority and 
claims that “al is ase nawt aȝeines luue, þe schireð ant brihteð þe heorte” (VII.2-3).120 The 
gloss once again proves illuminating. Nicholas Perkins observes that “[t]he scriptural ‘pietas’ 
is assimilated to the English ‘schir heorte’ without further explanation.”121 The scriptural text 
cited (1 Timothy 4:8) refers to righteousness rather than charity, and makes no mention of the 
heart at all. The author interpolates caritas from 1 Corinthians 13, the chapter which he 
proceeds to cite in the following sentence. 
Baldwin notes as much but argues that, since “Part 7 does not define purity of 
heart as purity of conscience but as charity,” it is at variance with the author’s preface.122  The 
author’s gloss on 1 Timothy 4:8, according to Baldwin, makes “clear that ‘love that makes 
pure and brightens the heart,’ ‘piety,’ and ‘sweet and pure heart’ are equivalent terms in 
opposition to ‘exterior hardships,’ ‘mortification of the flesh,’ ‘corporal works,’ ‘discipline of 
the body,’ [and] ‘physical activity.’”123 Baldwin uses the contrasting sets of terms to cement 
her conclusion that the Preface and Part VII of the AW are at odds with one another. Her 
reading of the gloss on 1 Timothy 4:8, however, hinges on an unsupported assumption: she 
maintains that “the author translates the … text from St. Paul.”124 We have already seen, 
however, that the vernacular glosses on Latin texts are closer to adaptations than direct 
translations. 
The Latin version of the AW provides evidence of how the text was understood by 
its medieval readers. The AW author’s method of glossing presented a problem that further 
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122 Baldwin, “Ancrene Wisse and its Background,” 101. 
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highlights the inexactness of the vernacular glosses. Perkins, for example, finds the Latin 
translator’s handling of 1 Corinthians 13 in Part VII a “relative failure” since “[t]he Latin 
text, of course, cannot translate scriptural citations.”125 The translator’s treatment of 1 
Timothy 4:8 is just as awkward. The Latin introduction to Part VII of the AW reads much like 
the English: “Beatus Paulus testatur quod omnes exteriores asperitates, omnes carnis 
afflictiones et corporis labores sunt quasi nichil in comparatione ad dilectionem que serenat et 
clarificat cor.”126 It is, in other words, a paraphrase of 1 Timothy 4:8. Direct citation of the 
biblical passage follows and thus renders the paraphrase redundant since the whole text is 
already in Latin. The difference between text and gloss is sufficient to warrant the translator’s 
inclusion of both if he is to accurately convey the sense of the AW author’s English original. 
The Pauline text refers to pietas but the paraphrase refers to dilectionem. The two words are 
not equivalent. The translator attempts to resolve the problem by reconciling 1 Timothy 4:8 
and 1 Corinthians 13 with the explanatory note “[c]aritatem, id est, dilectionem ad Deum.”127 
Pietas simply disappears, rushed out of sight as quickly as possible. The AW author’s use of 
the English luue to gloss pietas is therefore insufficient grounds for concluding that he 
redefines charity as duty. 
Perkins’ reading of Part VII is more convincing than Baldwin’s. He argues, in 
direct response to Baldwin, that “the author fuses both concepts – those of purity in the sense 
of piety, and the heart as the seat of love” by predicating the adjective schir of both.128 The 
author only applies schir to three things throughout the text: inwit (P.41), heorte (e.g. P.18), 
and bone (IV.962). Chearite and cleane inwit are clearly, as Perkins argues, closely related 
throughout the AW. Baldwin’s differentiation of the pure heart in the Preface and the pure 
                                               
125 Perkins, “Reading the Bible,” 218. 
126 Charlotte D’Evelyn, ed., The Latin Text of the Ancrene Riwle Edited from Merton College MS 44 and British 
Museum MS. Cotton Vitellius E vii (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 150-51, “Blessed Paul witnesses 
that all external severities, all afflictions of the flesh and labours of the body are as nothing in comparison to the 
love which brightens the heart and makes it clear.” 
127 D’Eveleyn, Latin Text, 151, “… charity, that is love towards God.” 
128 Perkins, “Reading the Bible,” 223-24. 
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heart in Part VII is unnecessary. Love as love retains distinctive characteristics of its own. It 
changes the quality and character of the heart throughout the text in ways that the other 
virtues do not.  
Love “makeð schir heorte” (VI.497) and “schireð ant brihteð þe heorte” (VII.2-
3); the only appearance of the verb schireð in the AW.129 The schir heorte is thus the resultant 
condition that love creates by working upon the heart. Love’s distinctness from and priority 
over the other virtues lies herein. It effectively alters the character of the heart. The author’s 
imagery, particularly the imagery of fire, supports this idea. 
Fire and burning signify love’s presence and the change it effects in the heart. An 
observer “maht underȝeoten þet ter was lute fur of chearite, þet leiteð al of ure Lauerdes luue; 
lute fur wes þer þrof þet a puf acwencte” (III.94-96).130 Insults from others ought to aid 
spiritual progress by kindling love “for þear-as muche fur is, hit waxeð wið winde” 
(III.96).131  The author instructs his reader to think of the insults they receive as air and only 
air. The air ought to fan the reader’s love of God into flame. The metaphor serves two 
purposes. It affords the opportunity to depict love while teaching moral discipline (in this 
case, patience).  It also allows the author to simultaneously stir the reader’s affections by way 
of the traditional image of fire. The author enables the reader to affectively experience love of 
God by opposing the image of fire to the experience of the insults that must be endured. If the 
insults of others are affectively felt, then the fire they kindle can be felt as well. 
Fire resurfaces as love in the description of “þe beore of heui slawðe” (IV.350) 
amidst the catalogue of temptations in Part IV.132 The occurrence of fire language here is 
more expressly affective. Torpor is a vice because the heart “schulde leitin al o lei i luue of 
                                               
129 Concordance to Ancrene Wisse, s.v. ‘schireð.’ 
130 “… might understand that there was little fire of charity, which blazes all for love of our Lord; it was a little 
fire that was quenched by a puff.” 
131 “… for where there is much fire, it grows with wind.” 
132 “… the bear of heavy sloth.” 
155 
 
ure Lauerd” (IV.351-52).133 The characterisation of a heart “o lei i luue” carries more 
affective force than the “fur of chearite” in Part III. The “fur of chearite” was the subject of 
the verb leiteð in Part III. There charity and not the heart “leiteð al of ure Lauerdes luue” 
(III.95). Part IV differs. The heart is now the subject of the verbal construction “schulde 
leitin.” Charity transforms the quality of the heart by setting it on fire. 
The fire imagery reaches its climax in Part VII. The author uses fire and burning 
to depict Christ’s wooing. Christ himself appears as “þe soðe sunne” (VII.230) who 
“spreaden oueral hate luue gleames” (VII.231).134 The author explains that Christ’s words in 
Luke 12:49, “[i]gnem veni mittere in terram” (VII.233), refer to “bearninde luue into eorðlich 
heorte” (VII.235).135 The heart receives its love for Christ from Christ. It is essentially 
passive. The construction of this love thus requires Christ’s participation, much as Peter of 
Celle’s conscience did.136 
The allegory that immediately follows reverses the passivity of love and instructs 
the anchoress to “gederið wude” (VII.244), specifically “twa treon” (VII.247) which 
“bitacnið … þe deore rode” (VII.248-49).137 The author proceeds to reconcile the two 
opposing images of passivity and activity by assuring the anchoress that if God “ifint ow þeos 
twa treow gederin, he wule gestnin wið ow, ant monifalden in ow his deorewurðe grace” 
(VII.253-56).138 The burning of love, then, is sent from God into the heart. It is received, but 
it has an important precondition: the allegorical gathering of wood with which “ȝe schulen 
ontende fur of luue inwið ower heorte” (VII.249-50).139 The fire comes about as the 
culmination of the collaborative labours undertaken by God and the anchoress. 
                                               
133 “… should blaze all alight in love of our Lord.” 
134 “… the true sun”; “… spreads hot love-gleams over everything.” 
135 “I have come to send fire into the earth”; “… burning love into earthly hearts.” 
136 See, for instance, pp. 84-85 of this thesis. 
137 “… gather wood”; “… two pieces of wood”; “… signify the dear cross.” 
138 “… finds you gathering these two pieces of wood, he will lodge with you and multiply his precious grace in 
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139 “… you shall kindle the fire of love within your heart.” 
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The love of Christ intensifies into “Grikisch fur” (VII.257). It is stronger than 
other kinds of fire because “ne mei na þing bute migge ant sond ant eisil … acwenchen” it 
(VII.258-59).140 It represents a fusing of the passive love received from Christ, and the active 
love wrought by the earlier gathering of wood. The anchoress “hit schule makien” from 
Christ “ireadet wið his ahne blod o þe deore rode” (VII.259-261).141 The author switches 
from the passive to active voice at the mention of the cross. Now Christ’s “blod, for ow 
isched upo þe earre twa treon, schal makien ow … ontende mid tis Grickisch fur” (VII.263-
64).142 
Gathering wood and production of Greek fire encompass two activities. 
Meditation is the first. The anchoress must “[b]iseoð ofte towart ham; þencheð ȝef ȝe ne ahen 
eaðe to luuien þe king of blisse” (VII.250-51).143 The meditation signified by gathering wood 
becomes, by implication, the essential ingredient in Greek fire. The author does not explain 
the practical signification of the metaphorical instruction to make fire from Christ’s blood, 
but the context of the passage indicates that it also involves meditation. The second activity 
does not produce Greek fire, but prevents the fire from going out. It is to “[s]turieð ow 
cwicliche aa i gode werkes” which “schal heaten ow ant ontenden þis fur aȝein þe brune of 
sunne” (VII.269-70).144 The author introduces it as a protective measure against the few 
things capable of quenching Greek fire. The result of both activities is the same. Meditation 
on Christ and good works combine in love of God, intersecting like the two beams of the 
cross. There is no dividing wedge between the two. 
Grayson argues that the fire imagery in Part VII serves a much larger purpose: 
“The heart fired with love becomes the dominant image into which all the other figures and 
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emotional qualities flow.”145 The appearance of fire draws together and encompasses the 
disparate strands of thought and imagery that have preceded it. Thus “[t]he two sticks, upright 
and crossbar, dissolve into the figure of the crucifix” that has featured prominently 
throughout the AW.146 The fire of love is read back into all the appearances of the crucifix. 
Similarly, “[t]he figure of the crucified Son … carries forward the metaphor of radiant sun 
and calls up the recent elaboration of Christ as shield.”147 The description of Christ visiting 
the anchoress as Elijah visited the woman of Sarepta “encloses physically the mystical kiss of 
the mouth” and recalls “the reference to the kiss of peace in Part One.”148 The seventh part of 
the AW thus imbues the imagery of the earlier parts with new meaning for future readings and 
re-readings of the text. The AW, as McHugh argues in a passage cited at the opening of this 
chapter, “forms a paradigm within which other material will be organised.”149 The author’s 
reservation of charity until the penultimate section of the AW is therefore not evidence of 
Baldwin’s position that charity is unimportant to the text. Charity is rather the interpretative 
key that enables the reader to structure their own thought, memory, life, and reading of the 
text. 
The author of the AW uses the heart as the conscience to fuse moral discipline and 
love together. Obedience to a rule fosters both. The author structures the text in such a way 
that love, the interpretative key to the whole text, is only fully explicated towards the end of 
the text. Love underlies all the moral and ascetic disciplines that the AW author presents and 
prescribes. This is the same strategy that Peter of Celle employs in his De Conscientia. Peter, 
as argued in the first chapter, divides the acquisition of conscience into three stages: fear, 
discipline, and love. He sets the stages out sequentially, but reveals that they are inseparable 
from one another and thus develop simultaneously because love and discipline are ultimately 
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148 Grayson, Structure and Imagery, 204. 
149 McHugh, “Inner Space as Speaking Space,” 84. 
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identical.150 Reading the AW in the tradition of conscience literature resolves the perceived 
contradiction between the text’s emphases on conscience and love.  
5. Thought of the Heart 
 
The AW author frequently depicts the heart as both the locus and the means of 
rational thought. The heart is associated with the understanding, in addition to the will and 
desire.  There are three main kinds of heart-thought association. 
The first is the author’s association of the heart with reason and understanding as 
faculties. The citation and gloss of James 1:26 (II.410-13) reveal the heart susceptible to 
deception.151 It must, therefore, possess a thinking, believing capacity. The author develops 
the idea further through his recurrent depiction of reason as a protector or “ȝeteward” 
(IV.1340) of the heart, particularly in Part IV. He warns, for instance, that if the devil “sið 
slepi ure skile” (IV.1364) he will attempt to stir up memories of past sins and parade them 
“biuore þe heorte ehnen forte bifulen hire wið þoht of alde sunnen” (IV.1369).152 The reason 
can thus function as a perverse subsequent conscience that reflects upon past sins in order to 
enjoy them rather than condemn them. It must be strengthened and fortified in order to judge 
rightly. 
The second association sees the heart’s thoughts directed against sin. The author 
instructs his readers to bear the Cross “i þoht of heorte,” (III.185-86). The anchoress has 
control over the thoughts of her heart and is therefore capable of summoning them so that 
they “wiðute neod arearet i þe heorte” (IV.904) as a means of combating temptation. The 
devil himself must be driven back in similar fashion, “mid nempnunge i þi muð, mid te 
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mearke i þin hond, mid þoht i þin heorte” (IV.1601-602).153 
The third kind of association between heart and thought is similar to the second. 
The heart’s thoughts are once more directed towards a particular goal, and effective to attain 
it.  They operate in a meditative capacity. The anchoress should “[c]reop in” Christ’s wounds 
“wið þi þoht … ant wið his deorewurðe blod biblodge þin heorte” (IV.1630-31).154 The heart 
ascends to its rightful, heavenly dwelling by way of “[ȝ]eornful, sechinde þoht” (II.922)155 
about the location of its spiritual treasure. Material concerns pose a threat insofar as they 
occupy thought, and thus “[a]ncre ne ah to habben na þing þet utward drahe hire heorte” 
(VIII.98-100).156 
The following sections demonstrate that reason and thought in the AW relate to 
the heart in the same way that they relate to the conscience in the contemplative conscience 
texts. Peter of Celle’s reason, for instance, must scrutinise the mirror of conscience. Peter also 
stresses that thoughts must be used as defences against sin’s encroachment upon the 
conscience. The Tractatus de Conscientia similarly treats the conscience as the locus of 
thought. It instructs its reader to use concentrated thoughts and meditations as weapons for 
the spiritual battle with temptation.  De Interiori Domo makes reason one of the seven pillars 
in the house of conscience. It is responsible for denying sin access to the house by refusing to 
consent to temptation.  
a. Reason and Understanding 
 
Skile is the most relevant term in regards to reason and understanding. Temptation 
becomes sin when “delit” in it reaches the heart “þurh skiles ȝettunge” (IV.1394). Two 
elements contribute to the process: skile and delit. Delit has already been examined in the 
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discussions of the heart as a moral faculty and the heart’s desire. We turn now to skile. The 
noun skile possesses a variety of different uses in Middle English that fall into two broad 
categories. The first is the reason as a cognitive faculty. The second is a reason as a cause or 
explanation.  The AW demonstrates both of these definitions but the author’s preferred use 
clearly fits within the first. His skile is a very specific cognitive faculty. 
Millett and Dance define skile in their glossary to the AW as “(the faculty of) 
reason” and wittes skile as the “power of understanding.” They contrast it with its alternate 
meaning: a “reason, cause, explanation.”157 The MED provides a similar set of definitions, 
but with some further qualifying citations. It lists the thirteenth-century “Dialogue on Virtues 
and Vices,” roughly contemporaneous with the AW, as the earliest occurrence of skile to mean 
“[t]he intellectual faculty, reason.”158  The “Dialogue” uses skele to translate the Latin racio 
in contrast with intellectus. The primary use of skile in the AW shares this sense of judgement 
or discernment rather than more general understanding. The AW author narrows the meaning 
even further. He advises “skile sitte as domesmon upo þe dom-seotel” (V.114-15)159 during 
preparation for confession. He also depicts “wittes skile” as a “ȝeteward” (IV.1340) entrusted 
“þurh bisi warschipe sundri god from uuel” (IV.1342).160 
The AW thus treats skile as moral judgement. Skile is the reason applied to 
discernment and performance of moral or immoral actions. It acquires some traits of the will. 
Ten of the word’s fifteen appearances in the AW significantly come from Part IV, the section 
devoted to identifying and combating temptation.161 Six of these are paired with ȝettunge, the 
act of giving or granting. The author uses “skiles ȝettunge” to gloss “[c]unsense” (IV.1585-
86), which he defines as the actual commission of sin, in contrast to temptation. Consent or 
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skiles ȝettunge occurs “hwen þe delit i þe lust is igan se ouerforð þet ter nere nan 
wiðseggunge ȝef þer were eise to fulle þe dede” (IV.1586-87).162 
Will and skile remain distinct from one another, in spite of these apparent 
overlaps. The first part of lechery involves a “ful wil to þet fulðe wið skiles ȝettunge” 
(IV.393-94).163 Skile does not desire sin, even in its ȝettunge. It simply fails to perform its 
proper function, as pictured by the image of the sleeping gatekeeper (IV.1378). It “ah to 
windwin hweate, schaden þe eilen ant te chef from þe cleane cornes” (IV.1340-41) by which 
the author intends it “sundri god from uuel” (IV.1342).164 Consent to sin is a failure to keep 
watch. 
Skile here performs the same role as reason in De Interiori Domo. The author of 
De Interiori Domo stipulates that “solus consensus reos nos facit” and so he urges: “Locum 
superiorem ratio semper obtineat,” and “[s]i vero aliquem motum ad id quod non debet, vel 
quomodo non debet, moveri senserit, non consentiat, sed illico resistat” (Domo 15).165 Reason 
serves the conscience in both texts by refusing to sin. Reason is therefore responsible if the 
person commits sin. Reason belongs to the heart-conscience in AW and to the house of 
conscience in De Interiori Domo (Domo 15).166 The texts concur that the conscience is the 
part of the person that commits either good or bad action. The Tractatus de Conscientia, as 
the second chapter of this thesis demonstrates, similarly differentiates the good and bad 
conscience based on whether or not the conscience itself consents to the temptation around 
it.167 The AW operates according to the same principles as the conscience texts. The 
conscience-heart, then, is the part of the person that sins. Skile may judge sins after the fact, 
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but it is also the perpetrator of them. The conscience is involved in the activities of the 
person. The conscience itself must be trained and fortified to resist sin, since its resistance is 
not an intrinsic property.  
Another three uses of skile in the AW appear in Part V, the instruction on 
confession. The best way for the anchoress to begin preparations for confession is to imagine 
Doomsday, and imagine the way in which her sins will be judged. She should then make a 
similar judgement of herself and her conduct in the present. Neither conscience nor inwit are 
her judge. Skile is instead. It sits as the “domesmon upo þe dom-seotel” (V.114-15).168 The 
author emphasises this arrangement again, scarcely more than five lines later, “nis nawt þe 
deme (þet is, Skile) ipaiet” (V.123).169 Inwit appears in these proceedings, but only as a 
witness who confirms the testimony of Munegunge (Memory), lamenting, “Soð hit is, soð hit 
is, þis ant muchele mare” (V.117-18).170 
The author envisions “þe ilke eorre Deme þet is ec witnesse” above the sinner 
(V.96-97), “þe wide þrote of helle” below (V.98) and finally “inwið us seoluen ure ahne 
conscience (þet is, ure inwit) forculiende hire seoluen wið þe fur of sunne” (V.98-100).171 
Inwit appears to be something different from skile. The author does not speak of skile 
consuming or burning itself up, but only of distinguishing things that ought to be burnt up. 
All of these uses paint skile as akin to moral judgement. It is closer in meaning to the 
prescriptive, anterior conscience than inwit is. 
Anselm of Canterbury’s second meditation provides the basis for the AW author’s 
description of the judgement scene.172 The same passage from Anselm also appears in De 
Interiori Domo (Domo 46).173 Reason judges the conscience, but its judgement is offered in 
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service of the conscience in both the AW and De Interiori Domo. The judgement scene in the 
AW impels the anchoress to make a thorough confession (V.132-35). The author of De 
Interiori Domo has his hypothetical confessor give it to the penitent as a remedy against the 
future intrusion of sin into the conscience. 
b. Thoughts as Meditations and Weapons 
 
Skile is the heart’s gate-keeper and þohtes are its arms in the fight against sin. 
Anne Savage notes that, in the AW, “[t]he role of prayer and meditation is … largely 
protective, directing the imagination to the right things.”174 The centrality of thought and 
meditation to the AW has commonly been observed, but usually in comparison with the later 
Middle English mystics. Thus the purpose of Savage’s chapter is to enquire “whether a 
successful anchoritic existence entailed … mystical experience.”175 Mari Hughes-Edwards 
finds a preponderance of “terms relating to … spiritual thought” in the AW.176 She maintains, 
however, that “[m]editation fosters a cognitive relationship with God, more apt to be 
comprehended intellectually than felt experientially.”177 Hughes-Edwards argues that the 
reader engaged in meditation remains detached from the meditation since “[t]he earlier 
medieval recluse is not constructed by the guides as a full participant in her imaginary 
world.”178 She concedes that the meditations proposed in the AW “are affective, intended to 
foster the recluse’s sensory and emotional involvement,” but “the scene remains a tableau … 
despite all attempts to draw the recluse literally into it.”179 Hughes-Edwards’ reading of the 
meditations is thus similar to Baldwin’s. Baldwin argues that “meditation is not the purpose 
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of this instruction at all, since the author’s subject is remedies for temptation.”180 The 
meditations become little more than distractions for the unruly mind, keeping it from 
mischief. 
The problem with these readings is that they overlook the role that meditation 
played within medieval thought, as explored in the first chapter of this thesis.181 A second 
group of readings of the AW and its related texts do take medieval thought on meditation into 
account. They contend that the anchoritic situation uniquely facilitates a heightened and 
intensive meditation that guidance texts utilise to their full advantage. Denis Renevey, for 
instance, argues that “[r]ather than reacting against the fundamental design of the anchorhold, 
the Ancrene Wisse and the Wooing Group exploit it to strengthen the affectus mentis.”182  
Thus “[t]he visual representation of the cross within the reclusorium, on the altar, supports 
the affective identification [with Christ] unlocked by the meditation.”183 Kristen McQuinn 
similarly argues for the significance of “feminised images of enclosure in the context of late-
medieval anchoritic devotion” since “[a] female anchorite could well have been able to 
connect more intimately with an image that was feminised.”184 Nicholas Watson argues that 
“the anchoresses are … enclosed within a powerful imaginative structure, and require only a 
personal and affective realisation of its significance,” a realisation that meditation affords 
them.185 Jocelyn Price notes Aelred of Rievaulx’s description of the church altar cloth and 
argues that “the cloth serves as the point of departure and return for a meditative process” 
such that “[t]he white cloth should now instantly summon, whenever the eye falls on it, this 
                                               
180 Baldwin, Ancrene Wisse and its Background, 305. 
181 See pp. 64-67 of this thesis. 
182 Denis Renevey, “Enclosed Desires: A Study of the Wooing Group,” in Mysticism and Spirituality in Medieval 
England, ed. William F. Pollard and Robert Boenig (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1997), 55. 
183 Renevey, “Enclosed Desires,” 57. 
184 Kristen McQuinn, “‘Crepe into That Blessed Syde’: Enclosure Imagery in Aelred of Rievaulx’s De 
Institutione Inclusarum,” in Anchorites, Wombs and Tombs: Intersections of Gender and Enclosure in the 
Middle Ages, ed. Liz Herbert McAvoy and Mari Hughes-Edwards, Religion and Culture in the Middle Ages 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005), 95. 
185 Nicholas Watson, “The Methods and Objectives of Thirteenth-Century Anchoritic Devotion,” in The 
Medieval Mystical Tradition in England Exeter Symposium IV: Papers Read at Dartington Hall, ed. Marion 
Glasscoe (Woodbridge: D.S. Brewer, 1987), 141. 
165 
 
inner ‘narrative’ of purity” with which meditative reading imbues it.186 Savage also argues 
that “in Ancrene Wisse, constant attention is devoted to the physical details of anchoritic life, 
so that the life itself becomes an object of meditation.”187 This second group of readings 
argue that meditations encompass all aspects of the anchoritic life, rather than being flights of 
fancy that are only useful because they are not harmful. 
Both groups of readings, however, fail to consider the role meditation plays 
within the context of monastic conscience literature which treats meditation as a positive 
means of cultivating and edifying the conscience. Baldwin’s observation that meditation 
predominantly serves to counter temptation in the AW holds true. Reading the AW in the 
context of conscience literature reveals that meditations aimed at countering temptation are a 
vital component of the good conscience. Peter of Celle, as argued in the first chapter of this 
thesis, saw meditation and meditative thought as the primary means of acquiring conscience. 
He treats meditation, along with confession, as a weapon to be used in the fight against 
temptation. Resistance to temptation, for Peter, is a necessary and effective discipline that has 
positive value in edifying the conscience.188 The AW conforms to this tradition. Its 
meditations are mostly directed against temptation, but this does not undermine or counter 
any of the observations made about meditation by the second group of readings described 
above. The remainder of this section demonstrates the dual purpose of meditation in the AW: 
that it simultaneously resists temptation and builds the conscience. 
Conscience in the AW, like the conscience texts, is the locus of both good and evil 
thoughts. It is therefore the battleground between the two. The author describes lustful 
“stinkinde þohtes” as the “blodi flehen” on the dog of hell (IV.1597-98).189 They are the first 
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Inclusarum,” in Medieval English Religious and Ethlical Literature: Essays in Honour of G. H. Russell, ed. 
Gregory Kratzmann and James Simpson (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1986), 201. 
187 Savage, “The Solitary Heroine,” 80. 
188 See pp. 87-91 of this thesis. 
189 “… stinking thoughts”; “bloody flies.” 
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line in temptation’s assault, the “cogitatiun” followed by “affectiun” and finally “cunsence” 
(IV.1573). The anchoress is to combat them indirectly by combating the devil whom they 
attend: “nim anan þe rode steaf mid nempnunge i þi muð, mid te mearke i þin hond, mid þoht 
i þin heorte” (IV.1600-602).190 Savage and Watson read this passage as an injunction to 
“imagine that in making the sign of the cross the anchoress is holding a weapon and dealing 
her enemy blows.”191 They are certainly correct. The anchoress is to “liðere to him [the devil] 
luðerliche mid te hali rode steaf stronge bacduntes” (IV.1603-604).192 The AW author here 
draws from several precedents. Millett and Dance trace the depiction of the sign of the Cross 
as a weapon to fight the devil as a dog to John Cassian’s Institutiones, with an analogue to the 
AW’s use in a sermon by Odo of Cheriton.193 
Cassian’s advice follows in the course of his description of the clothing worn by 
Egyptian hermits. Their practice of carrying staffs signifies the need to combat the 
“oblatrantes vitiorum canes, et invisibiles nequitiarum spiritualium bestias” by making the 
sign of the Cross.194 Thoughts of Christ’s Passion and “imitatione illius mortificationis” are 
the means to “exstinguere” them.195 
Both the sign of the Cross and thoughts of the Passion figure in the AW but, 
unlike in Cassian’s Institutiones, they do not overcome the vices. The author vividly 
describes fighting the devil, and then explicates the image: “Þet is, rung up, sture þe. Hald up 
ehnen on heh ant honden toward heouene. Gred efter sucurs” (IV.1604-605).196 If the desired 
                                               
190 “… seize at once the crucifix, with the name in your mouth, with the sign in your hand, with the thought in 
your heart.” 
191 Anne Savage and Nicholas Watson eds., Anchoritic Spirituality, (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 385. 
192 “Beat him harshly with the holy crucifix, with strong blows to his back.” 
193 Millett, Ancrene Wisse, 2:195. 
194 John Cassian, De Coenobiorum Institutis I.9, (PL 49:76A), “barking dogs of vices and invisible beasts of 
spiritual evils” (NB: Millett and Dance cite the Sources Chrétiennes and thus give the reference as I.8; I am 
using the text of the Institutiones from the Patrologia Latina). 
195 John Cassian, De Coenobiorum Institutis 1.9, (PL 49:76A), “by imitation of his mortification”; John Cassian, 
De Coenobiorum Institutis 1.9, (PL 49:76A), “extinguish.” 
196 “That is, rise up, stir yourself. Hold up your eyes on high and your hands toward heaven. Cry after succour.” 
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sucurs is not forthcoming, “gred luddre wið hat heorte” (IV. 1610).197 The þoht in heorte 
(presumably of Christ’s Passion as signified by the crucifix) therefore works in conjunction 
with the specified prayers (IV.1605-12) to elicit divine aid and assistance. It counters sinful 
thoughts with virtuous ones, but also invokes the presence of God. In this the AW resembles 
the Tractatus de Conscientia which holds that God is present within the good thoughts of the 
conscience: “Spiritus Dei loquitur, quando dulcia meditamur” (Tractatus 12).198 
“Hali meditatiuns” are offered earlier in Part IV as a remedy to temptation. The 
author recommends meditation on “[m]ors tua, mors Christi, nota culpe, gaudia celi, iudicii 
terror” (IV.877-78).199 He then prescribes an additional, similar remedy: “oþre þohtes” 
(IV.901) that “wiðute neod arearet i þe heorte” (IV.904).200 They include four kinds of earthly 
thought helpful to combat temptation. The author interrupts the two kinds of prescription 
(holy meditations and ‘other thoughts') with a short excursus on the relationship between 
material and spiritual things. 
He offers an English mnemonic verse on fitting objects of spiritual meditation 
that urges “þench of helle wa, of heouenriches wunnen” (IV.81).201 The author notes that each 
of the poem’s topics calls for further elaboration, but he singles this one out for discussion. 
He tells the anchoresses to “understondeð þet Godd walde o sum wise schawin ham [the 
sorrows of hell and joys of heaven] i þis world” (IV.889-90).202 Worldly pains and joys are 
“as schadewe” (IV.891) and no nearer their eternal correlatives “þen is shadewe to þet þing 
þet hit is of schadewe” (IV.891-92).203 The anchoress is not to be affected by these shadows. 
They belong to “þis worldes sea” (IV.893) whereas she is “upo þe brugge of heouene” 
                                               
197 “… cry louder with a hot heart.” 
198 PL 184:560A, “The spirit of God speaks when we meditate on sweet things.” 
199 “Your death, the death of Christ, the knowledge of sin, the joy of heaven, the terror of judgement”; 
200 “… other thoughts”; “… without need, arise in the heart.” 
201 “… think of hellish woe, of heavenly joys.” 
202 “… understand that God wishes to show in some way [the sorrows of hell and joys of heaven] in this world.” 
203 “… as a shadow”; “than a shadow is to the thing of which it is a shadow.”  
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(IV.893-94).204 The author cautions his reader not to be “þe hors eschif iliche þe schuncheð 
for a schadewe, ant falleð adun i þe weater of the hehe brugge” (IV.894-96).205 Anyone who 
does is “[t]o childene” (IV.896).206 
The placement of this discussion is especially striking because the author 
immediately turns to his concessive prescriptions.  Four kinds of thought “arearet i þe heorte” 
(IV.904) can be effective measures against temptation: “dredfule, wunderfule, gleadfule, ant 
sorhfule” (IV.903-904).207 Various hypothetical scenarios arouse such thoughts. Some of them 
expressly contradict the foregoing warning about the relationship between temporal and 
eternal affairs. One of the dreadful thoughts, for instance, involves the church burning down 
around the anchoress (IV.907). The joyful thoughts, by contrast, include the miraculous papal 
election of “þet mon þet te is leouest” (IV.913-14).208 The author recommends these earthly 
thoughts on the grounds that they “i fleschliche sawlen wrencheð ut sonre fleschliche 
temptatiuns þen sum of þe oþre [i.e., the meditations on final things]” (IV.918-20).209 
The author specifies that these other thoughts are not “hali meditatiuns” on Christ 
and his works or words (IV.899-900). His specification is, however, an inconsistency. Most of 
the ‘other thoughts’ deal with temporal, earthly matters, but the dreadful thoughts also 
include the sight of the devil (IV.905-906). The wonderful thoughts likewise include the sight 
of Christ, promising to grant the anchoress what is dearest to her, provided she resist the 
temptation (IV.909-12). 
Thoughts of Christ and the devil would seem to fall under the first heading of 
holy meditations, but the author does not place them there. He emphasises the effects that the 
thoughts have on the heart. Dread, wonder, joy, and sorrow – not the thoughts themselves – 
                                               
204 “… this world’s sea,”; “… upon the bridge of heaven.” 
205 “… like the nervous horse that jumps at a shadow, and falls down into the water from the high bridge.” 
206 “… too childish.” 
207 “… raised in the heart”; “… dreadful, wonderful, joyful, and sorrowful.” 
208 “… the man who is dearest to you.” 
209 “… in fleshly souls, [they] sooner wrench out fleshly temptations than some of the others.” 
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overcome temptation. The holy meditations, on the other hand, are different. The author does 
not discuss the effects of holy meditations, but only holy meditations themselves. Holy 
meditations overcome temptation by virtue of being meditations, and not by any conditions of 
heart they engender. The so-called ‘other thoughts’ are instruments. The holy meditations are 
ends. The ‘other thoughts’ are interchangeable with one another, but the holy meditations 
have value in themselves. The holy meditations, unlike the ‘other thoughts,’ situate the 
anchoress on the bridge of heaven above the sea of the world. The meditations directed 
against temptation thus perform the same function as the meditations in Part VII, signified by 
the “twa treon” (VII.247) that kindle love of God. Even meditations intended as counter-
measures against temptation have positive value in kindling love of God and edifying the 
contemplative conscience. 
6. The Guest Chamber 
 
Meditation, charity, and anchoritic discipline aim to produce the pure heart, 
synonymous with the clear conscience. Part II of the AW begins with a free English gloss on 
Proverbs 4:23: “‘Wið alles cunnes warde, dohter,’ seið Salomon, ‘wite wel þin heorte; for 
sawle lif is in hire, ȝef ha is wel iloket’” (II.1-3).210 The author uses the word heorte in Part 
IV to translate Gregory the Great’s expression “vita mentis” (IV.1354-56), which becomes 
significant in light of the claim that life of the soul is in the heart.211 The heart contains the 
life of the soul if its integrity is preserved, if “ha is wel iloket.”212 The senses must be 
guarded, temptations resisted, sins confessed, penance performed, meditations practiced, and 
the love of God cultivated. The heart is protected by the “fif wittes” which are the “heorte 
wardeins” (II.5-6).213 The outer wits protect inwit, the inner wit. The “weote of sunne” (P.41) 
                                               
210 “‘With all kinds of guard, daughter,’ says Solomon, ‘guard well your heart, for the soul’s life is in it if it is 
well protected.’” 
211 “… life of the mind.” 
212 “… if it is well protected.” 
213 “… five senses”; “… heart guardians.” 
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obstructs the inner wit and must be removed.214 The heart-conscience, then, is construed as an 
inner space that must be locked against the outer world by meditatively reinterpreting the 
outer world to its spiritual advantage. Renevey sums up the relationship between inner and 
outer world when he notes that “[t]he interplay between image and text allows the mind to 
effect solid affective links between the exterior world of the reclusorium and the inner world 
of the anchorite.”215  
The inner space of the heart-conscience possesses the attributes that have been 
examined thus far throughout this chapter: it is a moral faculty as well as the location of the 
will, desire, charity, and thought. These, as we have seen, are the attributes of the 
contemplative conscience. The conscience of the AW, like the contemplative conscience, is 
the space that God comes to occupy within the person. It has a knowing capacity insofar as it 
can be aware of sin. The heart-conscience that is free of sin “mei cnawen Godd” and 
“gleadien of his sihðe” (VII.19-20).216 It has a desiring, loving capacity that must be directed 
towards God, as the author tells the anchoress: “schulen ontende fur of luue inwið ower 
heorte” (VII.249-50).217 The author assures the anchoress that “þe soðe Helye, þet is, Godd 
almihti ... wule gestnin wið ow, ant monifalden in ow his deorwurðe grace” (VII.253-55).218 
Lusts, temptations, and sins are problematic because they draw the anchoress out of the inner 
chamber. The author describes Christ speaking to the anchoress, telling her that “schuldest i 
þin heorte bur biseche me cosses, as mi leofmon” (II.284-85).219 Christ thus inhabits the good 
conscience, the pure heart. The good conscience is able to interpret the world the anchoress 
inhabits, recognising the meaning within the symbolism and objects of the anchorhold, using 
the anchoritic life itself for meditation. The good conscience is thus the conscience that is 
                                               
214 “… knowledge of sin.” 
215 Renevey, “Enclosed Desires,” 60. 
216 “… can know God”; “rejoice at the sight of him.” 
217 “You must kindle the fire of love within your heart.” 
218 “… the true Elijah (that is, Almighty God) will visit you, and increase his precious grace in you.” 
219 “… you should, in the bower of your heart, beseech me for kisses as my beloved.” 
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able to recognise the presence of God. The inner chamber of the heart becomes the guest 
chamber that appears in Peter of Celle’s De Conscientia and the pseudo-Bernardine De 
Interiori Domo. The aim of conscience literature is to prepare the guest chamber, to awaken 
the soul to the presence of God in the conscience by reshaping and restructuring ordinary 
processes of perception and thought. It is the aim of the AW as well. 
7. Conclusion 
 
The heart in the AW, like the conscience of the contemplative conscience texts, 
does not easily fit into a single modern category. It is a knowing and volitional part of the 
person. It has the potential to apprehend both spiritual and earthly things. Its life is lost if it 
becomes diseased and wounded. The wounded heart produces morally corrupt actions that 
further its deterioration. Measures must be taken to prevent this from happening.  It is a moral 
entity insofar as it is shaped by its possessor’s life, and produces morally good or morally evil 
action.  
It is the location of desire and love. The anchoress must “ontenden þis fur [of 
charity] aȝen the brune of sunne; for alswa as þe an neil driueð ut þen oþer, alswa þe brune of 
Godes luue driueð brune of ful luue ut of þe heorte” (VII.270-72).220 Desire for God 
characterises the healthy, living heart. Fire imagery depicts both love of God and sin. The 
paradigm explains the description, borrowed from Anselm, of the sinner’s inwit at Doomsday 
“forculiende hire seoluen wið þe fur of sunne” (V.98-100).221 The precise role of inwit is 
unclear from the immediate context and appears to have baffled some medieval readers. The 
Cotton MS Titus D.xviii replaces forculiende with forcweðinde (‘reproaching’) and the Latin 
translation has no equivalent term.222 Destruction by the fire of sin is antithetical to the 
burning of charity in the heart. Sacramental confession undoes the damage and thus removes 
                                               
220 “… kindle this fire [of charity] against the burning of sin; for just as the one nail drives out the other, so the 
burning of God’s love drives the burning of foul love out of the heart.” 
221 “… burning themselves up with the fire of sin.” 
222 Millett, Ancrene Wisse, 2:207; D’Evelyn, Latin Text, 116. 
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the “weote of sunne þet ne beo þurh schrift ibet” (P.41-42).223 The heart can then burn with 
the love of God. The author is therefore able to declare without contradiction that 
“[s]chirnesse of heorte is Godes luue ane” (VII.38).224 
The heart, like the contemplative conscience, belongs to the realm of thought and 
the operation of the mind. Imaginative meditation is therefore a powerful force for shaping it 
and orienting it in the right direction. The author of the AW follows the writers of 
contemplative conscience texts in crafting a text filled with widely varying imagery, so that 
reading it works to cultivate the conscience. He also follows the monastic writers by 
depicting the thoughts of the heart as weapons to defend it against sin. The weapons derive 
their power from the presence of God. Resistance to temptation thus becomes a positive 
means of invoking and apprehending the presence of God. 
Reading the AW as a conscience text resolves longstanding debates and questions 
about the nature of the text’s spirituality. If the text is intended to be an instruction on 
contemplative prayer, then why does it say so little about contemplative prayer? Why is there 
so little reference to the traditional triad of purgation, illumination and ascent? Why is there 
so little language of ascent at all? On the other hand, if the AW is not intended as an 
instruction on contemplative prayer, then why is it so rife with allusions to what would now 
be described as ‘mysticism’? What sort of spiritual life does the author intend for his 
anchoritic readers?  
This chapter has shown the heart of the AW operates similarly to, and possesses 
the attributes of, the conscience as described in the contemplative conscience texts. It has 
shown that the spirituality of the AW is the spirituality of the contemplative conscience texts. 
Contemplation is modelled on moral reasoning rather than ascent. The cultivated conscience 
becomes the dwelling place of God, rather than the location of God’s law. Contemplation 
                                               
223 “… awareness of sin that has not been amended through confession.” 
224 “… clearness of heart is the love of God alone.” 
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involves the application of God’s presence to one’s life in the way that moral reasoning 
involves the application of God’s law to one’s life. The cultivation of conscience therefore 
involves a living and dynamic engagement with the outer world in such a way that the outer 
does not violate or intrude upon the inner sanctuary of the heart. The author alludes so often 
to contemplative prayer because he intends his readers to find and recognise the presence of 
God within their life of solitude and devotion, surrounded by imagery and symbolism. The 
conscience is the means by which this recognition takes place. The author thus follows the 
conscience texts in holding that recognition of the presence of God by means of the 
conscience is attained by the cultivation of discipline and love which cannot be separated 
from one another. Sequences like the ascending triad of purgation, illumination, and union are 
therefore inherently artificial and at odds with his conceptualisation of the contemplative life. 
He gives a much more appropriate image of contemplation, one that encapsulates the 
spirituality of the contemplative conscience texts: “þe niht-fuhel flið bi niht ant biȝet i 
þeosternesse his fode. Alswa schal ancre fleon wið contemplatiun (þet is, wið heh þoht) ant 
wið hali bonen bi niht toward heouene, ant biȝeote bi niht hire sawle fode” (III.339-42).225 
The passage that introduced the word contemplation into the English language does not 
describe a graduated ascent, but an ongoing flight. It is the contemplation of the conscience 
texts.
                                               
225 “… the night-fowl flies by night and obtains its food in darkness. Likewise shall the anchoress fly toward 
heaven by night with contemplation (that is, with high thought), and with holy prayers, and obtain by night her 
soul’s food.” 
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Conclusion 
 
The spirituality of the AW has generated scholarly debate for over half a century. 
What role, if any, does spiritual experience play in the AW? The AW author states that the 
virtue of all religious life is its capacity to produce a clean conscience. He accordingly makes 
good conscience the object of his inner rule, the rule that is common to all religious. The 
centrality of conscience has often been taken to indicate that the AW is an ethical guide, and 
nothing more. The author precludes such a reading, however, when he intersperses allusions 
to spiritual experiences throughout his moral prescriptions. The AW, however, never works its 
references to spiritual experience into the conventional tripartite scheme of purgation, 
illumination, and union. The conflict between the ethical and contemplative components of 
the AW thus gives rise to the question: does the author intend his readers to have ‘mystical’ 
experiences?  
This thesis resolves the problem by returning to the AW author’s statement that 
religious life aims for the attainment of a good conscience: “Rihten hire ant smeðin hire is of 
euch religiun ant of euch ordre þe god ant al þe strengðe’ (P.44-45).1 Answers to questions 
about the text’s spirituality will necessarily hinge on what the author means by conscience. 
Past scholarship on the AW has mostly overlooked this point. The only attempts to define the 
AW’s conscience have not considered the treatises on conscience that were written close to its 
time. 
This thesis argues that twelfth-century monastic writers developed a new kind of 
conscience, synthesised from disparate patristic approaches to conscientia. I have labelled 
this newer form of conscience the ‘contemplative conscience.’ The patristic anterior 
conscience was the space where God’s law inhabited the soul and provided moral direction. 
                                               
1 “To straighten and smooth it is the good and all the strength of each religion and of every order.” 
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The contemplative conscience became the space where God himself inhabits the soul. The 
older subsequent conscience was the conscience that evaluated past conduct. The 
contemplative conscience became the person as shaped by past conduct. The patristic 
conscience applied divine law to individual situations in order to determine the morally sound 
decision. The contemplative conscience applies the divine presence to individual situations in 
order to perceive their spiritual significance and the way that God works within them.  
The twelfth-century monastic writers coupled the contemplative conscience with 
their keen focus on the use of meditative images. The conscience exists within the mind and 
characterises how life is perceived and experienced. It influences ordinary processes of 
thought. The active use of meditation shapes the conscience and attunes it, so that it can 
correctly perceive and experience the world. Reading and meditation became just as 
important to the cultivation of a good conscience as moral living. The result was the 
production of highly imaginative and literary texts, designed to facilitate the acquisition of a 
good conscience. The contemplative conscience thus led to the birth of a different form of 
contemplation, one that was not predicated upon metaphors of graduated spiritual ascent 
towards union with God, but nevertheless reappropriated tropes from the dominant tradition 
of contemplative literature. The good conscience was the goal of religious life because God 
inhabits the good conscience.  
This thesis shows that the AW participates within the tradition of the 
contemplative conscience. Reading the AW as a contemplative conscience text solves the 
contradiction between its ethical and contemplative components, and explains the absence of 
metaphors of ascent or spiritual trajectory. The anchoritic life was an ideal place to exercise 
the teaching of the contemplative conscience texts, since it literalises the metaphor of the 
conscience as a house that is closed and sealed off from the world. The material 
circumstances of anchoritism all lend themselves to the cultivation of the contemplative 
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conscience, and the contemplative conscience enables the anchoress to read the spiritual 
significance of her physical situation. Every thought and action becomes unitive with God, 
not because the anchoress ascends to him through stages, but because God is already present 
to her thoughts and actions. 
The answer to the initial question, then, is that the author did intend for his 
anchoritic readers to live contemplative lives. Their lives were to be understood as an 
ongoing spiritual experience, as they continually negotiate between the spiritual and material, 
applying the presence of God as they might apply moral reasoning to make ethical decisions. 
The paradigm of the contemplative life is thus moral reason rather than ascent.  
The prevailing approaches to medieval mystical literature in contemporary 
scholarship, particularly Bernard McGinn’s ‘mystical consciousness,’ provide fitting 
descriptions of contemplative conscience texts but also account for more traditionally 
recognised mystical literature. They therefore offer a paradigmatic shift that removes 
anachronistically imposed requirements on texts, and allows a more nuanced investigation of 
the relationships between different kinds of medieval religious writing. Varying forms of 
contemplative texts can be read in conversation with one another. This thesis presents the 
contemplative conscience as an area for further study by scholars of medieval mysticism.  
There is, then, considerable room for further work on the contemplative 
conscience. The writings of William of St Thierry would, in particular, be a fruitful field for 
further investigation. I have not dealt with William in this thesis because he did not write a 
treatise on conscience. Conscience nevertheless plays a large role in William’s contemplative 
Expositio Super Canticum Canticorum, and should therefore be considered in relation to the 
conscience texts explored here. 
The role of conscience in more apophatic contemplative texts also calls for 
further examination. William Pollard, for instance, notes that Thomas Gallus describes 
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mystical union with God as occurring within the scintilla synderesis.2 Pollard translates the 
phrase as ‘spark of discernment,’ yet this is traditionally an expression for the conscience. 
Pollard traces Gallus’ influence on the fourteenth-century English mystic Richard Rolle. 
Rolle’s conscience is thus a potential field of further inquiry, since the contemplative 
conscience gained a firm foothold in the English devotional tradition via the popularity of the 
AW.3  
The conscience also appears in the richly apophatic Cloud of Unknowing, where 
it is “þi visage goostly” in need of a mirror.4 Phyllis Hodgson notes that many of the Cloud 
author’s “words are traceable back to Old English homilies; many more occur in the west 
Midland writings of the early thirteenth century,” suggesting the influence of the AW.5 
Apophatic texts disrupt the ordinary processes of knowledge and self-knowledge. The Cloud, 
in particular, stresses the need for self-forgetting rather than self-knowledge in the 
contemplative life. The relation between conscience and self-forgetting thus creates a 
contradiction worth further examination. 
The contradiction between ethical prescriptions and spiritual experience in the 
AW are solved by understanding the AW’s conscience as the contemplative conscience that 
emerged in monastic writing during the twelfth century. This conscience lies outside the main 
line of development of the idea of conscience and is thus usually overlooked today. This 
thesis contends that the AW cannot be read without reference to the contemplative 
conscience, and thus also lays the groundwork for further research on conscience in medieval 
contemplative writing. 
                                               
2 William F. Pollard, "Richard Rolle and the "Eye of the Heart"" in Mysticism and Spirituality in Medieval 
England, ed. Robert Boenig and William F. Pollard (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1997), 99. 
3 A. S. G. Edwards speculates that the AW “circulated for a longer period than any other Middle English prose 
work,” and notes that “[i]t was copied, in whole or in part, from the mid-thirteenth to the early seventeenth 
centuries.” A. S. G. Edwards, “The Middle English Manuscripts and Early Readers of Ancrene Wisse,” in A 
Companion to “Ancrene Wisse,” ed. Yoko Wada (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2003), 103. 
4 Phyllis Hodgson, ed., The Cloud of Unknowing and the Book of Privy Counselling (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1944), 72. 
5 Phyllis Hodgson, ed., Deonise Hid Diuinite and Other Treatises on Contemplative Prayer Related to the Cloud 
of Unknowing (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), xxxi. 
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Appendices 
 
Two of the texts discussed in this thesis, the Tractatus de Conscientia and De 
Interiori Domo have not previously been translated into English. I have therefore included 
my translations as appendices. A complete critical edition of the texts and complete 
translation of De Interiori Domo are beyond the scope of this thesis. The translations 
included here are only intended to supplement the thesis. I have therefore only translated the 
first twenty-two chapters of De Interiori Domo, since these are the primary focus of the 
discussion in the thesis. 
I have used the texts included in Migne’s Patrologia Latina. Migne occasionally 
notes Scriptural citations. I have included these notes, supplementing them with some of my 
own.  
179 
 
Appendix A 
Tractatus de Conscientia 
(A Treatise on Conscience) 
 
PL 184:551D-560C 
 
To a certain religious of the Cistercian Order. 
Prologue 
You seek from me, Beloved, what is above me and indeed contrary to me: 
namely, the light of knowledge and purity of conscience. You are mistaken to seek either 
from me, though because of your love for or opinion of me, you do not believe yourself to be 
in error. What am I, and of what am I capable? I am, indeed, a sinner, and sinner who sins 
beyond the normal measure. The vivacity of knowledge has no place in me. A multiplicity of 
troubles attend these matters. They conceal or repel the seeds of all doctrine in the 
knowledgeable man, according to Wisdom: “Wisdom must be written in the time of leisure 
and he who is reduced in act shall perceive it” (Sir. 38:25). 
Nevertheless, I shall rise to the task – as in the teaching of Our Lord – not 
because you are my friend, but because you are importunate (Lk. 11:8). I shall not give what 
is necessary for you, but only what I have at hand. Rather let the Lord share with you 
according to your heart. He it is indeed who gives the voice of strength to his voice (cf. Ps. 
67:34). He provides for the poor in his sweetness and fills your desire with good things (Ps. 
102:5). 
 
Chapter 1 
How Obscure and Impenetrable a Thing is Conscience 
1. The conscience of man is a great abyss. As even the depth of the abyss cannot 
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be drained, so the heart of man cannot be emptied of its thoughts. The conscience of man is 
as a “great and spacious sea” where “there are reptiles beyond number” (Ps. 103:25). How 
well it says “reptiles”! As a reptile creeps secretly and goes about hither and thither with 
sinuous coils, so poisonous thoughts sweetly enter and exit the conscience of man. The man 
knows neither whence they come nor where they go. He knew this well who said, “The heart 
of man is crooked and inscrutable, and who can know it?” (Jer. 17:9). He does not ask 
“who?” to express difficulty but rather impossibility, because the heart is not receptive to 
scrutiny or thought. See that great apostle, Paul I say, the only scrutiniser of his conscience: 
“For me,” he says, “it is the smallest thing that I be judged by you, or by human judgement.” 
Behold how he escaped human judgement, not hesitating at all on account of external things. 
“But neither,” he says, “do I judge myself” (1 Cor. 4:3). And where, O Apostle, is the holy 
word you yourself said: “If we judge ourselves, shall we not certainly be judged?” (1 Cor. 
11:31). Why is it that you pretend not to judge yourself, or to be judged by us? Hear why: he 
says, “I am conscious of nothing against myself.” The blessed conscience is not aware of 
anything against itself. It fears neither its own judgement, nor another’s. Do you see how 
heavenly the way of life that does not fear its own judgement or another’s? A snare and a 
great pit has hitherto gone unnoticed, O Chosen Instrument, but it cannot escape your most 
vigilant eye (cf. Acts 9:15). Indeed, he adjoins the sentence, “But I am not justified in this,” 
and he furthermore adds, “the one who judges me is the Lord” (1 Cor. 4:4). Even the most 
purified conscience cannot comprehend this third judgement, the judgement of God. The 
conscience is ignorant – according to Scripture – whether it is worthy of love or hatred, 
because all future things are kept hidden from it (Ecc. 9:1-2). The apostle is beaten and 
shaken with terror of this judgement. He laments and says, “I do not understand what I do” 
(Rom. 7:15). And so the judgement of God remains, even if I leave behind both the 
judgement of the world and my own judgement. God’s judgement does not permit me to 
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understand what I do, for I do not know if he will accept what I do. Indeed, he knows me 
better than I know myself. The knower of secrets scrutinises hearts and inmost depths, 
reaching as far as the division of soul and spirit (Heb. 4:12). He alone knows all things and 
the thoughts of everyone. 
2. O singular instrument of the Holy Spirit, if you do not understand what you do, 
why do you say in another place, “our glory is this: the witness of our conscience,” calling 
your glory your conscience (2 Cor. 1:12)? He understands in one instance, and he does not 
understand in the other. Clearly, he understands because he has passed beyond both his own 
and others’ judgement. Yet he is held back from the judgement of God, where he doubtlessly 
does not know what he does. Indeed, he is neither justified by his own judgement, nor the 
judgement of others. He shall be justified by God's judgement which is incomprehensible 
inasmuch as it is not knowable. However, rejection of the two judgements (which are our 
justification now, in this present life) is, in some way, a sure sign of the eternal predestination 
in which God foresaw us conformed to the image of his Son. It is a sign of future 
glorification, when we shall be in him and he in us, when he shall be all in all. Because of this 
– as certain as it is true – he says in another place, “I am certain that neither death nor life, 
nor many other things (which are enumerated at length there), have been able to separate me 
from the love of Christ” (Rom. 8:38-39). But when he has said so many and such great 
things, he leaves one thing unsaid: our own will, which is the cause of salvation and 
damnation. See how the man filled with God says that his conscience is his glory as if 
understanding it and himself in it. However, he also says that he does not understand what he 
does, that his conscience is not now in glory, but a fellow captive in ignorance. Therefore the 
searching apostle fails the scrutiny of his conscience. While he believed he had reached the 
bottom of it, getting rid of others’ judgement as well as his own, he ran into the depths, 
clearly not strong enough to penetrate the judgement of God. Now, either agreeing or being 
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overcome, he cries out, “your judgements, O Lord,” are not an ordinary abyss but “are a great 
abyss” (Ps. 35:7). What, therefore, shall we wretched and pitiable ones do if he who laboured 
more than everyone, to whom even the key-bearer of the kingdom with John and James 
appeared to be nothing, who was even snatched up to the third heaven, felt and spoke about 
himself like this? But in order to explain for your purity what I think about conscience with 
straightforward and clear words, I have decided to assign four modes of distinction. What has 
been thus distinguished may then be read sweetly and kept even better. 
 
Chapter 2 
Four Kinds of Consciences 
3. Therefore one conscience is good and tranquil, the second good and troubled. 
The third is bad and tranquil, the fourth bad and troubled. But to begin with, let us see to the 
first. The conscience is good which both punishes past sins and flees from committing things 
worthy of punishment. It does not consent to sin, even if it senses sin. “Blessed is the man, to 
whom the Lord has not imputed sin,” says the saint (Ps. 31:2). He did not say, “Who has not 
done sin.” There is no one who has never committed sin except one, and he is the Son of 
God. He did no sin, nor was any guile found in his mouth (1 Pet. 2:22). Therefore every sin 
which God has not decreed to impute to me is as though it had never been. “Blessed,” 
therefore, not the one found without sin, but rather the one “whose sins have been remitted, 
and covered” (Ps. 31:1). It does not say “whose sins are none” but “whose sins have been 
covered,” as though hidden from the eyes of God by a certain covering and in a certain way. 
Fortunate is the soul who, sensing sin, does not consent to sin. Although thought stains it, 
reason washes it. It fights and fights back against the law of sin. It has been grieved by the 
burden, but it is fruitful because, although it undergoes punishment, it produces a crown. 
What wearies the one who experiences it crowns the conqueror. In this conflict, where there 
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is sense but not consent, “there is no condemnation,” according to the Apostle, “for those who 
are in Christ Jesus” (Rom. 8:1). He who does not have a will for sin, but has instead a will for 
guarding his feet from a fall, he who has committed sins in time past and grieves and does 
penance, he who rejects wicked thoughts advancing upon his heart by dashing them against 
Christ, he has conscience and it has been purified and is pure insofar as he has been tied and 
tightened with this triple thread (cf. Ecc. 4:12). But I have called it a tranquil conscience 
because now the Spirit himself gives testimony to its spirit that it is a son of God. It is sweet 
to everyone, harsh to none, using a friend for grace and an enemy for patience, all for 
kindness, whomever it is able for generosity. Conscience of this kind is a rare bird in the 
lands. It is as much dearer to God as it is rarer. 
 
Chapter 3 
On the Good and Troubled Conscience 
4. The conscience is good but troubled which experiences nothing soft and 
nothing fluid. It scrubs itself more firmly with the bitterness of the world when it is able – not 
in sweetness, but in great bitterness. The more righteous way and more austere life seem hard 
to it. It sees everywhere that such a life displeases the flesh but it restrains itself with the 
bridle of the fear of God. It fixes itself to this anchor in every storm of its heart. For, 
according to the prophet, it is stirred up and did not speak (Ps. 76:5). But I have heard what 
the Lord says about this situation: “I am with him,” he says, “in tribulation.” To what end? “I 
shall take him, and I shall glorify him” (Ps. 90:15). I shall snatch him from bitterness; I shall 
glorify him in delight. The conscience that first acted because of fear shall act because of 
love. This conscience speaks to God in the Psalm, and says: “You have shaken the earth, O 
Lord, and you have stirred it up. Heal its sorrows, because it has been stirred up.” The earth is 
shaken up when a sinner confesses and repents, when he endures bitterness in his way of life. 
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But it is for him alone to heal those sorrows who heals all our infirmities. However, hear what 
follows: “You have shown hardships to your people.” Which hardships? “You have given us 
to drink the wine of compunction,” not the milk of unction (Ps. 59:4-5). 
5. But it must be noted that milk is set before certain religious to drink, wine 
before certain others. Both are from God. Those who drink milk are those for whom vigils 
seem short, meals sweet, work desirable, and the religious habit pleasant. Even that which 
demands great exercise for holy living is too little for them. Milk is drunk pleasantly. It flows 
sweetly and without harm, without bitterness. So it is that those who drink it advance in holy 
life pleasantly. They run sweetly without injury from their own conscience, without bitterness 
from another’s. He has this quality who drinks milk in such a way that his sin displeases him 
and he does not consent to the sin of another. Yet he does not therefore abandon the sinner. 
He does not disguise another’s vice inasmuch as it is present, but he does not insult when he 
rebukes. Behold this drink of milk. Now hear about the drink of wine. Wine, of course, is 
harsh and unpleasant. They drink wine who have undertaken and advanced in the ways of 
life. They are tormented with hardships of body and soul together but they do not fall, nor do 
they retreat from hardship. They are those to whom the Lord prophesies and will prophesy 
with his own mouth: “You are they,” he says, “who have remained with me in my trials” (Lk. 
17:28). But who of these seems more fortunate to you? He who runs the way of God's 
commands in pleasantness, or he who does so in difficulty? The first seems more fortunate, 
the second stronger. Nevertheless, both are right. Both are faithful, having their own gift from 
God. One has this, but another that (1 Cor. 7:7). You wish to know that God is well pleased in 
both: “Drink,” he says, “my wine with my milk” (Cant. 5:1). Indeed, he who releases the first 
kind of conscience from its trial comforts the second kind in its. Thus one experiences that 
the Lord is sweet but the other that the Lord is strong. He is clearly strong and able in battle. 
In the greatness of his mercy, he suffers his servant to be hard-pressed in battle but never 
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overcome. “Come,” says the prophet, “buy wine and milk without silver” (Is. 55:1). Every 
devout conscience which comes to God buys either milk or wine from him, as we have said 
and discussed. Know that he has set out wine in both cases, because he who perseveringly 
endures more hardship for God shall also have greater reward. These things have been said 
for the distinction between the good, tranquil conscience, and the good, troubled conscience. 
 
Chapter 4 
On the Bad and Tranquil Conscience 
6. The bad and tranquil conscience follows here. As nothing is worse, so nothing 
is more unfortunate. You ask what it is? It is the conscience that neither fears God nor reveres 
man. When it has come into the depth of evil, it only shows scorn (Prov. 18:3). See the slip – 
nay, the fall – of the bad conscience. Bit by bit, step by step, it departs from God and 
descends into the deep so that the well closes its mouth over it (cf. Ps. 69:15). First, when a 
man has become accustomed to good things and sins gravely, it appears truly unbearable to 
him. It seems he descends into hell while still living. But as time goes on, the sin seems not to 
be unbearable, however grave. It is no small descent from unbearable to grave sin. A little 
later he judges the sin venial. He is beaten with many blows but he does not feel the wounds, 
he does not attend the blows. Scripture expresses the truth of it like this: “They have beaten 
me, and I have not been hurt; they have drawn me and I did not feel it” (Prov. 23:35). But in a 
short space of time, not only does he not feel it, but it also pleases him. What was bitter 
becomes sweet; what was harsh is turned into pleasantness. Then it is turned into custom, so 
that now it does not just give pleasure sometimes, but it gives pleasure all the time. He is 
unable to contain himself. He cannot be torn away from the extreme because habit turns into 
nature. What before was impossible to do is now impossible to refrain from. Thus he 
descends – nay, he falls – from Jerusalem to Jericho. He is brought into abhorrence and 
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hardness of heart. This sinner stinks, this one has been four days; the stone of the cave has 
been placed over it (Jn. 11:39-38) and does not admit the merciful rays of divine light. 
According to Scripture, “confession from the dead has perished, as if from one who is not” 
(Sir. 17:26) unless God, pitying, at some time turns the sinner’s stone heart into a heart of 
flesh. 
7. This is the wicked conscience which falls head-first because of crises like this. 
It collapses and rushes in upon itself. How is it tranquil? It is tranquil when the prosperity of 
this world toys about with it and dupes it. The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul and 
the unjust is blessed (Ps. 9:24). The favour of sinners and the fear of those unwilling to sin – 
both unwilling and grieving – smiles at him. There are none who accuse him, nor who dare to 
accuse a sinner among all who are in his circle. And so is fulfilled in him what was written: 
“The prosperity of fools destroys them” (Prov. 1:32). Nothing affronts the majesty of the 
terrible Judge as much as sinning and sinning securely, being glorified for vices as though for 
virtues. The just man says, “O Lord, may you not pity all who work iniquity” (Ps. 58:6). This 
is the iniquity of the man God does not pity: he defends what God hates and asserts sin as 
righteousness. He resists the Almighty and the Almighty resists him. This is the pride of 
which is written, “God resists the proud but gives grace to the humble” (Jas. 4:6). Understand 
what it says, “He resists.” For to resist is the action of an equal. The man who proposes to 
resist God as an equal destroys what God builds insofar as he is able. He calls bad good and 
good bad, bitter sweet and sweet bitter, light darkness and darkness light (Is. 5:20). Impunity 
nourishes this tranquillity. Impunity is the mother of security and negligence, the stepmother 
of virtues, the poison of religion and the moth of sanctity. 
 
Chapter 5 
On the Bad and Troubled Conscience 
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8. The conscience is bad but troubled which is discovered and understood in the 
action of its sinners. It yields to human anxieties and shames as long as it believes itself to be 
fed with pleasures. It has been beaten with confusion, as is written: “In the works of his 
hands, the sinner has been found out” (Ps. 9:17). He is, for example, the man who desires 
adultery for pleasure, but is seized with anxiety therein. Anxiety is much greater than pleasure 
because of all the shame and anguish of a man who lives and knows himself to be a man. 
Some turn to the Lord when they make that discovery, but the number of those who remain in 
the disorder of sin is greater than the number of those who leave sin because of its disorder. 
Concerning those who leave, it is written: “Fill their faces with ignominy, and let them seek 
your name, O Lord” (Ps. 82:17). The prophet Jeremiah says of those who don't leave: “You 
have beaten them, O Lord, and they have not grieved. You have worn them down, and they 
have refused to take discipline.” (Jer. 5:3). These are the four streams of conscience flowing 
from the fount of the will. The just are cleansed in these streams and the unjust are polluted, 
so that what is written may come about: “He who is in filth, let him become filthy until now, 
and let the righteous be made righteous until now.” (Rev. 22:11). A man’s thoughts, whether 
good or bad, turn about with constant motion. Therefore I, for my part, have set out to 
demonstrate to you many modes of thought that twist and turn about on all sides, so that you 
may be better able to understand how far we are from the one who always remains the same – 
namely, Our Lord, Jesus Christ. 
 
Chapter 6 
The Various Kinds of Thought 
9. Some thoughts are burdensome, others lovely. Some are obscene, others 
peaceful. Some are meddlesome, others suspicious, still others busy. Hear what are the 
burdensome thoughts in the mind of the just, those he wishes to resist and yet cannot. 
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Whether he wishes it or not, the pestilence of the mice of Egypt rushes into the eyes of his 
mind, and frogs echo in the inner chambers of his heart. A man generally thinks terrible 
things about faith and horrible things about divinity. He is whirled about by phantasms of 
corporeal images. He feels things which even the burdened sinner dreads to cough up in 
confession. He is shaken and beaten in spirit with a severity proportionate to the ease with 
which has refrained from presenting the members of his body to sin as weapons of iniquity 
(cf. Rom. 6:13). That insatiable murderer with his assembled forces attacks within, once he 
sees himself shut off from external sensuality. But the spiritual man who judges all things is 
not ignorant of his schemes (cf. 1 Cor. 2:15; 2 Cor. 9:11). He drives back what he can, but he 
endures what he cannot drive back. He puts up with the barking dog, but he does not fear its 
bite. The dog barks when he tempts. He bites when he drags the man to consent to sin. He 
does not wound the man when he fails to drive in the sin he suggested. He crowns the man 
instead. He torments the man’s thought but he does not bind him to consent. Such thoughts 
are no less burdensome when a man has taken up Martha’s office. He is worried and troubled 
about many things and many people, concerned that they should have what they need for the 
spiritual life. 
10. A man’s thoughts are kindly when he is moved to care for the flesh, as in 
matters of food and clothing. A man is often touched with kindness for his neighbours 
according to the flesh. A man’s thoughts are obscene when carnal delight pricks and 
stimulates him. These thoughts must be repelled and kept far off from the very beginning, just 
like the most unclean filth. Thoughts are idle when the man is neither delighted nor stirred up 
by them. They are, for example, thoughts of a horse running or a bird flying, where the man 
often sits between vice and virtue. He neither descends to the one, nor ascends to the other. 
Thoughts are curious when they prompt a man to explore the secrets of his neighbours. The 
soul ought to carefully examine itself, but it forgets itself and worries about others instead. It 
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is now within, now out wandering abroad. It is talkative and impatient of quietness. A man’s 
thoughts are suspicious when he suspects evil of his neighbour without certain proof. Some 
things could go either way but he interprets them to mean the worst. Thoughts are busy when 
a man arranges and manages distant matters, kingdoms, and places. Such a man is busy with 
questions and thoughts of this world. According to Solomon, “God gave this worst 
occupation to the sons of men, so that they should be busy with it” (Ecc. 1:13). 
11. It is rightly acknowledged that there are a great variety of thoughts. Some 
inflate the heart, others elevate it. Some perturb it, others dissipate it. Some confound it, 
others busy it. Some bind it, others stain it. Some contract it, others corrupt it. Proud thoughts 
inflate the heart, and vain thoughts elevate it. Envious thoughts perturb it, angry thoughts 
dissipate it, slothful thoughts confound it, and ambitious thoughts busy it. Gluttonous 
thoughts bind it, lustful thoughts stain it, fearful thoughts contract it, and malicious thoughts 
corrupt it. After these thoughts have been shut out, the mind is cleansed if it is continually 
trained with holy thoughts, as it is written: “Holy thought shall protect you” (Prov. 2:11). 
There are, therefore, good and holy thoughts. We ought to think about God, so that we should 
delight in him. We ought to think about the Passion of our Redeemer, which he endured for us 
on the gibbet of the cross, so that we should be prepared to freely endure tribulations and 
anguish for him. We ought to think of the hour of our passing so that we should always be 
ready for it. We ought to think about the Day of Judgement, because there we shall give 
account for our works. We ought to think about hell, so that we fear punishment, because in it 
there is no redemption. We ought to think about Paradise, so that we desire crowns, which we 
shall have in the future. We ought to think about the Lord’s commandments and the 
sacraments of our redemption, so that we persevere in the way of righteousness through the 
grace of God. 
Amen. 
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Chapter 7 
The Four Spirits Speaking in the Heart of Man 
12. Four spirits continually speak by these thoughts of the human heart: the spirit 
of the world, the spirit of the flesh, the spirit of the devil, and the spirit of God. The spirit of 
the world speaks empty things. He speaks to our heart when we love vanity, when we are 
glad of vanity, and when we delight in vanity. The spirit of the flesh speaks when we desire 
soft things for the flesh and for the fleshly senses. He speaks when we fulfil care of the flesh 
with desires and pleasure. The spirit of the devil speaks both when we think bitter things and 
when we bring forward harsh things. He speaks when we are grieved in ourselves and raging 
at others, when we are ungrateful and envious, without love, and without faith (cf. 2 Tim. 3:2-
3). The spirit of God speaks when we meditate on and speak sweet things. He speaks to us 
when we speak joyful things to ourselves and our neighbours, in every sweetness and 
goodness, seeking to preserve the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace (Eph. 4:3). These are 
the consciences, these are the thoughts of consciences, these are the spirits speaking in our 
thoughts which your conscience, sweetest brother, distinguishes and discerns better than my 
page. I have been made foolish, you have compelled me. Still, I have wished to show my 
inexperience rather than to confound your face (cf. Ps. 43:16). If anything has been said well, 
account it to yourself, for whose faith the Son of God has given both the word and the 
meaning. If anything has been said otherwise than well, account it to yourself, because you 
have commanded me to write it. But forbear from haste, because nothing is so contrary, 
nothing so utterly jarring in writing than haste and speed. When you write, you seek to find 
what is fitting and to clothe what you find with fitting words. It requires a suitable place, 
comfortable time, lively invention and skilled style. But hide this epistle or book, if you 
choose to call it thus. If you decide to make it public, at least hide the name of the author. The 
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author of salvation – to whom alone is honour and glory – knows how much I love the 
salvation of your soul and the honour of your person. That is Our Lord, Jesus Christ, who 
gives himself for you, and crowns you in love and mercies. 
Farewell, and pray for me.  
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Appendix B 
De Interiori Domo 
(On the Inner House) 
Prologue to Chapter 22 
 
(PL 184:507C-532D) 
 
Prologue 
The house in which we dwell threatens us with ruin from every side. It is 
necessary for us to build up another, because this one shall fall in a short time. Let us 
therefore return to ourselves and let us examine our conscience. For, as our body is called the 
tent in which we serve as a soldier, so our conscience is called the house in which we rest 
after our soldiery. He fights well who builds the house of conscience through the fight which 
he exercises in the body. “Diligently cultivate your field,” says Wisdom, “so that afterwards 
you may build your house” (Prov. 29:27). That field is our body, whose senses and 
movements we use rightly. We turn them to the use of virtue, subjecting them by the 
command of the mind as long as the body is constantly subject to the mind, and the mind is 
wholly made subject to God. Interior conscience is undoubtedly built up in these ways: the 
good which the senses and movements of the body do, the appropriate satisfaction for past 
evils, and the wary, thoughtful avoidance of present evils. Fitting satisfaction is to correct bad 
deeds and, once they have been corrected, not to repeat them. Conscience is eternal. It never 
ends, just like the soul. Because it is immortal, just like the soul, it is impossible for it to not 
exist. Thus, it is never possible to exist without conscience. For conscience is inseparable 
from the glory or shame of each man, like a kind of deposit. 
 
Chapter 1 
That conscience must first be cleansed and subdued, then built up 
1. This conscience in which the soul shall eternally remain must be built up, but 
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first it must be cleansed. And who shall wash it? Surely, God and man – man through 
thoughts and affections, but God through mercy and grace. Thoughts and affections are 
necessary in the cleansing of conscience: thoughts in the investigation of truth, affections in 
the training of virtue. Mercy erases sin and gives strength for the resistance of sin. First it 
takes away the death that is sin, and then it sends in bitterness. It heals the affection. Grace 
aids us to goodness, defends us against evil, and teaches us discernment. Therefore a man, 
incited by the truth, confesses his sins. God, prevailed upon by compassion, has mercy upon 
the one confessing. There is therefore every hope of favour and mercy in confession, and no 
one can be justified from his sin unless he has first confessed his sin. Indeed, from confession 
everyone begins to be justified insofar as the accuser of himself has come forward for 
confession. 
2. The conscience is blessed in which mercy and truth have met one another, in 
which justice and peace have kissed (Ps. 84:2). The truthfulness of the one confessing and the 
compassion of the merciful have met together, because there can be no lack of mercy for one 
who knows himself in truth. The kiss of justice is to love one’s enemies, to give up one’s own 
parents for God, to patiently bear injuries inflicted, and to always decline the bestowal of 
glory upon oneself. The kiss of peace is to bring the hateful to peace, to call back the 
discordant to unity, to peacefully hold back adversaries, to faithfully and kindly teach those 
who err, to gently comfort those who grieve, and to have peace with all people. The soul is 
blessed which has been established in the peace of Christ and made strong in the love of God. 
Its inner peace is not disturbed when it suffers external conflicts. Whatever troubles may 
resound outside, they never break in upon the silence of inner peace in the soul. It is gathered 
within through desire, because it has been touched with the taste of internal sweetness. It is 
not immoderately dissolved externally in the pleasures of the flesh, because it possesses 
internally everything in which it delights. Thus it is at peace in itself when there is nothing 
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outside that it desires. It rests all within, through love. When it is all gathered to inner joy, it is 
reformed to the image of God which it venerates in itself. The angels and archangels often 
visit such a soul, and they honour it as the temple of God and the dwelling place of the Holy 
Spirit. May it be, therefore, the temple of God, and the Most High God shall dwell in you. 
For the soul that has God in itself is the temple of God, in which the divine mysteries are 
celebrated. 
3. But the soul which does not desire to cease in itself nor fix its desire in the love 
of God goes out through the eyes and the ears and the other corporeal senses. It delights in 
these external things. But when it finds those doors closed, then returning to itself and seeing 
itself naked and desolate, it is struck with inestimable confusion and horror. And because it 
sought the consolation of the world, it shall not have the consolation which is given by God 
within, in its conscience. And not only shall God disdain to visit it, but neither shall that soul 
be able to bear itself, knowing itself so wickedly. It shall not have rest in itself, because it 
abandoned him with whom it ought to have dwelt and had rest. Therefore consider now, 
while you are situated in the society of others, because you shall not always be able to remain 
with them. Meanwhile, choose for yourself that companion who – when all these things have 
been taken away from you – shall keep faith with you, who keeps faith with his lovers, and 
does not retreat in the time of trouble. He is your God, whom you ought to choose. 
4. Therefore, gather all the distractions of the heart and fluctuations of the mind 
into one, and fix your whole desire in God alone. Your heart is where your desirable and 
greatly beloved treasure is. Indeed, he frequently visits and gladly dwells within tranquillity 
of heart and the restfulness of a quiet mind, because that is peace and his place has been made 
in peace (Ps. 75:3). Therefore prepare yourself in such a way that God will come to be with 
you, so that he shall be in your prayer, so that he shall be in your heart, so that he shall always 
go with you, always return with you, and shall not retreat from you. He shall never send you 
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away, unless you first send him away. Wherever you go, you shall never be able to be alone if 
God is with you. Therefore, wash your conscience and make it always ready so that, at 
whatever hour the Lord shall come and wish to dwell with you, he shall find in you a 
mansion, ready for himself. For this reason he said: “Make a sanctuary for me, and I shall 
dwell in your midst” (Ex. 25:8). 
5. Let us strive, therefore, to build the temple of God within us: first, so that he 
may simultaneously dwell within each of us, then so that he shall dwell in all of us, because 
he shall disdain neither individuals nor all together. First, therefore, let each one desire, so 
that he should not be separated from himself, because every kingdom divided within itself 
shall become desolate, and the house shall fall upon the household (Lk. 11:17). Christ shall 
not enter in where the walls have decayed and the bricks have been dislodged. The soul 
wishes to have the house of its body intact, and it is necessary for the soul to leave it if its 
members have each been separated from it. Let that soul look, therefore, if it desires Christ to 
dwell in its heart through faith (that is, in itself). Let it look and take care anxiously, lest its 
members (that is, reason, will, and memory) are each separated from it. The one whose 
reason is not deceived, nor his will perverse, nor his memory polluted, prepares a fit dwelling 
for God. The soul is blessed which strives to thoroughly purify the house of its heart from the 
filth of sins, and to fill it up with holy and just works, so that not only angels shall delight to 
dwell in it but even the Lord of angels. After the house has been washed and all evils shut out 
from it, let it be filled up with all good things, so that it should not be necessary for us to seek 
anything outside, we who have abandoned every external thing. 
 
Chapter 2 
On the raising of the seven columns for building the house of conscience, and 
on the good will which is the first column 
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6. Let Wisdom, then, build a house for herself. Let her raise seven columns, by 
which the whole construction is supported. The house is conscience. The columns are the 
good will, memory (that is, to be mindful of the gifts of God), a cleansed heart, a free soul, a 
right spirit, a devout mind, and illuminated reason. Let the first column be raised before the 
others. For among all the gifts of God which seem to look toward the salvation of man, the 
first and principal good is found to be the good will through which the image of the likeness 
of God is restored in us. It is the first, because every good thing is begun by a good will. It is 
the principal, because nothing more useful than a good will is given to human beings. 
Whatever a person does cannot be good unless it proceeds from a good will. Without a good 
will, nobody can be saved at all. With a good will, nobody can perish. A good will cannot be 
given to the unwilling, nor snatched away from the willing. The will of man is the power of 
God. It is the will of man because to will is in the will of man, and therefore all merit is in the 
will. As much as you will, so much you merit. As much as your good will grows, so much 
your merit grows. Therefore, make your good will great if you wish to have great merit. And 
so God, as a most faithful and most merciful father, has placed our redemption in the good 
will, in which nobody can be lacking unless he wishes to be. For all people are able to love 
equally – both the rich and the poor, even if they are not able to give money equally. The will 
is not good, however, if it does not do what it can. 
 
Chapter 3 
On the second column which is memory of the gifts of God 
7. Let us therefore remember the mercy of God, so that we shall be set afire with 
love for him. Let us recall to memory the good things which he has shared with us, how often 
he mercifully snatched us away intact from dangers. Our sins have never been able to keep 
him from having mercy. Those who forget him, he has reminded of himself. He has called 
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back those turned away from him. He has kindly taken up those coming to him, shown 
kindness to the penitent, watched over the perseverant, held those who stand firm, and raised 
up the fallen. He has turned wicked delights into bitterness, and in turn he has shared his 
consolations for the healing of the embittered. At last, he restores rest and perfect peace to 
those purged by tribulation. He has never failed to correct sinners nor to watch over the just. 
Let us reflect upon how much good God has done for us when we neither asked nor desired, 
but rather rejected him. Let us consider how many sins he has forgiven us, from what great 
perils God our liberator has delivered us, and how great the repute of his righteousness has 
been. Let us consider that the grace of God has protected the ungrateful and adverse in many 
things, from so many sins into which we could have fallen, as we have fallen into so many 
others. Therefore, just as there is no moment in which we do not either use or enjoy the 
faithfulness and mercy of God, so there ought to be no moment in which we do not have him 
present in our memory. 
 
Chapter 4 
On the third column which is the cleansed heart 
8. It follows that we should love with a whole heart him from whom we have 
received such great gifts – that is, with a whole thought, with a whole affection, without 
defect. Let the heart be right, so that God may be pleasing to it through all things. Let it be 
right with the uprightness of intention, by the shutting out of perverse thought, by the 
constant presence of contemplation. Let it be prepared to follow the will of God in whichever 
direction it knows itself to be led. Let it be on high, for the contemplation and desire of 
celestial and divine things alone. Let it be pure, so that it suffers nothing evil to remain within 
itself, and let it not consider even the smallest stumbling-block bearable – either in its own 
conscience or in another’s. Let it be sweet, with a sweet reply, with a smooth admonition, 
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with a gentle reprimand, with restrained correction. Let it be cleansed so that it deplores the 
sins of thought as of action, rejecting the filth of all uncleanness. Let it weep bitterly for its 
own wretchedness and that of others. Let it not only mourn its own faults, but also those of 
others. Let it repent for the evils which it has committed, and for the goods which it has 
neglected. 
 
Chapter 5 
On the free soul, the fourth column 
9. The soul should be free from the anxieties of the world, from the pleasures of 
the flesh, from crooked thoughts, so that the man should be able to exert himself to serve 
either the advantage of his brothers or himself when he wishes, or to rest in the contemplation 
of heavenly things. Let it be firm, so that it should not be shaken by any sudden perturbation, 
so that it should not be seized by any enticements, not broken by any troubles. Let no anger, 
no impatience, be able to disturb the peace and rest of the soul. For Christ is peace, and the 
lover of peace rests in peace. He cannot dwell in the perturbed soul. Let it be complete in the 
love of God. This, indeed, is to love God: to seize the soul for him, to take up love of 
enjoying the vision of God, to have a hatred for sin and contempt for the world. It is to love 
one’s neighbour, whom God has decreed must be loved. 
 
Chapter 6 
On the right spirit, the fifth column 
10. Let the spirit be right, wholly turned away from all earthly and present things, 
inseparably joined and united with God. Let it ascend by faithful devotion, and let it visit the 
high seats and the many mansions which are in the house of the Father, humbly prostrating 
itself before the throne of God and of the Lamb. Let it run through the streets of the heavenly 
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Zion. Let it hear the melody of angels and let it entreat with reverence all the orders of 
blessed spirits – each order for itself, and likewise commending itself to all of them. But the 
soul that has not been long trained nor well-learned in the investigation of itself does not 
merit to receive such great grace. Indeed, one who is not yet able to see himself raises the eye 
of the heart to see God to no avail. First it is necessary that you should know the invisible 
things of your spirit before you can be fit to know the invisible things of God. And if you are 
not able to know yourself, you ought not presume to apprehend the things which are above 
you. 
11. The particular and foremost mirror for seeing God is the rational mind 
discovering itself. If, indeed, the invisible things of God are observed, having been known 
through the things which have been made, then where, I ask, are traces of knowledge of God 
found more expressly imprinted, than his image  (Rom. 1:20)? Let anyone who thirsts to see 
his God wipe his mirror clean, let him cleanse his spirit. Blessed are the pure in heart, 
because they shall see God (Matt. 5:8). The true penitent does not cease daily to examine, 
scrub, maintain, and guard this mirror. He does not cease to look if he might find in it 
anything that would be displeasing to God. He does not cease to scrub, not just sins of action, 
but also of thought, so that nothing remains in it that would offend God. He does not cease to 
maintain it, lest, falling down from on high through love of the earth, he becomes stuck to the 
earth, and lest he become filthy with the dust of empty thoughts. He does not cease to guard 
it, so that he whose tabernacle is with men – whose delights are with the sons of men, who 
stands at the door and knocks – may find a clean shelter at whichever hour he wishes to enter 
(cf. Rev. 21:3; Prov. 8:31; Rev. 3:20). Indeed, God who is a lover of cleanness cannot dwell 
in a polluted heart. 
12. After this mirror has been wiped clean and diligently inspected for a long 
time, a certain clarity of divine light begins to shine through it, and the measureless ray of 
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unaccustomed vision appears to the eyes of the heart. The mind, set aflame by the vision of 
this light, begins to witness high and inner things by the cleansed sight of the heart. It begins 
to love God, to fasten itself to God. It considers as nothing all the things that press upon it. It 
renounces all affections. It wholly presses on only into love, knowing that only the one who 
loves God is blessed. Finally, the mind never reaches such grace through its own industry. 
This is the gift of God, not the merit of man. But without doubt, he who abandons care for the 
world and takes care of himself receives so great a grace – he who desires to reflect upon 
himself frequently and to diligently recognise what he is. Go back to your heart, therefore, 
and diligently examine yourself. Consider whence you came, whither you are heading, how 
you live, what you do, what you lose, how much you accomplish, or how much you fail each 
day. Consider by which thoughts you are assailed more, by which affections you are more 
frequently struck, or with which stains of temptation you are more bitterly attacked by the 
wicked spirit. When you fully know the whole state and condition of the inner and outer man 
as much as possible – and not only of what sort you are but also what you ought to be – you 
can be raised up to the contemplation of God. For as much as you achieve in knowledge 
every day, the higher you always reach. But perhaps you have already ascended, already 
returned to your heart, and you have learned to remain there. Let this not be sufficient for 
you. Learn to dwell there and to build a mansion. Regardless of whatever wandering of mind 
draws you away from it, always hasten to return there. Without doubt – through much use – 
whenever you are there, it shall be turned into a delight for you in such a way that you will be 
able to remain there constantly, without any difficulty of labour. Indeed, it shall be more 
punishing for you to be anywhere else than to make some time there. 
 
Chapter 7 
On the devout mind, the sixth column 
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13. If you have plainly seen that your desires are moved by external delights and 
that your thoughts are continually seized by them, round them up with great care and do not 
permit them to enter into your heart. Instead, return to your heart and strive in every way to 
enter and to dwell in it. Indeed, the mind which does not raise itself to the consideration of 
itself, but is still scattered through various desires and various thoughts, is stretched here and 
there. It is not able to gather itself into unity, because it does not yet know to enter into itself. 
It still remains in thought and conduct. And, therefore, it is unable to fly up by the wing of 
contemplation to the things which are above itself. Let it learn, therefore, to gather together 
all the dispersions of its heart. Let it become accustomed to being undelayed in its inner 
matters. Let it strive to draw together the out-goings of mind, and to forget all exterior things. 
Let the mind that gasps for celestial contemplation, that sighs for familiarity with divine 
things learn to love only good interior things and to think about them more frequently. 
Whenever it has attended diligently to itself and has sought for a very long time, when at last 
it has discovered what sort of thing it is, it stands firm so that it may know by divine 
revelation what it ought to be. It may know what sort of house of the mind to prepare for 
God, and by which services it needs to please him. 
14. The one who gathers the wanderings of the mind and fixes all the motions of 
the heart into one desire for eternity has certainly already returned to his heart. He already 
waits there gladly and is wondrously delighted. And because he is not able to seize himself 
for joy, he is led above himself, and is raised up to the heights through ecstasy. Through 
himself, above himself, through knowledge of himself, he ascends to knowledge of God so 
that he learns to love God alone and to think upon him unceasingly. He learns to rest 
delightfully in God. When the love of Christ has so absorbed the whole affect of man that, 
disregarding and forgetting himself, he perceives nothing but Jesus Christ and the things 
which are of Jesus Christ, then finally, as I judge, charity is perfected in him. To one thus 
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affected, poverty is not burdensome. He does not feel injuries. He laughs at his shame, scorns 
his loss, and considers his death as profit. Indeed, he does not think that he dies because he 
knows that he passes from death to life (cf. Jn. 5:24). The one whom the love of God thus 
holds fastened within, who is not in the least strong enough to pass outside, burns within with 
desire for God as amply as intimately and as vehemently as constantly. He who is thus 
continually delighted in the love of God frequently experiences ecstasy. He is snatched from 
all present, earthly things and is presented before God. While he gazes upon the beauty of 
God, he is astonished at the magnitude of God’s beauty. He is wholly suspended in 
admiration of God. He marvels at the glory of the King, at the magnificence of the kingdom, 
at the nobility of the heavenly city, and at the happiness of its citizens. Furthermore, he 
contemplates the splendour of glory, the goodness of God, the sweetness of inner comeliness, 
and the tranquillity of eternal peace. He meditates upon the power of the Father, upon the 
wisdom of the Son, the benevolence of the Holy Spirit, and the beatitude of the angelic 
nature. He is delighted by God, in God, while he admires God’s faithfulness and 
contemplates his splendour. O how sweet it would be if he were not snatched away for so 
short a time! He is snatched up while he contemplates celestial things alone and is delighted 
by contemplation. But when he tries to stay there longer, suddenly he slips back and, 
returning to himself, is unable recount to himself anything which he saw above himself. But, 
enticed by the perception of sweetness, he wonders at the attraction of the sweetness tasted, 
and the heavenly infusion of spiritual joy within himself. With a silent mind he turns over in 
his heart the clarity of incorporeal light, the taste of innermost satiety, the secret of inner 
peace, and the mystery of highest tranquillity. In the contemplation of this, and in the 
sweetness of contemplation, the mind is delightfully stirred and wondrously delighted. Let it 
fly, therefore, and not grow faint. Let it fly until it arrives before the King and there let it 
weep and let it sigh and sacrifice itself in tears. Let it entreat kindness, let it pray for grace 
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and let it not retreat from there until it perceives that God, whom it has greatly offended, is 
pleased, and it receives consolation from him. 
 
Chapter 8 
On the illuminated reason, the seventh column 
15. Then the reason – raised up through ecstasy in contemplation of high things, 
snatched away into the hidden place of divine contemplation, there illuminated with the 
knowledge of truth and of the true light, inflamed with desire for goodness – gathers together 
into one all illicit pleasures, affections and wandering meditations of the memory, dispersions 
of the heart, roamings of the spirit, and uncertainties of the soul. It fixes all its desire in that 
fount of joy. Let reason always maintain a higher place and let there be no rebellious 
movement against it, but let everything obey it as it also obeys God. But if it perceive any 
motion stirred against it – either that ought not to be stirred up, or in a way that it ought not 
be stirred – let reason not consent, but let it resist there. For consent alone makes us guilty, 
even if something impedes works from following. Then, indeed, the soul is said to die, as it is 
written, when the reason itself is bent towards sin through consent. “The soul which has 
sinned shall die” (Ez. 18:20). Let it resist, therefore, so that it may not die. Let it fight, so that 
it may be crowned. Burdened, it is grieved, but it is fruitful. For if it has punishment, it shall 
also have a crown. The temptation does no harm where there is no consent. Indeed, that 
which wearies the resistant crowns the conqueror. 
 
Chapter 9 
On the indications and signs of a well-edified conscience 
16. In this way, without doubt, the good conscience is built up. The conscience is 
good which punishes past sins and flees back from things worthy of punishment. If it senses 
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sin, it does not consent to sin. If thought stains it, reason washes it. The conscience is right 
which is displeased with its own sin and does not consent to another’s sin. But this does not 
mean that it either deserts the sinner or hides his sin. When it reproaches, it does not insult. It 
is tranquil because it is sweet towards all and severe towards none. It uses a friend for grace, 
an enemy for patience, all for kindness, whomever it is able for generosity. Indeed, the house 
of the soul is built with such excellent things. If, perchance, the thief who does not come 
except to steal, kill and destroy approaches it (as is accustomed to happen), if, I say, the thief 
– that is, glorification of the heart rising up within, or the desire for human praise advancing 
from outside, or any other pestilence whatsoever which schemes to break into that house – 
then let reason’s anger keep vigil like a dog guarding treasure (Jn. 10:10). Let it bark, bite and 
attack the throat, rushing upon its enemies. Let it spare none. Let it permit none to enter, but 
let it cry out and let it stir those dwelling inside to take up arms. From wherever vice attempts 
to do harm, whether secretly or openly, let reason’s anger drive it far off so that the 
conscience might be secure. Conscience is secure when it does not suffer any accusation, 
either for a time of goodness, or for presumption of evil. It is cleansed and knows itself well 
when it is neither accused justly for the past nor unjustly delighted about the present. The 
conscience is pure to which God does not impute its own sins (because it has not committed 
any), nor those of another (because it has not approved of them), nor negligence (because it 
has not kept silent), nor pride (because it has remained in humility). 
 
Chapter 10 
That the care of conscience should be preferred to knowledge 
17. Many people seek knowledge but few seek conscience. But if conscience 
were sought with as much zeal and concern as worldly and empty knowledge is sought, it 
would be more swiftly apprehended and more usefully preserved. For to meditate on 
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conscience is perfect sense, and whoever guards conscience shall always be secure. With a 
healthy reverence for wisdom, it is more useful to run to conscience than to wisdom, unless it 
is the wisdom which builds conscience. Indeed, the soul understands itself when conscience 
is illuminated. The heart is filled with good conscience when the created image has received 
God in itself and itself in God by a mutual exchange. The creator image in the created image 
is nothing other than wisdom in the soul, glory in the conscience, sanctification in the ark. O 
how indescribable is the faithfulness of God that inclines such great majesty to such humility! 
He who created us is created in us. And, as if it were not enough for us to have God as our 
Father, he even wishes for us to become his brother and mother. “Whoever,” he says, “does 
the will of my Father who is in heaven, he is my brother and mother” (Mt. 12:50). Brother, by 
obeying; mother, by producing. Brother, through participation in heredity; mother, through 
the instruction of others. O faithful soul, open wide your bosom, spread your affection. Do 
not be distressed to conceive within your innermost parts the one whom all the world was not 
able to embrace until the Blessed Virgin conceived him by faith. For Christ is conceived by 
faith, born by the proclamation of the Word, nourished by devotion, and held by love. 
Therefore let conscience be pure, so that it may be a fitting guest room for God. Let it be 
concerned about faithful service, lest such great majesty decline the bosom of our heart. Let it 
be devout, so that it be pleasing to God alone, so that it stretch out to God alone and not 
retreat from him. Such a great conscience makes the soul joyful and presents itself as pleasing 
to God, as worthy of reverence to men and to angels, and becomes calm and restful in itself.  
 
Chapter 11 
On the benefits and fruits of good conscience 
18. Conscience is knowledge of the heart, which is understood in two ways. It 
may be seen either as that which knows itself through itself, or that which knows other things 
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besides itself, outside of itself. The heart, indeed, knows itself and many other things by its 
conscience. When it knows itself, it is called conscience. When it knows other things besides 
itself, it is named knowledge. Good conscience is the title of religion, the temple of Solomon, 
the field of blessing, the garden of delights, the golden chariot, the joy of the angels, the Ark 
of the Covenant, the treasure of the King, the palace of God, the dwelling place of the Holy 
Spirit, the book signed and closed that shall be opened on the Day of Judgement. Nothing is 
sweeter, nothing safer, nothing longer-lasting than good conscience. Though the body press, 
the world draw, the devil terrify, it shall be secure. Good conscience shall be secure when the 
body dies, secure when the soul shall be presented in the presence of God, secure also when it 
is placed before the terrifying judgement seat of the just Judge on the Day of Judgement. 
There is no remedy more useful for future blessedness, no testimony more certain than good 
conscience. Good conscience never grows weak when the world is spun about with every 
whirl, when it weeps, laughs, dies, passes through. Though the body be subjected to 
punishment, though it be worn down in fasts, though it be torn by blows, though it be 
stretched on the rack, though it be butchered by the sword, though it be afflicted with the 
suffering of the cross, conscience shall be secure. 
19. In the mirror of conscience, the state of the exterior and interior man is 
known. Indeed, the soul which is without a mirror [does not know] itself. The good 
conscience is the clean, bright and pure mirror of all religion. As a woman who desires to 
please her husband or lover arranges the beauty and elegance her face in gazing at the mirror 
that returns a facing image, so the soul rereads and understands in its conscience the ways in 
which it has departed from the image of truth, or in which things it may recover the traces of 
the creative image. Not without cause have we compared the conscience to a mirror because 
in it, just as in a mirror, the eye of the reason is able to apprehend by a clear sight what is 
decent and what is indecent in itself. 
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Chapter 12 
On the protection and restraint of the heart necessary for good conscience 
20. No one’s life is known, except in conscience, and no one arrives at a good 
conscience except through protection of the heart. The heart brings itself either to life or to 
death by its own choice. For to wish to sin is evil. To sin is worse. To persevere in sin is 
worst. To not wish to repent is deadly. Therefore, whatever the heart reflects upon that does 
not pertain in any way whatsoever to its own advantage or that of its neighbours must be spat 
out. Therefore, let the wandering and insatiable heart return to itself from the diverse parts of 
the world in which it is held or pointlessly occupied, and let it examine itself. When it has 
found a fault, let it fear punishment. But in seeking the fault, let it never discover a fault 
except in itself. When the fault and the cause of punishment have been discovered, let it set 
itself before itself for punishment, and let it judge itself as though it were another: the 
culpable self before the troubled self, the guilty self before the severe judge self, the wicked 
self before the self turned back to piety. Let it place itself before itself. Let it determine what 
must be done by itself about itself. Let it justly inflict just scourges upon its unjust self. Let it 
speak to itself, thus: “You suffer division because you have deserted the peace of your Lord 
God and have rushed into battle with yourself, so that you are condemned by yourself. 
Because you have broken the agreement of peace, you wish what you do not wish and you do 
not wish what you wish. You shall be condemned by your very self. You wish what must not 
be wished. You do not wish what must be wished. Lo, by your mouth I judge you, O wicked 
servant (Lk. 19:22). Humble yourself, therefore, and place yourself before your face so that 
you see your disgrace and reflect upon your foolishness.” Thus, indeed, the heart returns to 
itself in its wretchedness, and the heart is set before the heart. Strength is a certain thing 
which works about the heart thus: it restrains the fluid and empty heart so that it does not 
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flow forth into the abyss of utter destruction. That very strength – or violence – seizes the 
Kingdom of Heaven. “The Kingdom of Heaven,” says the Lord, “suffers force, and the 
violent seize it” (Mt. 11:12). He shall possess the noble kingdom who possesses his own 
heart. He does not reign who has been given in heart to the slavery of vices, who watches 
over cities and crowds of people. He alone reigns who, with the empire of his heart kept safe, 
orders the whole household of interior and exterior motions according to the laws of reason. 
If a lion-like madness rises up within, it is pressed down through patience, the wantonness of 
the he-goat through abstinence, the aggressiveness of the wild boar through gentleness, the 
pride of the unicorn through humility. 
 
Chapter 13 
That the mobility of the heart must be restrained through consideration of 
divine majesty and power 
21. Amongst the other liberal arts, no liberal art is found excelling the others by 
which the heart can be held. For the heart is quicker than every quick thing, more slippery 
than every slippery thing. Because of its mobility, its natural instability, it refuses to stay 
fixed in one place. Its life is in motion and motion is life to it. So tiny a vital motion in the 
heart moves the great structure of the whole human body. By what art is it contained such 
that, moving other things, it is not moved itself? Perhaps it would not be moved if the ass-
drawn millstone were tied to its neck. On the contrary, it would be much more stirred up with 
the millstone. It is necessary for it to go around and walk throughout the land if, perchance, it 
is able to find something swifter and more mobile than itself. If it has not found anything like 
itself on the land, then let it even go about the ring of heaven and move the chariot wheels of 
God to its own course. What shall it then do to those who walk above the wings of the winds? 
Perhaps it shall be able to contend with them. Surely it shall not run with that strength, which 
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“strongly reaches from one end to the other, and ordains all things sweetly” (Sap. 8:1)? And 
surely it shall not apprehend that thing, concerning which it is said, “Wisdom is quicker than 
all quick things” (Sap. 7:24)? Even so, when it has seen the power of its Creator leaping over 
its own power with such wide bounds, let it halt and send away its own wings, restraining 
itself, and with the reins of god-like preparation, gather and restrain itself to itself. Let it not 
walk out beyond its own boundaries. Thus, indeed, the holy animals in the vision of Ezekiel 
“stood and submitted their wings when there was a voice above the firmament, because it was 
above their heads” (Ez. 1:25). The saints clearly do this after seeing all the works and 
wonders of God above understandable things and hidden mysteries. They discover that they 
know nothing, but they weigh out all their works with the movement of scales. Then the heart 
understands that it is not moved by itself, for it would remain immobile by itself, unless the 
one who moves all things likewise moved it among all things. Therefore, coming to know its 
movement borrowed from God, it shall no longer take it as its own but as something loaned. 
The borrower ought to use the thing lent for the will of the lender, otherwise he commits theft 
of the thing lent. 
 
Chapter 14 
On divine admonitions by which the heart of man is constantly moved to 
careful use of creatures and the right governance of itself 
22. Therefore, O human heart, let yourself be moved when God has moved you or 
wishes you to be moved. Otherwise, do not let yourself be moved, because you were not 
moved but upset. But when does God move you? When he admonishes. He admonishes thus: 
“You are pointlessly occupied in these things which are vanities of vanities, O wise heart that 
surpasses every privilege. It does not become you to be beneath these things, but to be before 
them. These things need you in order for them to subsist better and more comfortably. You do 
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not need these things either for blessedness or immortality. Indeed, they prepare the journey’s 
provisions for your packhorse on the road. They may be taken in measure, but not to 
superfluity. Whenever packhorses are flooded with an excess of food so that they end up 
vomiting, it happens that they grow weak from refreshment. Thus your body, O prince and 
lord of the body, digs for itself a lake of perdition in the hospice of reparation and prepares 
destruction from the remedy and shipwreck from the vessel, if it goes out beyond the 
regulations of necessity and opens its mouth to the pit of concupiscence. What then? 
Superfluity destroys what is necessary. Remove superfluous things, and no one shall lack 
necessary things. From the superfluous supply of some, the grievous destitution of others is 
powerfully created. 
23. It is your duty to correct deeds performed wickedly. It pertains to your order 
and office to regulate the household of the body’s members and the soul’s motions. It is your 
responsibility to assign tasks to individual parts according to their competence. There should 
be none in the kingdom of your body who violate with impunity the laws and duties of your 
Creator – not the eye, not the hand, not the foot, not the ear, not the throat. What shall I even 
say about the ignoble and commonplace members? If they have presumed to reach for 
rebellion, let them be crushed with stones. Let them be pierced with javelins of rebukes and 
let them know that King Solomon sits upon the king’s mule – that is, that reason is above the 
sensuality of the body (cf. 1 Kings 1:38). What if those shamefaced things, which modest and 
chaste lips ought always to call by a concealed name, harass the kingdom with an unordained 
motion? Without doubt, let them be cut off – not with the sword but with fasting, not by 
chopping them off, but by mortification. The Apostle says, “Would that those who cause 
disquiet would cut themselves off” (Gal. 5:12). The unbridled heart, perilously hurrying along 
its course, can be held back by these convictions, so that the conscience may be good. The 
conscience is good if it has purity in its heart, truth in its mouth and rightness in its action. 
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For these, it shall merit the vision of the Trinity. O blessed vision, in which God shall be 
known and evident so that he shall be seen by us individually, in us individually. He shall be 
seen in himself. He shall be seen in the new heaven and in the new earth and in everything 
which shall be created then. 
 
Chapter 15 
That the book of conscience must be corrected 
24. The human conscience is the vineyard of the Lord which confession of sins 
ought to improve, as should satisfaction for sins, display of good works, and preservation of 
them. Each one has a book, his own conscience. Everything else is learnt for the purpose of 
examining and correcting this book. The soul can carry no other book with it besides the 
book of its conscience, when it goes out from the body. In that book, it shall know where it 
ought to go and what it ought to receive. We shall be judged according to the things which 
have been written in our books. Our books ought, therefore, to be written following the 
exemplar of the Book of Life. If they have not been so written, they must at least be 
corrected. And so, let us bring our books together with the Book of Life. If what they have is 
different, let our books be corrected lest, in the final arrangement, they be found to have 
anything different and be thrown away. Blessed is the man who is able to recognise and 
despise himself, to test and condemn himself. For he who is displeasing to himself is pleasing 
to God, and he who is worthless to himself is precious to God. The sciences of men are many, 
but there is none better than that one by which a man knows himself. Wherefore, let me 
return to my heart and become accustomed to remaining there, so that I should be able to 
examine my whole life and to know myself. Let me pour out all my miseries in the presence 
of God if, perchance, his great goodness might move him. I shall confess my sins to him, to 
whom all things are bare and open, whom I am unable to deceive, because he is wisdom, nor 
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escape, because he is everywhere (cf. Heb. 4:13). 
 
Chapter 16 
A man laments his wretchedness, the disturbance of his heart, and his 
propensity for evil, in the presence of God  
25. Hear my confession, O Most Faithful God, and look to your faithfulness, and 
do with me according to your mercy. Hear how often the rushing crowd of many thoughts 
expels you from my memory. Those cogitations are accustomed to rush out in my heart like 
commoners to some spectacle. When I wish to pray or to sing in the monastery, I do not know 
what manner of foolish thought snatches my heart and leads it through diverse places. I am 
not able to hold it whenever I call it back to myself, but it slips away immediately. It is 
scattered here and there, and poured out through innumerable things. Thus the constant allure 
of earthly desires and the profusion of vanities so occupy my heart that I think of the thing 
which I desire to avoid, and I turn it over in my mind. Indeed, my heart and my thoughts are 
not in my power. My thoughts are suddenly poured out. They confound my mind and soul, 
and draw them to something other than what I had set before them. My thoughts call me back 
to worldly things. They bring in worldly things, pleasurable things attack me, and seductive 
things draw me in. I am often thrown down to earthly things, infected with empty thoughts in 
the very time I intend to raise up my mind to you. I wish to banish the tumults of such 
raucous thoughts from my heart every day, but I am not strong enough. They recall to my 
memory things I have seen and heard, said and done. They make a racket in my memory with 
great relentlessness. I think about things in the present, and I think back again on the things I 
have thought, and I do not cease to go over them again and again. After I have thought for a 
very long time about whatever I was able, I am unable to be without thoughts. They enter and 
exit. Some introduce others and block still others out. I endure these things unwillingly. I 
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often consent to them when I wander with a roving mind through the things I have seen or 
done without utility or discretion. Thus my mind is always mobile and never stable. It is 
forever wandering and drawn through diverse things as though drunk. I sin gravely when my 
heart abandons me, for it is a grave loss – a loss brought about through negligence. I suffer 
force when it deserts me. Strengthen my heart, O God, because it struggles to remain within 
itself. It is drawn off, away from itself, in some unknown way. Thus I sin out of the habit of 
sinning, even when I do not know. My heart – my empty heart – is brought down through 
innumerable things, and is divided in many desires.  
26. When I wish to sleep at night, I see with closed eyes the images and 
phantasms of many things, and I bear them unwillingly. However much I struggle to avert the 
point of my mind from them, the more fully they force themselves upon me. They pollute my 
heart with burdens of disgraceful thoughts. Death-bearing delight has often harmed me in this 
way. It is customarily birthed out of recollection of past sins, but most especially from the 
recollection of lust. This, indeed, is the pestilence more familiar to me than other vices, 
inasmuch as it has a greater propensity for harm and is more difficult to repel. For when I 
wish to repel it, it assails me against my will. It is seductively burdensome, pleasing by 
displeasing, and displeasing by pleasing. I have never been able to escape the lust of the 
flesh. It always follows me, and is able to seize me with some thought of delight or desire for 
some sight. It does not permit me rest, either by night or day. It enters subtly and occupies my 
mind. It entices and burns, and diffuses itself slowly through the whole body like a poison 
unless it is repelled at once. It multiplies crooked thoughts, causes evil affections, and stirs up 
the mind with illicit delight. It bends the soul to consent to depravity, and corrupts all the 
virtues of the soul. I can scarcely be torn from this pestilence when I am held bound by it, 
either because I blush to confess its stings or I don't know how. They are so subtle and 
disgraceful. Truly, the fire of lust is difficult to extinguish. It stimulates the young, inflames 
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youths, weakens men, and wearies the old and feeble. It does not despise the cottage; it does 
not revere the palace. O would that it would flee monasteries alone! Help me, O Lord my 
God, that I might be able to resist this pestilent and death-bearing vice. For I know indeed 
that what wearies the resistant crowns the conqueror. I know that if I pollute my mind with 
unclean thought, I shall not be able to please you, the author of cleanness.  
 
Chapter 17 
He proceeds to accuse and lament his wretchedness regarding bitter 
thoughts, misuse of his members, and the sight of external things for the advantage of 
life.  
27. Create in me a clean heart, O God, because not only does empty thought 
occupy it and shameful thought pollute it, but bitter thought scatters it as well. Often, 
provoked by some injury, I am overwhelmed by constant disturbances of thought in my heart. 
Here and there, troubled and blind, I search for the opportunity for vengeance for injuries 
received. I multiply plans, and I complete quarrels in my heart which are not going on 
outside. I do not see those present. I speak against those absent. I give and receive insults 
within myself, but I respond more severely to the ones received. I construct vicious disputes 
within my heart whenever there is nobody present who would come against me. I consider 
the treachery of my enemies, and I weigh out what they might be able to bring up in response 
to my attacks. I seek out what I should answer, but I exert myself as an idle litigant because I 
don't have any cause. And thus the day is spent in ease, but I turn over all night in thought. I 
am lethargic at the thought of useful work, because I am made weary by illicit thought. Thus 
the mind fights within when nobody fights back against it. But sometimes, with troublesome 
thought, I turn over in my mind what I have done in the body. Each time I am more gravely 
tormented in recollection than I had been before, in the doing of the work. I often think about 
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things which I have never done nor intended to do, and it grieves me not to have done them. 
Cleanse me, O Lord, from my hidden faults, for I sin gravely within when I do nothing 
externally. I keep in my heart images of things which I have seen and done. Therefore I do 
not cease to turn over the tumults of temporal things, even when I am idle. I eat in thought 
when I fast. I speak when I am silent. I rage and I am at peace. The body rests; the soul runs 
off here and there.  
28. Thus I have never been able to pass through this life without sin. Even the 
times I have lived praiseworthily are not without some guilt. They are undermined by my 
lack of piety. Snatch me away, O Lord, from my necessities (Ps. 24:17). For often when I 
desire to render my debts to necessity, I devote myself to the sin of pleasure. Under the veil of 
necessity, I fall into the snare of pleasure. For I have eaten and drunk most often not for 
necessity, but for pleasure. What was enough for necessity was too little for pleasure. I have 
even thought about food and drink when I ought not, and where I ought not, and more than I 
ought to have. By thinking about meats, I would chew meals in thought all day long. When I 
seek garments for covering my limbs, I desire not only those which cover, but those which 
extol. I seek not only that which fortifies with comfort against the numbness of cold, but 
those garments which delight through softness – and not only garments which are delightful 
to touch because of their softness, but which seduce the eyes with their colour. When I have 
been given permission to speak to someone for some need, I have not only spoken of 
necessary things, but also about unnecessary things, and about things that did not pertain to 
me, and which I did not have permission to discuss. I have immersed myself in the 
conversations of men. There I have spoken not for building up, but for the purpose of 
destruction, not what was fitting, but what was pleasing. I have spoken empty words, words 
good for laughter, and words both lazy and useless. Devoting myself to verbosity and eager 
for slander, I have stained my mouth with deception and slander. My tongue is full of every 
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falsehood, and it harms me more than all my members. For I am never able to report the 
things which I have heard or seen in the way they were said or done. I affirm some things in 
place of others, and often I sow many superfluous things. Thus, either for too much praising 
or too much reproaching, almost as often as I speak, I lie.  
29. My throat burns with insatiable gluttony. Gluttony cannot be satiated with 
different tastes. I wound my crooked heart, full of malice, and I have never been able to 
cleanse it through pure confession. My hands have been ready to do corrupt work, and lazy to 
do good work. My stomach and innards are often filled with too much food, and are therefore 
filled with grief. For the stomach is inflated within, because of things that delight the appetite. 
The body becomes infirm, and death often follows. Through delight of the appetite, I have 
fallen into the gluttony of the stomach. I contracted great destruction by excessive eating, the 
very thing from which I ought to have obtained health. My feet carried me more swiftly to 
see some curiosity than to church. My eyes corrupted me with wicked sight, and drew every 
movement of my body to unclean desires. I have more quickly opened my ears to lazy and 
empty words than to holy ones. The sense of smell has been delighted with pointless scents, 
taste with the various tastes of different things, and likewise each of the other senses, 
delighted by this and that to which its desire would carry it. Thus, O my God, I go out beyond 
the bounds of nature in all my members. All my members, as if by a conspiracy, have handed 
over dominion from me to my enemy. They have entered into a treaty with death; they have 
settled an agreement with Hell.  
 
Chapter 18  
The greater accusation of his own sin, especially concerning the vice of envy, 
of hatred, of boasting, etc.  
30. Snatch me away, O Lord, from the evil man – that is, from myself, from 
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whom I am not able to retreat (Ps. 139:2). For my vices follow me wherever I turn myself. 
Wherever I go, my conscience does not depart from me. It appears present, and it writes 
whatever I do. I am therefore unable to flee the judgement of my own conscience, whatever 
human judgements I artfully evade. And if I hide what I have done from men, I am not able to 
hide it from myself, who knows the evil which I have carried out. Awareness of my own guilt 
does not permit me to rest, but tortures me vigorously from day to day, and terrifies me more 
vigorously about the Day of Judgement. For in that day, when the Lord has come to 
judgement, the conscience of each one shall be brought to witness, and every fault shall be 
brought back before the eyes by the open book of conscience. And thus everyone’s 
conscience shall force him to become his own accuser and judge. Therefore, I shall set myself 
before myself, and I shall judge myself so that I shall be able to escape the judgement of that 
final and terrible day. My conscience condemns me, even though divine judgement does not 
condemn me yet. It accuses me of homicide, which, if I have not done by work, I have often 
done by will and desire. It accuses me of adultery, and I answer in the same way. It accuses 
me of envy, and I confess it, because envy has most often mutilated my heart. For through 
envy, I have made the merits of those who live well into my sins by envying them. For I do 
not believe that the good things I hear they said or did are altogether true. I convert the very 
things which are done well into wickedness by interpreting them wickedly. I believe at once 
every evil which deceitful rumour puts out, as though I myself had seen it. I would shape 
every evil from my rivals, and I would make a deficiency of their success. I would conceal 
these hates within myself, and I would nurture them in my torments. I would begrudge the 
successful, I would favour sinners, I would rejoice for their ills and lament their successes.  
31. I used to burn with gratuitous enmity, and I would fear this malice of my 
breast being discovered. I was always bitter about it and never settled. I was a friend of the 
devil and an enemy of myself. I have sown discord amongst friends, I have strengthened the 
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discordant in their dissent, I have stained their opinions with lies, I have praised carnal things 
in spiritual people in order to persuade them that they lacked spiritual goods. I have feigned 
friendships in order to deceive those who carelessly entrust themselves to me by whichever 
device I could. I have amassed occasion for hatred with perverse suspicion, and thus I have 
gladdened the demons whose behaviour I followed. I have been as a friend to many in 
submissiveness, ornate in word, repulsive in soul. I have been a betrayer of secrets, holding 
on to evil suspicions, perverse in both. And so the enemy has pursued my soul; he has made 
low my life in the land (Ps. 142:3).  
O Most Faithful Lord, how am I able to be good, I who have been so evil in 
goodness? I would sin, and you would conceal it. I would prolong my iniquity for a long 
time, and you would prolong your goodness, because you would think upon penitence and 
pardon. Therefore give mercy to the wretched, you who have spared the guilty for so long. 
For I believe that whatever you have decreed to forgive to me shall be as though it never was.  
32. Not only has envy afflicted my heart, but the futility of various delights has 
also enveloped my languishing mind. For through the futility of many works of which I was 
not conscious, I have put myself forth disgracefully. I would be eager to teach things of which 
I was ignorant. I would wish to have lofty things believed about myself. I would prefer 
delightful things to weighty ones. I would curse in word what I desired in mind. I would 
impose the names of virtues upon my vices, and so I would cheat myself and deceive those 
who favour me. I have been swift in making an honourable promise but false in display. I 
have been changeable in goodness, persistent in evil, grave in word, disgraceful in mind, false 
in both. I have been glad at fortunate conditions, weak in adverse ones, inflated at 
submission, disturbed at rebukes, immoderate in joys, easy in human affairs, but difficult in 
honourable ones. O Most Merciful Lord, my days have passed away in vanity – the days in 
which I ought to have wept for iniquity committed, to stir up my remiss will, to sigh for my 
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lost inheritance, to aspire for promised felicity, to hasten to angelic company, to be made right 
with your majesty.  
 
Chapter 19 
He mourns and bewails his wretchedness and vices thus far in the presence 
of God.  
33. My whole life terrifies me, O my God, because when it is diligently examined 
it appears to me as either sin or fruitlessness. If anything seems fruitful in it, it is either false 
or imperfect, or in some way corrupt, so that it can either fail to please or actively displease 
you. And although it is like this in reality, it feels to me as though it were not so. That is 
misery above misery. So I eat, I drink, and I sleep secure, as though I have already passed the 
day of my death and escaped the Day of Judgement and the torments of Hell. Thus I play and 
I laugh as though already a king with you in your kingdom. Fearing because of the multitude 
of my iniquities, but confident because of your goodness, I confess to you my Creator and 
Redeemer who have promised to follow guilt with favour and forgiveness through a pure and 
lamentable confession. I confess, for I have been conceived in sin, nurtured in sin, and I have 
dwelt in sin at every stage of my life until this day. I find no sin by which I am not stained in 
some way. For through pride I have transgressed your teachings and those of my elders. I 
have not held silence and taciturnity as the Rule teaches. I have done, given, and received 
what has not been lawful for me. I have not willingly heard the cries of the poor and 
wretched, nor have I visited them in their infirmities. I have consented to those who urged me 
to evil. I think about many things that are below more easily than one thing that is on high. I 
blame the vices of others more easily than my own. I do not blush to do what I reprove in 
others. I hold out the vices of each person more easily than his virtues. Although I distinguish 
the faults of others, I do not regard my own. I am lenient towards my faults. I wish to be 
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severe towards the faults of others. I am strong when it comes to giving insults, weak when it 
comes to bearing them. I am slack in obedience but incessant in harassing others. I am slow 
to things which I both ought and am able to do, but ready to do the things which I neither 
ought nor am able to do. And so my soul is filled with evil things, with my demanding sins.  
34. I find myself degenerate in church. I do not pray devoutly before the holy 
altars. I do not handle the sacred vessels reverently. I am in the choir with my body, but in 
some other business with my mind. Now I remain within; now I go outside. Such is the 
lightness of the body, and not only of the mind. I sing one thing and think another. I bring 
forth the words of psalmody, but I do not attend the meaning. I stray and gaze, wandering in 
mind, dissolute in character, fascinated with eyes looking out here and there, wheresoever 
they are carried. Woe to me, for I sin where I ought to make amends for my sins. But 
sometimes in the very goods which I do, I draw near to something worse. For, as long as my 
good deeds give birth to happiness for the mind and bear a certain security, my secure mind is 
handed over, and it becomes relaxed in torpor. Often I have even praised myself and the 
works which I had done, and I have wished to be praised by others. Often the human praise 
offered to me, which I was not seeking, pleased me. When I was carelessly extolled because 
of good works, suddenly many things which I had done came to my memory so that I was 
lifted up in elation even more. Subtly repeating these things and amassing them all into one, I 
began to swell up, more and more deceived. And while I was stupefied, occupied in 
admiration of myself, giving glory to myself and not to God from whom I had received 
everything, I lost the enjoyment of everything. Thus I learnt that those who praised me 
conspired against me. Inasmuch as anyone is glorified in himself, he is cut off from the love 
of God.  
35. Thus, O my God, my life approached hell. If you free me, I shall have cause 
to give you thanks. If you do not, I shall not have cause to reprehend you, because you are 
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just. Alas for me! How I have lived! What evil things I have done and said! I am ashamed to 
have lived thus, and to have been born. I would rather not exist than to be such as I am. I was 
good, and I made myself evil. Surely it is right for me to always be wretched, I who made 
myself wretched voluntarily. My conscience merits damnation. My penance is not enough 
satisfaction. But it is certain that your mercy erases every offence. Therefore erase, O Faithful 
Lord, my iniquity with the greatness of your mercies. For I have lived to this day without a 
purpose. From now on I do not wish to live without a purpose.  
36. But alas, O wretch! I have confessed these things and, rising and falling, I am 
exhausted from confessing as often as I sin. Many times I have promised to amend myself, 
and I have never held to it, but I have always returned to sin. I have joined new evils to 
former wickedness. I have never changed my habits (as I ought to have) into better things, 
nor retreated from evil deeds. Destroying myself, I have even made many others sin and been 
a cause of evil to many. Some have been upturned by the examples of my life. Behold, I do 
not conceal my sins, O most merciful God, but I show them. I accuse myself. I do not excuse 
myself, for I recognise my iniquity. And I am not righteous for that. If another were to accuse 
me as I accuse myself, I would not be able to endure it patiently. I had certainly been able to 
despair because of my many sins, vices, faults and the infinite negligence which I have 
committed and which I unceasingly commit every day with heart, mouth, work, and every 
way human weakness can sin except, O God, that your Word was made flesh and dwelt 
among us. Now I do not dare despair, because he, obedient to you even to death – and death 
on a cross – bore the record of us sinners, and nailed it to the cross. He crucified sin and 
death. I give thanks to you, O Lord, my God, because you have visited me and shown me my 
sins. Now I have learnt, by your inspiration, to return to my heart and to know myself. 
Therefore I shall call upon one of your friends, and I shall set out all my faults before him as 
you have taught me, so that with his counsel and help I might be set free from all my 
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iniquities and be reconciled to you.  
 
Chapter 20  
Confession to his prelate  
37. Hear me, therefore, father, a wretched sinner. Hear the voice of one tearful 
and penitent. Attend to how I have sinned gravely, and I have offended my Creator. At God’s 
command I have returned to my heart, and with everything shut out except the Lord God and 
myself, I have examined my whole life as diligently as intimately. To admit the truth, I have 
found nothing there but a place of horror and of vast loneliness – that is, my conscience 
neglected all day, entirely overgrown with spines, covered with thorns, and filled with every 
horror. I find no vice from which I have not drawn some infection. Rage stirred me up, envy 
lacerated me, and pride inflated me. Then I committed changeableness of mind, scurrility of 
mouth, insults of neighbours, crimes of slander, impetuosity of the tongue. I did not keep the 
commands of my elders, but I judged them. Reproached for my negligence, I have been 
rebellious, or I have muttered back. I have impudently desired to put myself before my 
betters. I have scornfully attacked the simplicity of my spiritual brothers. I have rudely 
asserted my opinions. I have disdained the bestowal of obedience. I have not observed 
reverence in obedience, modesty in conversation, or discipline in morals. I have been 
persistent in my intentions, hard in heart, and boastful in talk. I have been false in humility, 
obstinate in hatred, and vicious in jest. I have been impatient with submission, a follower of 
power, lazy at good work, savage towards unity, hard in servility, eager to say what I did not 
know, ready to supplant, and discourteous in fraternal company. I have been reckless in 
judgement, loud in speech, disdainful in listening, presumptuous in teaching, and 
disgracefully unruly in laughter. I have been burdensome to friends, hostile to the peaceful, 
ungrateful to the generous, proud toward subservience, and imperious to those subject to me. 
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Often I have put myself forth as having done something which I did not do, having seen 
something that I had not seen, or as having said something that I did not say. I have even 
pretended not to have done what I had done. I have denied that I have said what I said, 
claimed not to have seen and heard what I had seen and heard. And so I am guilty on every 
side. I am guilty in the world, guilty in the cloister – but there through ignorance, here 
through negligence. Both terrify me.  
38. Nevertheless, it terrifies me much more that I find myself wicked in the 
monastery, before the sight of God. God has set me in the place of pleasure, in the house of 
fruitfulness, in a paradise of delights. But I am wretched and miserable. I perish for hunger 
amongst tables of banqueters, I thirst next to the fountain, I am chilled before the fire, and I 
want to extend my hands to none of these things, for I am lazy and indolent. Thus I lose the 
time which God gave me by his goodness to do penance, to obtain favour, to acquire grace, to 
merit glory. I stand as a sort of monster amongst the sons of God, having the clothing of a 
monk but not the way of life. I deem all things good for me, with a great tonsure and a large 
cowl. I occupy the land like a fruitless tree, and, like a worthless packhorse, I consume more 
than I accomplish. I hold another’s high place, and I do not do his duty. I am like a trunk 
without leaves or fruit. Others feed me from the work of their hands, like their beneficiary. 
But I am poor and wretched. I support neither cleric nor layman. I am unable to sing or read, 
and I do not know how to work. I am a disgrace to men, more worthless than cattle, and 
worse than a corpse. Even the putrid dog stinks more bearably to men than my sinner soul 
does to God. I am sick of living. I am ashamed to live, because I accomplish so very little. I 
am afraid to die, because I am not ready. Yet I would rather die, commit and commend myself 
to the mercy of God because he is kind and merciful, than to give scandal to someone else by 
my bad life (Joel 2:13). All day my shame is against me, and the confusion of my face buries 
me when I see myself sleeping at vigils, late for canonical hours, and lazy at manual labour 
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(Ps. 43:16). I see others going about divine praises so strenuously and devoutly, and still 
others attending before God and praising him reverently and eagerly. But I am unable to feel 
compunction to tears, so hard is my heart. Singing does not please me, nor praying delight 
me. I do not find meditations holy. My soul is greatly sterile, and I suffer such scarcity of 
devotion.  
39. Alas for me! The Lord visits everyone in my circle, but he does not draw near 
me. Indeed, I see someone of singular abstinence, someone else of admirable patience, 
another of highest humility and sweetness, and yet someone else of much mercy and 
righteousness. That one frequently goes out in contemplation, this one knocks and pierces the 
heavens in the moment of prayer, and these excel the others in virtue. I examine everyone and 
look for the fervent, all devout, all one soul in Christ, all flowing with celestial gifts and 
grace, as though truly spiritual men whom God visits and in whom he dwells. But I find none 
of these things in myself, because the Lord has departed from his servant in anger. And so it 
is that, when others keep vigil, I sleep. When others sing in the monastery, I run about here 
and there. When they steal away from the conversation of men into some secret place in order 
to speak with the King of Angels, I seek out the conversation of men. When they are away to 
read, I go away with stories and idle words. When they examine and judge themselves, I 
judge others. The common life, the common discipline, and the common study please them, 
but nooks and corners please me. Thus I have been able to sin there. I have never been able to 
leave off sinning and evil works. I have forever piled up sins upon sins, and I have never been 
able to make satisfaction for them. I have never ceased to finish wicked intentions and evil 
desires.  
40. Above every evil thing, the delight of the flesh – which has always grown 
with me, even from the cradle – has always stuck to me, and even now does not leave my 
failing members for old age. It has polluted, dissolved, and taken captive my wretched soul in 
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many and various ways. It has rendered me weak, empty, and devoid of every virtue. I 
confess that I am often excited and inflamed with unclean memories of this wicked work, and 
I suffer no small shameful desires. And not only the evil memory and foolish recollections of 
my pleasures do me injury, but also the wicked deeds of others which have been told to me. 
They have been brought back to my memory through sordid recollections, and they pollute 
my heart with not a little poison of iniquity. In this I am pitiable and pitiful, for I do not feel 
as much sorrow as I know that I deserve, but am numb, as though I do not know what I 
suffer.  
41. This is more wretched to me than every misfortune: I approach the altar 
perverse in action, polluted in mouth, and unclean in heart. I do not fear to touch the body of 
Christ with my hands. I approach with pride towards the humble, anger towards the meek, 
and hard-heartedness towards the merciful. The humble endure the proud, the mild endure the 
enraged, and the merciful endure the heart-hearted. I approach the Lord as a servant – not 
with love, but fear, not with devotion, but for my advantage. I approach the Lord whose 
servant I have beaten. I approach the Father whose Son I have killed. I have beaten with my 
word; I have killed with my example. I neither fear the Lord, nor honour the Father. 
Whenever I go to make peace, I remain in the tumult of my brothers, stirring up others and 
stirred up by others. I approach to give the kiss of peace when I ought to have been 
reconciled before, offering the kiss of a troubled brother. My iniquity makes me guilty and an 
enemy of God. My sin has often separated me from God. I beseech you, father, teach me how 
I may be able to stand with my God, or return when I have been moved from him by pressing 
sins. 
  
Chapter 21  
The response and instruction of the spiritual father to the penitent  
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42. Your confession, my son, brings me to tears – both for myself and for you. I 
weep for myself because I find in myself almost the same or similar things to those you have 
spoken about yourself. You recall to my mind many things that I had forgotten. I rejoice for 
you, for the Rising Star has visited you from on high. You are not far from the kingdom of 
God. Recognition of sin is the beginning of salvation. Trust in God, for the humility of a pure 
confession shall supply whatever fervour and good works are lacking in you. At whatever 
hour a penitent sinner begins to mourn, he shall be saved (Ez. 18:21, 27). For God shall not 
despise the humble and contrite heart (Ps. 50:19).  
Indeed, it seems to God that it is slower to give mercy to the sinner than it is for 
the sinner to receive it. The merciful God hastens to absolve the guilty from the torment of 
his conscience, as though compassion for the wretch tortures God more than compassion for 
himself tortures the wretch. He who truly does penance and sincerely grieves shall receive 
indulgence without doubt or delay. As frequently and as vehemently as he is sorrowful about 
his inner suffering, so certain and so sure he becomes about the favour of forgiveness. Thus it 
is that the Holy Spirit comforts the soul of the penitent afflicted with tears, as frequently as 
gladly. He visits frequently, comforts gladly, and restores fully in the assurance of his favour 
the soul which he considers to condemn its evils by grieving, and to grieve by condemning its 
evils. And from then on, a certain intimacy between God and the soul begins, in which the 
soul feels that it is visited by him more often. It is no longer consoled by his arrival, but 
rather filled with ineffable joy at it.  
43. But who is fit for this? Truly, the perfectly penitent. For all things are washed 
in confession. Conscience is cleansed, bitterness is taken away, sin is put to flight, tranquillity 
returns, hope revives, and the soul rejoices. After baptism, no remedy has been established 
other than the refuge of confession. Therefore, let compunction of heart be devout, confession 
of the mouth true, mortification of the flesh wise, the uprooting of vice swift, the display of 
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good works joyful. You should not be ashamed to confess to God, from whom you cannot 
hide. He knows the hidden things of hearts – he to whom all things are bare and open, before 
whose sight all our sins have been written. But what sin writes there, confession deletes here. 
You ought not to be ashamed to say, therefore, what you were not ashamed to do. For if you 
are ashamed to expose your sins to me alone, myself a sinner, what shall become of you on 
the Day of Judgement, when your conscience shall appear exposed to everyone? If you were 
forced to pass before a multitude with a naked body, you could not be unashamed. Why, 
therefore, would you not be dismayed, when you are made filthy in your mind by unclean 
thoughts? Why are you less ashamed about the shameful things of your heart than you are 
about the shameful things of your flesh? Why do you fear the faces of men more than the 
faces of angels? Such great shame separates from God. Every hope of favour and mercy is in 
true confession. If confession is feigned, it is not confession, but duplicitous confession. 
Indeed, feigning misery shuts out the pity of God. Graciousness has no place where 
graciousness has been presumed. Humble confession of misery, however, provokes 
compassion. There is no sin so grave that it may not find forgiveness through pure 
confession. Therefore reveal the vices and crooked thoughts of your heart in confession. The 
sin that is brought forward is quickly cured, but crime is enlarged by keeping silent. If vice is 
endured, it shall go from being large to small. If it hides, it shall grow large from very little. 
For swift confession swiftly makes medicine. It is better that you should avoid vice than that 
you should make amends for it, lest you cannot be called back when you run into it.  
 
Chapter 22  
He suggests remedies effective against crooked thoughts: memory of the 
Passion of Christ, and of Final Things.  
44. As often as you feel yourself beaten with poisonous thoughts and allured to 
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illicit delight, place before the eyes of your mind how Christ was crucified on the cross for 
you. See how he is handed over to the Jews by Judas and treated horribly, blasphemed and 
beaten, judged and condemned, plundered and flogged, and finally afflicted with insults and 
reproaches, and hung between two robbers. He was affixed to the cross with nails, derided 
with spit, crowned with thorns, pierced by the lance. Blood flows from every part of his body, 
and he gave up his spirit with bowed head. Thus your Redeemer dies for you, and you are 
defiled in your mind by filthy thoughts of what sort I don't know. This thought shall be 
sufficient to exclude all illicit thoughts. But behold, let us pass to others.  
45. Consider how you shall die, when you have been vexed by grave infirmity 
and dragged down to the edge. There, after you have been cast to the earth amidst long gasps 
and sobs, you shall breathe your last amidst diverse sorrows and fears. Then your body shall 
become pale and rigid, pus and stench. It shall be a worm and food for worms. Soon the 
spectral faces which awaited your end shall seize and snatch your soul. Terrible and horrible 
demons shall terrify it on every side. Think who shall defend it from the roaring demons 
prepared to feast on it. Think who shall console it when it sees the foulest monsters amongst 
the demons rushing together in swarms to destroy it. Or think who shall drag it down through 
that unknown place. See what comes so suddenly: your final day. It comes suddenly, and 
perhaps it shall be today. It is here now. Now you shall be presented before the terrible Judge. 
You shall be charged with many and great offences – not one, not a few, but innumerable 
crimes. They are not small, but huge. They are not doubtful, but certain. It is not a short 
accusation, but long – as long as your whole life. There will not be one accuser, but as many 
as your pleasures. The Judge himself shall be your severe accuser. All the good and wicked 
spirits shall accuse you before God. The good, because they owe God justice; the wicked, 
because they serve iniquity. You shall stand before as many judges and people as there are 
people who surpassed you in good works. You shall be ruined by as many charges as there 
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were people who set you examples of living well. You shall be convicted by as many 
witnesses as there were people who warned you with good conversation and righteous 
actions. Your iniquities shall be naked before all people, and your whole wickedness shall be 
open to all the crowds – not only wickedness of action, but even of thought and of speech.  
46. Many sins shall rush forward suddenly as though from ambushes which you 
do not see, and perchance they are more numerous and more terrible than the sins which you 
see now. There shall be anguish for you everywhere. Here your sins shall be accusing, there 
justice terrifying. The horrible chaos of Hell shall be below; the angry Judge shall be above. 
Conscience shall burn within; the world shall burn outside. If the just shall scarcely be saved, 
where will the sinner who has been recognised as a sinner go? It shall be impossible to hide, 
unbearable to appear. In that great crisis, your conscience shall torture you with the evil 
things it knows that are against it. The secrets of your heart shall torment you. You yourself 
shall be your own accuser and judge by the force of your conscience. After you have been 
convicted by the witness of your own conscience, you shall not be able to flee the witness of 
the eyes of the Judge himself. You shall stand trembling and anxious, awaiting the weightiest 
judgement in anguished peril and perilous anguish, since you shall never be able to get rid of 
the judgement you shall receive there. Then the Judge shall be vehemently enraged, and 
terribly severe. His unchangeable judgement shall be brought forth once and for all. The 
horrible torturers who never have mercy shall be ready so that, once the sentence is given and 
you have been damned, they shall snatch you off to torments. The torments shall be without 
interval and without moderation. Fear shall confound you when the earth opens before you, 
and you shall be ruined and fall into the pool of burning, stinking sulphur.  Outside, fire shall 
burn away your flesh. Within, the worm shall gnaw away your conscience. You shall be there 
without end, without hope of mercy and forgiveness. But worse than all the punishments of 
Hell, you shall not see God and you will be without the good things which you had in your 
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power to obtain.  
47. Think these things often, if you wish to expel wicked thoughts from your 
heart. For your thought is the place where your affection is, where your heart is, and where 
your desire is. We most often turn over in our thought things whose love we have been more 
affected by. In his thought each man falls or stands. If you think good things, your holy 
thought shall protect you (cf. Prov. 2:11). If you think evil things, the Holy Spirit of discipline 
shall flee from your falsehood and withdraw himself from your thoughts which are without 
understanding, and the temple of God shall be the cave of the devil  (Sap. 1:5). For the devil 
seizes the one God deserts. The Holy Spirit suggests good and sweet things. The wicked spirit 
suggests wicked, bitter, empty, useless, and unclean things. And therefore you must not 
consent to wicked thought, at whatever hour it touches your heart. You must not permit it to 
remain in your heart, but repel it there. Resist impure thought in the beginning, and it shall 
flee from you. For our wicked thoughts do not fly before the eyes of God. No moments of 
time in our soul escape without his retribution. Perverse thought gives birth to delight, delight 
gives birth to consent, consent gives birth to action, action gives birth to custom, custom 
gives birth to necessity, necessity gives birth to death. As the viper is killed, destroyed by the 
young in its womb, so the thoughts nourished within us kill us. It is for the demons to suggest 
evil thoughts. It is for us to expel them immediately. It is the role of our will to allow these 
things into our soul, and it is considered our own fault. For he who falls, falls by his own will. 
He who stands, stands by the will of God. However, unclean thought does not stain the mind 
when it strikes, but only when it subjects the mind through delight in it. 
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